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The consistent rise in health care expenditure in these last years has attracted a lot of 
attention  by  academics,  policy  makers,  and  politicians.  The  quota  of  GDP  spent  on 
health has become considerably high in many OECD countries and pundits searched for 
possible solutions to increase the  efficiency of the health care sector  and to contain 
waste.  Decentralization  has  been  perceived  as  a  solution  to  be  pursued  in  order  to 
achieve better economic performance thanks to the closeness of the government to the 
local population, which should allow to shape policies that satisfy their preferences. 
Such  a form of  multi-level  governance has  generated consistent interest because the 
allocation  of  health  responsibilities  between  layers  of  government  is  far  from  being 
permanently set. A rapid look at OECD countries reveals a complex scenario: in some 
cases funding and management responsibilities have been decentralized to lower levels 
of  government,  while  in  other  cases  only  decisions  about  the  management  and 
organization of the health care system have been relinquished by the center.  
The goals envisaged in this research are twofold: first, to understand the different level 
of health decentralization reached in a sample of 20 OECD countries. It will be shown 
that many factors (historical, cultural, administrative and basic structure of the state) 
contribute  to  the  set-up  of  a  health  care  system  and  to  varying  practices  of 
decentralization. Second, to investigate econometrically the determinants (demographic, 
supply-related and socio-economic causes) of national and regional differences in per-
capita health care expenditure. It is important to stress that the focus of this study is 
purely  on  the  level  of  costs  incurred  by  a  group  of  health  care  systems  of  OECD 
countries and by the Swiss health care system. Unfortunately, because of lack of data, 
there is thus no consideration of variables measuring the quality of care and the health $EVWUDFW  7
 
 
care  system’s  effectiveness,  the  access  to  medical  care,  and  the  level  of  public 
satisfaction over health services.  
The results point in the direction that, from a cost viewpoint, socialized health insurance 
(SHI) countries with a decentralized health care setting spent more resources in the last 
decade  (1990-2000)  than  the  other  three  typologies  of  health  care  system  (SHI 
centralized,  National  Health  System  centralized  and  decentralized  respectively).  The 
variable measured is the level of health expenditure and this result must not be construed 
as a “failure” of SHI decentralized systems, because no implication is formulated about 
the performance of these countries in terms of health outcomes and quality of care. The 
Swiss analysis highlights that in such a decentralized context, regional differences in 
terms of per-capita health care expenditure tend to be wide. The empirical results show 
the  existence  of  different  regional  patterns  of  consumption  of  health  care  services 
between  the linguistic areas  of  the  country,  and  a positive  impact  on health  outlays 
derived by citizens’ participation in the political process.  

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There has been much attention given in these last few years by academics, policy makers 
and professionals to the topic of health care and decentralization. In many countries 
decentralization is deeply anchored in the health care system and these states can draw 
on decades of organizational and managerial skills. In other countries decentralization 
has come to the fore as a means to revamp the performances of the health care sector, 
seeking to remedy the inadequacies of centralized national models of decision making. 
Decentralization  is  increasingly  seen  as  an  attractive  framework  for  health  system 
organization  and  management,  incorporating  elements  of  local  control  and  gains  in 
efficiency in the management of financial and human resources.  
The  economic  theory  of  fiscal  federalism  supports  this  move  because  through 
decentralization of competences there is a higher and tighter commitment of the local 
governments to shape services according to the needs of the local population. In this way 
the  economic  efficiency  is  increased  and  wastes  contained.  Furthermore, 
decentralization allows to experiment. If one sub-layer of government performs well, 
then the experiment can be replicated somewhere else. 
This  form of  multi-level  governance has  generated  considerable  interest because  the 
optimal assignment of health policy issues to sublevels of government is far from being 
crystal  clear.  A  closer  look  at  the  OECD  health  care  landscape  reveals  a  complex 
picture.  There  exists  no  singular  pattern  of  devolution  of  competences  and  the 
implementation of decentralization has generated marked differences in the health care 
sector.  However,  a  common  trend  has  been  to  decentralize  some  functions  to  local ,QWURGXFWLRQ  17
 
 
jurisdictions: more specifically, in some cases both funding decisions and management 
responsibilities have been delegated to local governments (regions, counties, provinces). 
In  other  cases  only  decisions  pertaining  to  the  organization  and  management  of  the 
health care system have been relinquished by the central government, which is still in 
charge of financing the health care sector. 
The  impact  of  multi-level  governance  on  health  care  has  also  been  investigated  by 
Banting  and  Corbett  (2002)  who  put  forward  a  descriptive  analysis  based  on  a 
comparative  study  of  five  federalist  countries.  The  authors  researched  the  impact  of 
federalism on cost containment, access to health care, and health care policy. They find 
that federal institutions on their own cannot be viewed as determinative. In general, the 
simple distinction between federal and non-federal countries does not take one very far. 
Other factors such as economic interests and political ideologies as well as the norms 
and values embedded in the underlying culture leave powerful imprints on the health 
care systems that emerge in different countries. Nevertheless, the structure of the federal 
political  institutions  matter  in  shaping  national  health  policies.  The  broad  patterns 
emerging from the study are that in none of the five federations analyzed is health care a 
purely local responsibility. There is always some central intervention in the set-up of the 
health  care  system.  Moreover,  federalism  is  important  with  respect  to  two  distinct 
agendas  at  the  heart  of  health  policy:  first,  access  to  services;  and  second,  rational 
planning. Federal states have successfully managed to establish interregional evenness in 
health services. In contrast, federations have proven to be less able in the politics of cost 
containment. 
Rich and White (1996) also contribute in highlighting the relationship existing between 
federalism and health policy. In their book they stress that health care policy is probably 
the  most  critical  issue  at  stake  in  the  ongoing  debates  about  those  who  favor  a 
decentralized versus a decentralized government. In their research they illustrate that the 18    &KDSWHU
 
 
theories  of  fiscal  federalism  and  intergovernmental  relations  can  provide  a  useful 
framework for examining the subdivision of roles between layers of government in the 
health care sector. Another important contribution to this topic is the book of Holahan et 
al.  (2003)  who  focus  on  the  Medicaid  program  existing  in  the  United  States.
1  In 
particular the aspect on which the authors dwell on is the increasing role of the states in 
the  program  due  to  the  fact  that  Medicaid  has  been  lately  plagued  by  an  array  of 
problems that have made it unpopular and difficult to use to extend health care coverage. 
In recent years states have been given the flexibility to change many features of their 
Medicaid programs. The research examines the record on the changing health safety net; 
in particular how well states have done in providing acute and long-term care services to 
low-income populations, how they have responded to financial incentives and federal 
regulatory requirements, and how innovative they have been. The striking fact is that 
nowadays  there  is  a  constant  “struggle”  between  the  two  layers  of  government  for 
defining the precise set-up of this insurance, and the decision recently taken points into 
the direction of a larger scope for decentralization.  
At this point I would like to draw the attention of the reader on the fact that on the one 
hand, when one refers to federalism, the existence of a form of multi-level governance 
and the decentralizion of functions to the lowest possible level of government are always 
assumed. However, this is not always accomplished; in fact, some federalist countries 
are characterized by a highly centralized health care system (e.g. Belgium). On the other 
hand, some unitary countries that are normally thought to be very centralized, show full 
decentralization of responsibilities to sublevels of government (e.g. Finland). Thus, the 
                                                 
1 There are two insurance programs in the United States. Medicaid is a health insurance that helps poor 
people who cannot afford medical care pay for some or all of their medical bills. It is both a federal and a 
state responsibility. In particular, states define their own guidelines regarding eligibility and services. 
Medicare is a federal health insurance for people 65 years of age or older, certain younger people with 
disabilities,  and  people  with  end-stage  renal  disease.  The  responsibility  for  the  Medicare  program  is 
federal.  ,QWURGXFWLRQ  19
 
 
scope of this study is not to focus on the simple classification of federalist versus non-
federalist country because this does not allow to capture the degree of decentralization of 
health care systems. The goal of this research is hence to concentrate on the issue of 
decentralization. Furthermore in this work, besides descriptive country case analyses on 
decentralization in the health care sector, there will be two empirical applications on one 
of the most severe strains faced nowadays by governments, namely the level of health 
costs. The first empirical analysis will shed light on the different levels of per-capita 
total health care expenditure in a group of OECD countries. We are aware that there 
exist different shares of private health care expenditure in all countries partaking in the 
international analysis; however, this research has relied on previous studies conducted 
by Gerdtham et al. (1998), in which covariates have been regressed on the level of total 
health expenditure. Subsequently, the Swiss case will show that even within a state there 
can be some wide differences between its regions in terms of per-capita health outlays. 
Pundits are interested in understanding the main determinants of health care expenditure 
but also the impact of the overall organization of the health care system and its degree of 
decentralization on the level of health expenditure. In focusing on the centralization and 
decentralization  of  management  and  financing  responsibilities  respectively,  I  am 
certainly not arguing that these are the only relevant influences on national paths. Other 
features  have  to  be  taken  into  consideration  such  as  the  legal  tradition,  the  major 
institutional solutions within a constitutional system, the political set-up, the economic, 
cultural and historical background. 
An ample part of this thesis deals with the empirical analyses on OECD countries and 
Switzerland;  it  is  important  to  stress  that  more  attention  has  been  assigned  to  the 
empirical part. Therefore, no theoretical model of federalism in health care has been 
formulated in this work.  
 20    &KDSWHU
 
 
The scope of this thesis is twofold:  
·  First, to assess the pros and cons related to fiscal federalism in the health care sector. 
This research will investigate the different degree of decentralization of health policy 
reached  in  a  sample  of  OECD  countries,  and  will  provide  an  overview  of  the 
different experiences with decentralization. 
·  Second, to empirically investigate the main determinants of health care expenditure. 
To do this, two econometric analyses will be performed. The first one is on a sample 
of OECD countries and measures the impact of the health care system organization 
(centralized  vs.  decentralized)  on  the  per-capita  health  care  costs.  The  second 
analysis is an intra-national study of Switzerland, a federal state that has a long-
standing tradition of multi-level governance and direct democracy, and the focus is 
on the level of per-capita health care expenditure and its determinants. 
It is beyond the ambition of this book to offer a detailed blueprint for the set-up of a 
health care system that performs well and succeeds in curbing health expenditure. The 
goal  is  to  shed  light  on  the  different  models  of  decentralization  experienced  in  the 
countries  partaking  in  the  analysis  and  to  understand  whether  decentralized  health 
systems  have  incurred  a  higher  (or  lower)  level  of  health  care  expenditure  than 
centralized  structures.  The  focus  of  the  research  is  on  the  level  of  health  care 
expenditure; other factors that capture the effectiveness and quality of the system as well 
as equity variables have not been considered in this study because of lack of data. 





The thesis is structured in six chapters. Following this introductory first chapter, where 
the  goals  have  been  illustrated  and  presented,  the  second  chapter  will  outline  the 
fundamental theoretical basis of the theory of fiscal federalism. An ample margin will be 
given  to  the  explanation  of  the  various  arguments  in  favor  and  disfavor  of 
decentralization. Furthermore, Chapter 2 will put forward empirical applications of the 
impact  of  decentralization  on  service  delivery,  economic  growth,  corruption  and 
governance, and macro management and fiscal imbalance. Chapter 3 will provide deeper 
insights of decentralization in the health care sector. Here the main goal is to explain the 
relationship  between  decentralization,  health  policy  and  the  level  of  health  care 
expenditure  in  some  OECD  countries.  The  delicate  topic  of  the  allocation  of health 
responsibilities to sub-layers of government will also be set forth. Chapter 4 sets out the 
first  empirical  analysis  with  panel  data  on  a  sample  of  OECD  countries.  Per-capita 
health  care  expenditure  is  modeled  on  a  set  of  demographic,  socio-economic,  and 
supply-related factors, and the analysis will also check the impact of decentralized and 
centralized  health  care  systems  respectively  on  costs  for  the  period  1990-2000.  In 
addition to the econometric estimations and results, there will be a description of the 
four most popular approaches for analyzing panel data. Chapter 5 will deal with an intra-
national analysis. It will be focused on the Swiss case and cantonal data will be used. 
The choice of the country is straightforward:  Switzerland is characterized by  a high 
decentralized  health  care  system  and  by  the  principle  of  subsidiarity,  which  assigns 
responsibilities to the lowest level of government possible. The study will present the 
estimations of an econometric model of per-capita socialized health care expenditure. 
An overview of the conclusions is set out in chapter 6.  
 





The decentralization of the public sector is a topic of great debate worldwide. There is a 
widespread  devolution  of  tasks  from  the  center  to  local  governments  in  both 
industrialized  and  developing  countries.  On  the  one  hand,  through  this  “instrument” 
countries  seek  to  improve  their  public  sector  performance  by  allowing  greater 
competition between different layers of government, by improving the efficiency of the 
delivery of goods and services, and by bringing decision making closer to the people. On 
the other hand, there is also a process of centralization in Europe with a new layer of 
government (EU) that constitutes a more centralized decision making procedure thereby 
allowing greater coordination between member states on various topics.  
The literature on fiscal federalism has been very productive over the last forty years and 
has  developed  a  particular  view  of  multi-level  governance  finance.
2  Scholars  have 
                                                 
2 The major figures in the fiscal federalism theory are Samuelson (1954, 1955), who is particularly known 
for his work on determining the optimal allocation of resources in the presence of both public and private 
goods; Tiebout (1956), who built an economic theory of local government expenditure by arguing that 
people vote with their feet and move to places with the right combination of taxes, freedom, and public 
versus private choices; Arrow (1970), who conceptualized the roles of the private and public sectors; 
Oates  (1972,  1999),  who  formalized  his  proposition  on  the  multi-level  government  setting  as  the 
'HFHQWUDOL]DWLRQ 7KHRUHP; and Musgrave (1959, 1983), who set forth the allocation of roles between 
layers  of  government.  Other  important  contributions  were  given  by  Olson  (1969)  with  the  ILVFDO
HTXLYDOHQFH principle that related the provision of public goods with the spatial/geographical patterns of 
benefits;  Boadway  and  Flatters  (1982)  addressing  the  issue  of  equalizing,  lump-sum  grants  from  the 
central to regional government; McLure (1983), who questioned what forms of taxation are best employed 
at the different levels of government; Inman (1988) explaining the concept of intergovernmental grants; 
and Fischel (2001) who showed that local property taxation fosters efficient local budgetary decisions.  7KHWKHRU\RIILVFDOIHGHUDOLVPDQGVRPHDSSOLFDWLRQV 23
 
 
addressed questions relating to the assignment of governmental functions, the design of 
a tax system and intergovernmental grants. Recently, researchers have moved in other 
directions frequently including important contributions from disciplines outside public 
economics. Wallace Oates himself, who can be thought of as the “father” of the fiscal 
federalism  literature,  recently  stated  that  a  “second-generation  theory  of  fiscal 
federalism” is emerging.  
The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the main advantages of decentralization and 
shed  light  on  the principal  drawbacks  that  may  occur  if  this  powerful  instrument  is 
misused.  Decentralization  can  neither  be  conceived  of  as  a  magical  recipe  that 
automatically stimulates public sector efficiency, nor is it a way to revamp the state. On 
the contrary, the issues to be considered are: which governmental functions are best 
decentralized, the institutional environment in which one wants decentralization to take 
place,
3 and the type of decentralization one has in mind.
4 The crucial aspect remains of 
course the identification of the best level of government that can deal with each kind of 
activity. 
The structure of this chapter is the following: in section 2.2 the economic, political, and 
historical justifications for decentralization will be exposed. The analytical tool used is 
drawn  from  the  standard  fiscal  federalism  theory.  Some  arguments  that  support 
centralization will be put forward in section 2.3. Section 2.4 will deal with the allocation 
of tasks by level of government. Section 2.5 briefly deals with the recent evolution of the 
theory on fiscal federalism, and section 2.6 will present some empirical evidence on the 
effects of fiscal decentralization. Conclusions will be drawn in section 2.7. 
                                                 
3 Fiscal decentralization can appear to be good in some countries, while it can have different results in 
other  nations.  For  example,  one  should  expect  that  decentralization  of  competences  works  more 
effectively in those countries characterized by different ethnic groups. 
4  The  reference  is  to  the  scheme  adopted  by  Rondinelli  (1981),  namely  deconcentration,  delegation, 
devolution and privatization. 24    &KDSWHU
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In recent years, a growing number of countries has implemented fiscal decentralization 
programs as part of structural reforms of the state (De Mello, 2004). The majority of 
these programs has devolved revenue sources, expenditure functions, and managerial 
decisions to sublevels of government, namely provinces, regions, and municipalities.  
A unique definition of decentralization does not exist; such concept has been defined in 
a variety of ways, according to the degree of delegation and autonomy granted to local 
actors.
5 The most often cited typology of decentralization is Rondinelli’s (1981), who 
specifies  four  different  analytical  frameworks.  In  particular,  Rondinelli  thought  of 
decentralization as “the transfer of authority, or dispersal of power, in public planning, 
management and decision making from the national level to subnational levels or, more 
generally, from higher to lower levels of government” There are basically four different 
types  of  decentralization:  deconcentration,  devolution,  delegation,  and  privatization. 
Financial  authority,  means  of  representing  the  local  community,  geographical 
conditions, and their legal status are important factors in classifying them. 
Deconcentration  refers  to  the  dispersion  of  activities  previously  carried  out  by  the 
central government to local bodies. The center retains control over decision making and 
financial  decisions  so  that  local  officials  still  remain  accountable  to  the  central 
administration. Local authorities are able to make very few decisions without referring 
                                                 
5  The  extensive  literature  on  decentralization,  centralization  and  devolution  covers  a  wide  range  of 
disciplines  including  politics,  public  administration,  economics,  management,  sociology,  and 
organizational  studies.  Some  relevant  references  in  this  field  are  Bossert  (1998),  Levaggi  and  Smith 
(2005),  Bennet  (1980),  Buchanan  (1950),  Oates  (1972),  and  Putnam  (1993).  An  interesting  report 
investigating the prolific literature about decentralization is Peckham et al. (2005).  7KHWKHRU\RIILVFDOIHGHUDOLVPDQGVRPHDSSOLFDWLRQV 25
 
 
to  the  center.  This  type  of  decentralization  is  normally  found  in  unitary  systems  of 
government.  
Delegation  refers  to  the  transfer  of  decision  making  authority  from  the  central 
administration to the local authorities for pre-defined activities. It usually involves the 
distribution of fiscal resources to the local level accompanied by specific instructions 
about their allocation. Since the central administration retains the power of reallocating 
resources, this form of decentralization has some of the characteristics of a principal-
agent  relationship,  with  the  central  government  as  the  principal  and  the  local 
governments as the agents. The autonomous organizations receive public funds and they 
are accountable to the central government. Delegation thus occurs when central actors 
lend  authority  to  semi-autonomous  organizations,  with  the  understanding  that  the 
authority can be withdrawn. Federal governments in recently independent countries are 
more likely to opt for this kind of decentralization. 
Devolution refers to the transfer of significant fiscal and allocative decisions to local 
authorities that gain full responsibility for them, with no interference from the central 
administration.  In  practice,  the  central  government  relinquishes  administrative  and 
political powers. Devolution may be accomplished by granting substantial tax powers to 
local governments. This latter type of decentralization is qualitatively different from the 
two previous ones, because the lower tiers of government gain complete control over 
resource allocation and are generally accountable to local constituencies, which should 
increase decision making responsiveness to local needs.  
Finally,  privatization  is  a  transfer  of  responsibilities  from  the  public  to  private 
enterprises, both for profit and non profit, which assume functions that were previously 
carried out by the central government itself.  26    &KDSWHU
 
 
The  arguments  for  decentralizing  specific  functions  rely  on  economic,  political,  and 
historical  reasons.  As  we  will  see  in  the  next  section  the  main  economic  argument 
suggests  that  the  performance  of  the  public  sector  can  be  enhanced  by  taking  into 
account the local differences in culture, environment, preferences and needs, endowment 
of natural resources, and economic and social institutions (Frey, 1997; Putnam, 1993; 
Putzel,  1997).  The  local  government  has  an  information  advantage  over  the  central 
government, being closer to the local people and hence more identified with the local 
causes, more sensitive to local problems, and more responsive to local demands. Fiscal 
decentralization thus shortens the “informational distance” (De Mello, 2004) between 
the  providers  and  the  recipients  of  public  goods  and  services,  so  as  to  diminish 
information costs and to boost public sector efficiency in service delivery. Moreover, 
public  economists  also  affirm  that  one  advantage  of  a  decentralized  governmental 
system is that it allows for experimentation; it is a laboratory for government. Should 
one local government perform well, then it can be viewed as a “best practice” and as an 
example to be followed. On the contrary, if it does badly, it has a “worst practice” and 
the negative outcome of such policy is confined to that sub-layer of government and not 
to the whole country.  
Another concept that lies behind decentralization is that the different jurisdictions can 
act and function as if they are in a competitive market. This is based on the assumption 
that the subnational levels of government will interact with each other in a similar way 
as firms compete in  a  market place. Political scientist Thomas Dye (1990) observes 
“Matching public policy to citizen preferences is the essence of responsive government”
Like economic competition, political competition is driven by informed choice among 
alternatives. People can choose not only how to vote, but also where to live, work and 
run  businesses,  and  thus  also  where  to  pay  taxes  and  receive  the  public  services. 
Citizens, through their “voting with the feet” mechanism, can penalize bad performing 7KHWKHRU\RIILVFDOIHGHUDOLVPDQGVRPHDSSOLFDWLRQV 27
 
 
local governments by exerting their right to exit or, alternatively, they can reward their 
local governments by simply residing there. The mobility of individuals and businesses 
increases as the size of governmental units decreases, because movement across nearby 
jurisdictions is culturally and economically much easier than longer-distance movement. 
By exerting their right to exit, citizens manage to realign people’s preferences with the 
jurisdiction policies. Furthermore, a jurisdiction can change its policies in response to an 
actual  or  threatened  movement,  further  increasing  the  possibility  of  realignment. 
Proponents  of jurisdiction  competition  suggest  that  residents  of  different  subnational 
levels of government would be worse off if forced to shift toward a national system. 
Another pro-decentralization argument belongs to what the  public choice school has 
popularized as the Leviathan hypothesis,
6 whereby decentralization prevents taxpayer’s 
exploitation by government’s bureaucrats and in so doing it protects its citizens from the 
danger  of  the  Leviathan.  Brennan  and  Buchanan  (1980)  have  asserted  that  “total 
government intrusion into the economy should be smaller, ceteris paribus, the greater the 
extent to which taxes and expenditures are decentralized”. The arguments used by the 
two authors is that as long as individuals and firms, or at least some of them, are mobile, 
then having a multi-level system of governments forces jurisdictions to engage in tax 
competition, thus destroying the Leviathan’s monopoly on taxation and, furthermore, 
bringing government outlays closer to citizens’ preferences.  
Decentralization is politically interesting because politicians and local officials have an 
incentive to be responsive since their careers depend on whether they pursue efficient 
policies. Politicians become more concerned about local self-governance because they 
are personally held responsible for the outcomes they reach. In the absence of local 
governments’  accountability,  strong  economic  incentives  may  result  in  corruption, 
                                                 
6 The Leviathan hypothesis basically states that public officials behave in a budget maximizing way. 28    &KDSWHU
 
 
provincial  protectionism,  and  capture  by  vested  interests  (Tanzi,  1996;  Sonin,  2003; 
Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya, 2003). 
Historical factors also contribute to decentralization. Nordic countries of Europe and 
countries characterized by multilinguism have traditionally delegated responsibilities of 
services (health, education, social services) to the lowest possible tier of government, on 
account of the principle of subsidiarity. 
To conclude, there exists no single pattern to decentralize functions; each country has its 
own  economic  and  political  reasons,  historical  paths,  and  has  developed  its  public 
administration system differently. As Tuohy (1999) suggests, choices about delegation 
of responsibilities are “accidental” in the sense that they occur in a place and at a time in 
which there is a unique window of opportunity shaped by ideas and agendas within a 





The  traditional  economic  theory  of  fiscal  federalism  assumes  the  existence  of  a 
“benevolent  dictator”  who  manages  to  satisfy  the  heterogeneous  preferences  of  the 
population  through  sub-layers  of  government  (Liberati,  1999).  The  Decentralization 
Theorem of Wallace Oates (1972) states that for a public good – the consumption of 
which is defined over a geographical subset of the total population, and for which the 
cost of providing each level of output of the good in each jurisdiction are the same for 
the central or the respective local government – it will always be more efficient (or at 
least as efficient) for local governments to provide the Pareto efficient levels of outputs 7KHWKHRU\RIILVFDOIHGHUDOLVPDQGVRPHDSSOLFDWLRQV 29
 
 
for their respective jurisdictions than for the central government to provide any specified 
and uniform level of output across all jurisdictions (the “one-size-fits-all” concept).  
Figure 1 depicts the decentralization theorem. Assume that the population of a particular 
state is divided into two distinct localities. A local public good is to be provided in each 
locality, which shows different preferences, and there are no spillover effects. The cost 
is to be shared equally by residents. In figure 1  '
￿  and  '
￿  respectively represent the 
demand  for  the  local  public  good  of  two  representative  individuals,  one  from  each 
locality  $ and %. The marginal costs (0&) of providing such good are assumed to be 
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In this figure, if a centralized regime provides a single uniform level of the good in 
question,  the  level  of  output  provided  would  be  a  compromise  between  the  two 
representative individuals in each locality (qc). Such a quantity is lower than the amount 
that would be asked by  $ but more than the quantity demanded by the representative 
individual in the jurisdiction %. The ensuing welfare losses are experienced by each of 
the two individuals. They are represented by the colored areas in Figure 1; these are the 
triangles 123 and 145 respectively. Triangle 123 shows the loss that arises because the 
individual  $  does  not  consume  as  much  good  as  he  would  choose  if  there  was  a 
decentralized provision. Triangle 145 indicates the welfare loss experience by % because 
he  is  consuming  more  than  what  he  would  otherwise  choose.  If  each  jurisdiction 
provides itself with the quantity of the good required, then such deadweight losses could 
be prevented. Decentralization thus allows to adjust to the preferences expressed by the 
local population.  
Notice that there are a number of points to add: 
·  As  Oates  (1979)  notes,  if  qa  and  qb  are  closer,  then  qc  would  provide  a  close 
approximation. It becomes evident that decentralization works well where there is a 
high heterogeneity of tastes and preferences in the different jurisdictions. 
·  One  should  not  take  it  for  granted  that,  within  a  jurisdiction,  preferences  are 
homogeneous. With very heterogeneous tastes in a jurisdiction there can be some 
welfare losses even within the local government. Furthermore, some individuals may 
be more unhappy about a decentralized provision of goods than a centralized one; 
this depends on the degree of heterogeneity in the local preferences compared with 
the national average preferences.  
·  Welfare losses also depends on the elasticity of the demand. The more rigid (steeper) 
the demand curves, the larger the area of the shaded triangles. 7KHWKHRU\RIILVFDOIHGHUDOLVPDQGVRPHDSSOLFDWLRQV 31
 
 
·  The above analysis presumes that there are no economies of scale. However, if they 
exist, a centralized provision of the good would perform better. Moreover, spillover 
effects are not taken into consideration. If there are some externalities, then it is 




The Decentralization Theorem shows that local governments perform better when tastes 
are heterogeneous, however it does not give any insight about the determination of the 
optimal size of the local authorities. It is assumed that jurisdictions have the optimal 
dimension,  and  no  space  is  left  for  the  presence  of  economies  of  scale  and/or 
externalities. Moreover, through the correspondence principle,
7 Oates states that for each 
public good there must exist a territorial entity responsible for the provision of good for 
all citizens.  
The question of how big the jurisdiction should be was first investigated by Buchanan 
(1965) with the theory of the clubs. The main hypotheses are that there is an impure 
public good, whose consumption is not confined by technology to a precise geographical 
subset  of  economic  units,  and  that  people  group  together  in  clubs.
8  The  two  main 
features  of  clubs  are:  first,  people  join  the  club  on  a  voluntary  basis;  second,  the 
                                                 
7 The correspondence principle is when the government size corresponds perfectly to the area of benefit of 
the good it provides. 
8 The good envisioned here is of a complex but not unrealistic nature. While the good may in fact be 
consumed collectively in groups of different sizes, it is also assumed that each group of individuals can 
exclude others from the consumption of the group’s own units of the good. The point is thus that the 
number of individuals who jointly consume a particular output is itself a variable. Some examples of 
impure public goods are the education system and the fire protection services.  32    &KDSWHU
 
 
possibility of leaving the club and joining a different one. This in turn means that there 
are no relevant financial barriers to join a new club. 
On the one hand, by consuming the good jointly it may be possible for individuals to get 
it at a lower price, so that some economies of scale in the consumption of the good can 
arise. On the other hand, if the dimension of the club increases congestion costs emerge. 
There are hence two opposing forces: congestion costs push for a smaller dimension of 
the club, while the reduction of per-capita costs pushes for a bigger dimension. The 












The  line  2&  represents  the  aggregate  cost  savings  from  increasing  the  number  of 
individuals  who  jointly  consume  a  particular  good.  The  line  2/  represents  the 
congestion price to be paid because of joint consumption of the good. There is reason to 
believe that the aggregate welfare loss, due to the differences between the actual and 
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desired levels of consumption, will tend to increase with the magnitude of Q (the size of 
the group). As the group size increases, the influence of any particular individual on his 
own level of consumption of the good diminishes. As a consequence, a greater aggregate 
welfare loss is expected with larger groups. The curve 2: is the vertical subtraction of 
2/ from 2&, and represents the net increase in welfare from joint consumption for each 
group size. The curve reaches its maximum at point  Q, which represents the optimal-
sized group to consume the good jointly. The conclusion therefore is that, the more 
widely  the  efficient  levels  of  consumption  vary  across  jurisdictions,  the  more 
pronounced is the potential welfare loss from the centralized provision of goods.  
The theory of the clubs rely on some important assumptions: 
·  The  first  assumption  is  that  the  members  of  the  club consume  the  good  equally 
(equal sharing). 
·  The presence of some spillover effects is not taken into consideration. Obviously, the 
smaller the group, the smaller the likelihood to internalize the externalities. For this 
reason,  the  expected  loss  in  welfare  from  such  externalities  will  tend  to  vary 
inversely  with  the  size  of  the  jurisdiction.  Furthermore,  there  will  also  be  an 
incentive to engage in a free-rider behavior that will be accentuated with a large 
number of relatively small groups of consumers.  
·  Economies of scale can be experienced in the provision of increased quantities of a 
local public good. The solution would be to enlarge the jurisdiction. 
·  If  individuals  with  similar  income  are  grouped  together,  the  outcome  can  be 
unstable. If the taxes that the individuals pay for a local public good were higher as a 
consequence of higher income, the poor might enjoy a greater quantity of a local 
public  good  if  they  were  resident  in  a  high-income  area.  There  may  well  be  a 





Following  the  previous  discussion  of  the  Buchanan’s  theory  of  the  clubs,  it  is 
appropriate to consider now how individuals take up club membership, that is how they 
choose to reside in a particular jurisdiction. Note that the decentralization theorem of 
Oates  explains  the  superiority  of  a  decentralized  setting  in  two  cases:  first,  when 
preferences  within  a  jurisdiction  are  homogeneous  (so  that  there  is  a  representative 
individual); second, if preferences are less heterogeneous than national tastes. But what 
if the starting point of analysis is a highly heterogeneous distribution of preferences at 
the local level? In such a case it is clear that even in a context of decentralization there 
can be welfare losses, because the consumption of the representative individual in the 
jurisdiction is far too much (or too low) for the other individuals and hence some of 
them could be better off if the provision of the good in question is centralized. It thus 
becomes a question of comparing welfare losses experienced under decentralization with 
those resulting from centralization. 
In  order  to  tackle  this  problem  Tiebout  (1956)  argued  that  individuals  select  those 
communities  whose  provision of  local  public  goods  and  tax  prices  best  satisfy their 
demands and needs. Individuals reveal their preferences by moving to the locality that 
best  reflects  their  tastes  and  offers  the  preferred  tax-benefit  mix.  By  so  doing, 
preferences  within  a  jurisdiction  will  tend  to  level  out  and  become  homogeneous. 
Tiebout’s analysis was framed as a direct response to Samuelson’s (1954) conclusion 
that individuals are not willing to reveal their preferences for public goods. However, in 
Tiebout’s  view  individuals  “vote  with  their  feet”  and  hence  they  do  show  their 
preferences by picking up one specific community. It is clear that the Tiebout model 




The restrictiveness of the assumptions underlying the model are manifold:  
·  It is assumed that all individuals have perfect knowledge and complete information 
of the local taxes, expenditure, and range of services provided. 
·  The mobility of individuals is supposed to be costless. Costless mobility implies that 
there are no work problems, or that households do not have to worry about transport 
costs to their place of work. This assumption “makes the voting by feet hypothesis 
somewhat unrealistic, except in a setting where people work in the inner city and 
may choose among the suburbs for residence” (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1989).  
·  When preferences over public goods are very heterogeneous the number of local 
communities  required  to  produce  an  equilibrium  is  extremely  large.  This  might 
imply  the  presence  of  many  small  communities  that  miss  out  on  possible  gains 
derived by the existence of economies of scale in the production of the local public 
good.  
·  The  movement  of  one  individual  from  one  community  to  the  other  may  well 
generate some spillovers in the form of added congestion. In fact, when a household 
moves to a new region, he can add congestion costs to already crowded facilities.
9 
·  Benefits provided by one jurisdiction may spill over to another community. The two 
localities  may  decide  to  internalize  such  externalities  by  a  process  of  direct 
bargaining or, alternatively, the central government may decide to step in and play a 
role.  
·  Preferences are non-static. The needs of households change during the life cycle. For 
example the need for good educational services can be a priority at certain ages, but 
later on individuals might be more concerned with facilities for the elderly.  
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It is obvious that the improbability of all the above assumptions casts doubts on the 




Some  recent  literature  has  started  to  question  whether  the  major  advantages  of 
decentralization – that is the possibility of tailor-made policies, service delivery based on 
a greater knowledge of local preferences, greater chances for civil participation, and, in 
general,  a  more  efficient  allocation  of  public  goods  and  services  –  are  still  valid 
nowadays.
10 
The following paragraphs shed light on some specific arguments that support a more 




The point of departure of the Decentralization Theorem implicitly assumes that under 
certain conditions, a varied pattern of local public goods in accordance with local tastes 
will be Pareto superior to an outcome characterized by a uniform provision of output, 
determined centrally, across all jurisdictions. The literature has suggested that a central 
authority  would  face  a  difficulty  in  determining  the  preferences  of  each  single 
jurisdiction. However, with perfect information, one could also think of an outcome in 
                                                 




which the central government establishes Pareto efficient levels of public goods. Note 
also that when the distribution of preferences is very much heterogeneous at the local 
level, a centralized provision of goods could result in a minor welfare loss than under a 
decentralized setting.  
Furthermore, as stressed by Prud’homme (1995), the standard theory of fiscal federalism 
only takes into consideration the demand side (namely the preferences  expressed by 
citizens),  ignoring  completely  the  supply  side  of  goods  and  services.  The  hidden 
assumption is that supply is always efficient, but that might not always necessarily be 
the case.  
The  “perfect  mapping”  of citizens’ preferences  and jurisdictions may also encounter 
additional  problems.  In  fact,  a  variety  of  local  public  goods  may  have  different 
geographical patterns of consumption, making it hard to believe that it could exist a level 
of government whose jurisdiction coincided perfectly with the pattern of geographical 
benefits  for  every  local  public  good.  In  particular,  there  might  arise  problems  of 
interjurisdictional spillovers. First of all externalities (both positive and negative) may 
be present. A spatial externality arises whenever a cost or a benefit is not internalized, 
that is to say that a cost or a benefit resulting from the consumption of one good does not 
include  only  the  residents  of  one  single  jurisdiction  but  also  residents  of  other 
jurisdictions.
11  Of  course,  the  presence  of  spillover  effects  should  be  taken  into 
consideration  when  it  comes  to  determine  the  optimal-sized  group  to  consume  a 
particular public good. The smaller is the group, the less the external effects are likely to 
be internalized: for this reason the expected loss in welfare from such externalities will 
tend to vary inversely with the size of the jurisdiction (Oates, 1972). The economic 
                                                 
11 One plausible example could be the educational system. In fact, as shown by Weisbrod (1964) the 
quality  of  education  in  one  area  may  have  significant  effects  on  the  welfare  of  individuals  in  other 
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theory  suggests  some  options  in  order  to  solve  the  spillover  effects:  to  enlarge  the 
dimension  of  the  jurisdiction,  to  arrange  for  some  Coasian  bargains  or  a  system  of 
intergovernmental grants (Fisher, 1996).
12 
Another important point to underline is the presence of economies of scale, that is when 
the minimum average cost of producing public goods is reached. The optimal dimension 
of the community should be one where the economies of scale are all exhausted, that is, 
that it is not possible to decrease further the average cost of production. One plausible 




Another strand of criticism against decentralization stresses the weaknesses of the view 
that jurisdictions play in the political market as private enterprises do in a competitive 
one. And even if it is assumed that such competition exists between jurisdictions, one 
might  also  argue  that  interjurisdictional  competition  is  harmful  and  not  beneficial 
(McGuire,  1991;  Revesz,  1992;  Inman  and  Rubinfeld,  2000).  The  arguments  that 
support this view are twofold: first, the fierce competition can unleash a “race-to-the-
bottom” in providing benefits rather than a “race-to-the-top” in innovation and good 
administration. Needy beneficiaries of public programs would move from less generous 
jurisdictions  to  their  more  generous  neighbors,  and  this,  in  the  long  term,  would 
undermine the stability of the latter ones. Jurisdictions that are willing to improve their 
services could probably not afford to do so after a while, no matter how efficiently they 
                                                 
12 Coasian bargains are voluntary contractual agreements between the user and provider of a good and/or 
service. They are thus direct agreements and do not involve any central intervention by governments or 
other regulatory bodies. 7KHWKHRU\RIILVFDOIHGHUDOLVPDQGVRPHDSSOLFDWLRQV 39
 
 
run their programs. As a consequence, in order to avoid migration, jurisdictions would 
rather opt for reducing their program benefits below what they would have otherwise 
chosen, in order to become less attractive to beneficiaries, who would then go to the next 
highest  jurisdictions,  which  would  go  on  with  this  “vicious  cycle”  by  cutting  their 
benefits as well. By reducing their public programs, jurisdictions would also become 
very similar to each other. The diversity across them would tend to diminish. 
Second, competition undercuts jurisdictions’ ability to tax residents as much as they 
would like. In order to keep wealthy citizens on its territory, a jurisdiction is not willing 
to impose taxes that are much higher than the neighboring jurisdictions, simply because 
residential and commercial taxpayers will move. Hence, jurisdictions fear to lose high-
income taxpayers; for this reason they will tend to have low rates of taxes, and this 
would  cause  a  lower  provision  of  public  goods  and  services  that  would  go  to  the 




Decentralization not only transfers power from the central to the peripheral government, 
but  also  from  central  to  local  bureaucracies.  The  technological  argument  states  that 
public  local  officials  may  lack  of  capacity  to  provide  highly  skilled  quality  public 
management (Prud’homme, 1995; Letelier, 2004). Thus, central bureaucracies are likely 
to attract more qualified personnel because of different reasons: better salaries, better 
career paths, greater diversity of roles, and greater chances of promotion. Moreover, 
access to up-to-date and comprehensive information will be initially at disposal at the 
higher administrative level of government, because central bureaucracies are likely to 





Alongside the public management quality, previously described, there is also concern for 
corruption. Corruption might probably be more widespread at the local level rather than 
a national one, since excess closeness of local officials to private local interests is a 
potentially dangerous fact, especially in developing countries. As Conyers (1990) has 
stressed, “… decentralization may increase the participation of people at the local level, 
but sometimes it is only a small privileged elite group who gets to participate” And it is 
likely  that  such  elites  may  pursue,  and  lobby  for,  their  own  narrowly  focused  self-
interest. The outcome of local policies will hence not reflect the preferences and the 
needs of the population of the constituency, but the interests of the lobby group(s) that 




The economic theory of federalism has stressed the importance of decentralizing the 
provision of goods and services to sublevels of government. Another important aspect to 
take into consideration relates to the assignment of tasks to sub-layers of government 
(who does what) that was first investigated by Musgrave (1959). The author delivered 
important  and  crucial  insights  into  the  question  of  assignment  of  responsibilities.
13 
According to Musgrave the government has to perform three main tasks: changing the 
allocation  by  providing  public  goods  and  correcting  the  external  effects  of  private 
economic behavior; redistributing income in order to equalize income distribution that is 
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the  result of  market forces;  and  stabilizing  the  economic  process in  order to  reduce 
business  cycle  fluctuations.  The  solution  usually  proposed  is  that  redistribution  and 
stabilization  should  be  performed  at  a  national  level  whereas,  according  to  the 
“correspondence principle” stated by Oates (1972), the provision of public goods should 
be  performed  at  the  lowest  governmental  level.  This  allows  an  approximate 
correspondence between those who benefit from their provision, those who have to pay, 
and those who decide on the amount provided. 
The following paragraphs describe the Musgravian theory and present some additional 




Public goods cannot be provided by the market system, that is by transactions between 
individual producers and consumers. In fact, in some cases, the market mechanism fails 
entirely,  while  in  some  other  cases  it  works,  but  inefficiently.  The  basic  reason  for 
market failure in the provision of public goods is that the benefits to which public goods 
give rise are not limited to one particular consumer who purchases the good, as in the 
case for private goods, but become available to others too. A consumer is prone to spend 
part of his income to buy the private good he desires, and the consumption of that good 
stands in a rival relationship. Public goods’ consumption, however, is non-rival. Clean 
air  is  something  that  is  available  to  everybody.  The  benefits  derived  by  anyone’s 
consuming a public good are externalized, in the sense that they become available to the 
whole society. Conversely, in the case of private goods, the benefits of consumption are 
internalized with a particular consumer, whose consumption excludes consumption by 
others. The market mechanism is thus well suited for the provision of private goods 42    &KDSWHU
 
 
because it is based on exchange, and an exchange can occur only where there is an 
exclusive title to the property that is to be exchanged. However, this system does not 
work  with  public  goods.  It  would  be inefficient  to  exclude any  one  consumer  from 
partaking  in  the  benefits,  when  such  participation  would  not  reduce  someone  else’s 
consumption. But when benefits are available to all, consumers will not voluntarily offer 
payments to the suppliers of public goods. They will tend to free-ride and that is the 
reason why the government should step in to provide such goods. The initial difficulty 
for the government is thus to decide the type and quality of a public good to be supplied, 
and how much a particular consumer should be charged. Consumers have, of course, no 
incentive to step forward and declare how much they value the public good and how 
much they are willing to pay. Hence, a different technique is needed by which the supply 
of the public goods and its cost allocation can be determined. This is where the political 
process  enters  the  picture  as  a  substitute  for  the  market  mechanism.  Thus  decision 
making by voting becomes a substitute for preference revelation through the market. The 
result will probably be a second best, in the sense that a number of voters are bound not 
to be pleased with the outcome of the political process. Yet this is the only way to 
approximate  an  efficient  solution.  Reaching  an  approximately  efficient  solution  will 
depend  in  particular  on  the  community’s  preferences  over  the  matter  and  on  the 
efficiency of the polling process itself.  
But is it realistic to think of a local public good whose benefits are spread only within 
the boundaries of a politically-defined jurisdiction? According to Olson (1969) there can 
be  three  possible  relations  between  the  benefits  of  a  local  public  good  and  the 
boundaries of a sublevel of government: (1) the local public good reaches beyond the 
boundaries of the government that provides it, (2) the local public good reaches only a 
part of the constituency that provides it, or (3) the boundaries of the local public good 
are the same as those of the jurisdiction that provides it. It is obvious that the first two 7KHWKHRU\RIILVFDOIHGHUDOLVPDQGVRPHDSSOLFDWLRQV 43
 
 
situations do not lead to an efficient outcome, and only the third setting reaches the 
fiscal equivalence, or perfect mapping principle. If this is a straightforward theoretical 
conclusion, one should question what happens in reality. A very interesting contribution 
in  this  field  is  the  FRQVWLWXWLRQDO SURSRVDO  suggested  by  Frey  (2001).  The  author 
advances this proposal based on the notion that there are meaningful government units, 
whose major feature is not the territorial extension but its function. The constitutional 
proposal  allows  the  creation  of  governmental  organizations,  which  do  not  have  any 
territorial monopoly, their territory is variable and are in competition with each other. 
Frey reports some examples of jurisdictions that are close to the constitutional proposal. 
In Switzerland for instance, in addition to political communes, there are roughly 5,000 
overlapping, functional special communes. The most important are school communes 
offering education for the children of one or several political municipalities. 
In a World Bank paper Shah (1994) has identified the spatial area of benefits for some 
public services and goods.
14 His conclusions are that national defense, international and 
national trade, immigration, employment, railway and air transportation, foreign affairs, 
and monetary policy are examples of functions with national costs and benefits. Local 
fire brigades, police, environment, agriculture, local roads, garbage collection, and city 
parks are classified as public goods and services whose benefits are delimited locally.
15 
The allocation function can thus be performed either by the central government or by a 
sublevel of government; the crucial feature to be established is that of spatial limitation 
of benefit incidence. In any case, the choice of the proper level of government that deals 
with the allocation function is sensitive to the specificities of each country. Moreover, 
                                                 
14 Although Shah’s work focuses only on developing countries, it is believed that the criteria used could 
perform well also in industrialized nations. 
15 Owens and Norregaard (1991) also reach in their analysis a similar subdivision of duties among layers 
of government.  44    &KDSWHU
 
 
the motivations that point to decentralize some particular functions are dynamic and 




The  distribution  of  income  and  wealth  depends  chiefly  on  the  distribution  of  factor 
endowments. The distribution of income might be so that it is not perceived as “right” 
by the society. The answer to the question of fair distribution of income and wealth 
involves value judgments. As Musgrave and Musgrave (1989) have pointed out, there 
are two difficulties in “the translation of a justice role into an actual state of income 
distribution”. The first one is related to the fact that it is impossible to compare the 
utility which various individuals get from their income. This limitation has thus forced 
people  to  think  more  in  terms  of  social  evaluation  rather  than  subjective  utility 
measurement. The other difficulty is that all redistributional policies entail an efficiency 
cost that should be taken into account when deciding on the extent to which equity 
objectives should be pursued.  
Notwithstanding  these  difficulties,  distributional  policies  have  become  an  important 
issue  of  public  policy.  As  underlined  by  Musgrave,  policies  to  adjust  for  these 
differences in income and wealth should be pursued by the central state. If these policies 
are  assigned  to  the  lowest  layers  of  government,  then  the  risk  is  to  have  local 
inefficiencies. Let us consider now the case where regional measures for redistribution 
are present: what may happen is that the rich will leave the jurisdiction while the poor 
will move to the more egalitarian-minded jurisdictions. There would be a flow of rich 
people from the cities to the suburbs, while poor people would migrate from the low-7KHWKHRU\RIILVFDOIHGHUDOLVPDQGVRPHDSSOLFDWLRQV 45
 
 
benefit rural areas to the high-benefit urban locations.
16 A vicious cycle triggers in such 
a situation because the inflow of needy citizens in richer jurisdictions undermines their 
sustainability. The creation of a single jurisdiction where all poor people go must be 
avoided,  because  this  brings  a  very  unstable  outcome.  The  case  for  assigning  the 
distribution  function  to  the  national  government  rests  on  two  assumptions:  first,  the 
national government’s broad taxing powers can more easily redistribute income; and 
second,  the  ability  of  taxpayers  to  move  from  one  jurisdiction  to  another  to  take 
advantage of more attractive spending and taxation policies weakens local government’s 
ability to “soak up the rich and redistribute to the poor” (Kee, 2004). 
However, Pauly (1973) argues that redistribution can also be interpreted as a local public 
good;  individuals  might  be  more  prone  to  give  money  to  the  poor  of  their  own 
jurisdiction  than  to  the  others.  It  is  true  that  some  local  governments  enforce 
redistributive  policies  (for  instance  by  defining  the  criteria  of  eligibility  for  public 
housing). The Swiss example clearly shows that, under certain conditions, redistribution 
can also be successfully pursued at the state (cantonal) level (Bird et al., 2003). In the 
health care sector for example a system of subsidies both from cantonal and federal level 
has been established in order to help needy citizens pay their health insurance premiums. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the financing of this system of subsidies is borne for two-
thirds  by  the  Confederation  and  the  remainder  by  cantons,  it  is  remarkable  that  the 
implementation of the subsidy distribution lies solely within the single cantons. Hence, 
redistribution of financial resources follows a decentralized framework in this case.  
Note  that  a  decentralization  of  health  care  expenditure  makes  redistributive  policies 
important since the fear is that via decentralization there might be an impoverishment of 
the  access  to  health  care,  because  of  the  different  fiscal  capacity  and  wealth  of 
                                                 
16 This happens because one expects a higher public assistance to poor people in urban areas instead of in 
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jurisdictions. Redistributive policies tackle the problem of horizontal inequity that arises 
when individuals with the same needs and fiscal capacity have a different access to the 
health care sector because they live in two different parts of a country. Not only should 
redistributive polices be concerned with equal access to health care, but they should also 
assure that there exists no differences in health per se. An equal access to inappropriate 
health  services  brings  discomfort,  however  it  is  “equitable”.  Likewise  an  excellent 
distribution of facilities spread out all over the country could be totally meaningless if 
the service was shunned by the population. Hence, even when redistributive policies are 
an affair of sub-layers of government, it is advisable to have a central participation in 




The  goal of  a stabilization policy is to maintain a high employment rate, to control 
inflation  and  to  secure  an  acceptable  rate  of  economic  growth.  Unfortunately  full 
employment and price stability do not happen automatically in a market economy, so 
that public policy guidance is a must. Without it, the economy would tend to be subject 
to fluctuations, and it may undergo periods of inflation and unemployment.
17 The overall 
level of employment and prices in the economy depends on the level of the aggregate 
demand. A central government has two instruments to stabilize the economy: fiscal and 
monetary  devices.  The  array  of  fiscal  instruments  includes  how  to  maneuver  public 
expenditures and tax rates. Government expenditures add to total demand, while taxes 
                                                 
17  Note  that  inflation  and  unemployment  can  occur  simultaneously  in  a  country  (stagflation).  This 
contradicts the famous Phillips curve, which stated in the mid-fifties that the rate of inflation of a country 
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reduce it. The budgetary effects on demand will be the larger, the higher the level of 
expenditures and the lower that of tax revenue.
18 The monetary instrument basically 
includes proper money supply. Money supply has to be controlled by the central bank 
and it must be adjusted to the needs of the economy in terms of short-run stability and 
long-run growth.  
It  is  readily  understandable  that  the  stabilization  function  should  be  pursued  by  the 
central (national) government. In fact, fiscal measures cannot work in the jurisdictions 
since they all are open economies within the national market areas and thus local fiscal 
measures  would  suffer  from  many  leakages.
19  Furthermore,  the  use  of  monetary 
instruments at the lower levels of government is even less acceptable, since central-bank 
policy is inherently a national function. The power to print money would, in fact, invite 
monetary irresponsibility at the local level. There is hence general agreement among the 
public  finance  experts  that  the  national  government  should  have  the  stabilization 
responsibilities. 
 
 (YROXWLRQ RI WKH WKHRU\ RI ILVFDO IHGHUDOLVP WKH VHFRQG
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In the last years the fiscal federalism theory has developed further and some scholars 
have  started  to  talk  about  a  “second  generation  theory”  (Oates,  2004;  Qian  and 
Weingast, 1997). The main areas of interest of the second generation studies in fiscal 
                                                 
18 The government may increase its expenditures or decrease its taxes if demand is to be expanded, and 
vice versa if demand is to be contracted.  
19 Note that, given fixed exchange rates, monetary policy has a special advantage (due to its effects on 
international capital movements) in securing balance of payment adjustments, whereas fiscal policy is 
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federalism dwell on two topics: first, the behavior of political agents who can have their 
own objective function to maximize; second, the information problems. In settings of 
asymmetric  information,  the  literature  has  shown  us  that  optimal  “procedures”  or 
institutions are likely to be quite different from those in a setting of perfect information. 
In particular, Qian and Weingast (1997) stress that the first generation economic theories 
ignore  the  problem  of  why  government  officials  have  an  incentive  to  behave  in  the 
manner prescribed by the theory. They take for granted that political officials provide 
public goods and preserve markets. According to the authors, governments are seen as 
black boxes where people act benevolently, but only a modest explanation is given for 
why government officials would behave in such a way. In Qian and Weingast’s work it 
is  thus  assumed  that  participants  in  the  political  process  have  their  own  objective 
function to maximize, and they try to do so in a political context that constraints their 
behavior. And even in the case in which local officials would like to fulfill the local 
preferences, it is not sure whether the local bureaucracies would follow. The principal-
agent  problem  can  emerge:  the  mayor  is  the  principal  who  gives  order  to  his  local 
bureaucracy, the agent. The degree of control of the principal over the agent and the 
efficiency of this control is very much likely to vary from country to country. But one 
can presume that in many cases, local bureaucracies are not responsive, as they rather 
follow their own agenda with their own objectives than the principal’s. 
The point of departure of Qian and Weingast’s study is that the local government should 
respect two market incentives: (1) the state must maintain positive market incentives that 
reward economic success. In the terms of North (1990), the “state predation” problem 
should be avoided;
20 (2) the state must also commit to negative market incentives that 
                                                 
20 The state predation problem emerges when the government takes away too much income and wealth 
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efforts today (Qian and Weingast, 1997). 7KHWKHRU\RIILVFDOIHGHUDOLVPDQGVRPHDSSOLFDWLRQV 49
 
 
punish economic failure. In the terms of Kornai (1986) problems related to “soft budget 
constraint” should disappear.  
According to the authors this capacity of the public sector to respect the abovementioned 
goals  depends  on  two  elements.  Firstly,  through  the  appropriate  decentralization  of 
information and state power, federalism can establish positive incentives to limit the 
state  predation  problem  and negative  incentives  to  reduce  the  soft  budget constraint 
problem.  Through  a  decentralized  allocation  of  information  and  authority  the  local 
governments  give  credible signals  of its  actions, the  efficacy  of  which  can  be more 
easily tested by citizens. Secondly, competition among jurisdictions forces governments 
to represent citizen interest and to preserve markets. As already underlined by Tiebout 
(1956) interjurisdictional competition allows for increases in efficiency through sorting 
and matching. Qian and Weingast’s approach also adds that competition among sub-
layers of  government  serves  as  a disciplinary  device to  punish  inappropriate  market 
intervention by lower government officials. Their argument parallels the recent models 
developed in corporate control and the theory of the firm. Just as market competition 
pressures firm managers to reflect the interests of the shareholders, competition among 
local governments help to limit the government’s predatory behavior. Similar arguments 
can  be  used  for  the  soft  budget  constraint  problem  (Qian  and  Roland,  1996).  A 
jurisdiction that incurs in inefficient expenditures will find it harder to attract mobile 
resources. As a consequence, competition endogenously hardens the budget constraints 
of local government and changes the incentives of local politicians.  
This is the contribution of the second generation studies on fiscal federalism, which 
must be seen as a complement and not a substitute of the traditional approaches. Qian 
and Weingast (1997) appeal to the theory of the firm to address incentive problems and 
their main result is that political institutions serve a similar role for government officials 50    &KDSWHU
 
 
as firm institutions do for firm managers. Appropriately designed institutions help align 
the public officials’ interests with the ones of the citizens. 
The other area of interest of the second generation studies in fiscal federalism deals with 
the problem of imperfect information. Information asymmetries have long been cited as 
part  of  the  case  for  fiscal  decentralization.  In  the  first  generation  studies  the  local 
governments were thought to have a better knowledge of local preferences and needs. 
However,  there  is  the  interesting  question  of  why  this  would  be  so.  An  important 
contribution  to  this  topic  is  the  work  of  Cremer  et  al.  (1996)  who  suggest  that  the 
information acquisition is endogenous and there is no reason why a central authority 
could  not  make  use  of  a  variety  of  channels  (for  example  surveys  or  pricing 
mechanisms)  to  collect  information  on  local  conditions.  But  such  activities  are  not 
costless, and the failure of the central authorities to obtain such information must reflect 




The  theoretical  aspects  of  fiscal  federalism  have  been  outlined  so  far,  but  what  do 
empirical  applications  reveal  about  this  issue?  Does  decentralization  imply  a  better 
provision of goods and services? In other words, do services provided correspond to 
citizens’ preferences? The goal of this paragraph is to shed light on this aspect: to review 
the empirical literature of the impact of decentralization on service delivery, economic 
growth,  corruption  and  governance,  and  macro  management  and  fiscal  imbalance. 
Unfortunately,  the  literature  provides  mixed  results;  some  studies  find  fiscal 
decentralization to be a sort of panacea for reforming the public sector, while others 






A  consistent  number  of  studies  has  recently  explored  the  impact  of  fiscal 
decentralization  on  service  delivery  in  various  countries.  There  is  not  a  clear-cut 
evidence  of  these  analyses,  since  the  results  go  both  in  a  positive  and  negative 
direction.
21 One of the most representative contribution has been given by Enikopolov 
and Zhuravskaya (2003), who explore the impact of decentralization on the efficiency of 
public good provision, along with government performance and economic growth, by 
using a large sample of 95 countries (both developed and developing) for 25 years. Their 
main results are that the effect of decentralization depends on two aspects of political 
centralization: first, the strength of national party system (measured by the age of the 
main  parties  and  fractionalization  of  the  government  parties);  second,  subordination 
(whether local and state executives are appointed or elected). Solid support is found for 
Riker’s (1964)
22 theory in developing countries, namely that strong parties significantly 
improve the results of fiscal decentralization in terms of economic growth, quality of 
government, and public goods provision. There is also some evidence that subordination 
of local to higher-level governments improves the effect of decentralization on growth 
                                                 
21  The  positive  impact  of  decentralization  on  service  delivery  has  been  found  by  Alderman  (1998), 
Bardhan and Mookherjee (2003), Galasso and Ravallion (2001), Foster and Rosenzweig (2001), Eskeland 
and Filmer (2002), King and Ozler (1998), and Huther and Shah (1996). However, some other studies find 
a  negative  or  inconclusive  impact:  Ravallion  (1998),  West  and  Wong  (1995),  Azfar  and  Livingston 
(2002), Azfar et al. (2000a; 2000b), Winkler and Rounds (1996), and Khaleghian (2003). 
22 Riker argued that a strong party system is a very important source of political accountability; even more 
important than any other administrative and constitutional arrangements. When political parties are strong, 
the career of politicians in the local government depends on their party’s political and financial support to 
get reelected, as well as on the possibility of promotion to the national government. Parties, in turn, are 
interested  in  extending  their  control  over  competent  local  politicians,  so  that  their  policies  become 
associated with the party, and therefore, increase the number of party supporters. 52    &KDSWHU
 
 
and public goods provision both in developed and developing countries, and government 
quality in developing countries. Their main conclusion is hence that a remedy to poor 
service provision in inherently decentralized countries is building strong national parties. 
The impact of decentralization on education and health has been tackled by Letelier 
(2001),  who  depicts  a  strong  and  positive  relationship  between  decentralization  and 
governments’ performance on education and health.
23 Decentralization thus seems to 
have a positive and significant effect on the governmental technical efficiency. This 
result  has  been  later  confirmed  by  Habibi  et  al.  (2003),  who  analyze  the  impact  of 
decentralization on health outcome (infant mortality rate) and on education in Argentina. 
They  use  panel  data  for  the  period  1970-1994  on  the  23  Argentine  provinces  and 
conclude that fiscal decentralization had a positive impact on the delivery of health and 




The  relationship  between  decentralization  and  economic  growth  has  been  frequently 
analyzed by scholars in the last 30 years.
24 As Breuss and Eller (2004) have stressed, 
linking economic growth and decentralization has mainly three reasons: first, growth is 
perceived as one of the main goal pursued by the process of decentralization, because it 
brings with itself a better allocation of resources in the public sector; second, it is one of 
the primary role and intention of each government to pursue policies that accrue per-
capita income; third, per-capita growth is easier to calculate and construe than other 
                                                 
23 Letelier uses a sample of both developed and developing countries. 
24 For further knowledge please refer to Bahl and Linn (1992), Oates (1995), Lin and Liu (2000), Akai et 
al. (2004), Akai and Sakata (2002), Zhang and Zou (1997), Desai et al. (2003), Woller and Phillips (1998), 
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economic  performance  indicators.  Both  theoretical  and  empirical  analysis  that 
investigated  the  relationship  between  federalism  and  economic  growth  tend  to  be 
inconclusive and come up with different results. 
One of the most important contribution in this field is the work of Thiessen (2000), who 
analyzes the impact of decentralization on  economic  growth for a sample of OECD 
countries.
25 The author tests the hypothesis of a hump-shaped relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and economic growth. Where the level of decentralization is too high, 
the spillover effects cannot be internalized and economies of scale are not exploited; the 
consequences  are  negative  growth  effects.  However,  the  same  argument  holds  for  a 
lower level of decentralization: preferences are  not taken into consideration and this 
leads to inefficiencies in the provision of public goods, what inhibits, in turn, economic 
growth. This theoretical framework hence supports the view that, in order to achieve 
economic growth, it is necessary to set the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization. 
Thiessen finds  that  this  hump-shaped  relationship  is  particularly  pronounced  in  high 
income countries, while there is evidence that low per-capita income countries grow 
linearly  with  higher  decentralization  degrees.  Moreover,  the  observed  trend  of 
convergence among high-income OECD countries toward a medium degree of fiscal 




The word “governance” has emerged to be a catch-all term when one speaks about the 
role of institutions in economic activity and particularly socioeconomic development. 
                                                 
25 The countries partaking in the analysis are the EU 15 (Western) members, Switzerland, Norway, Japan, 
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According to the World Bank (1994) definition governance stands for “the manner in 
which  power  is  exercised  in  the  management  of  a  country’s  economic  and  social 
resources  for  development”.  Being  a  complex  term,  governance  is  thus  tough  to 
measure.  Some  papers  have  aimed  to  test  the  hypothesis  that  fiscal  decentralization 
improves governance in a set of countries. An important contribution concerning the 
effect  of  decentralization  on  the  level  of  governance  is  the  paper  of  De  Mello  and 
Barenstein (2001). The authors utilize a cross-country analysis for 78 developed and 
developing  countries  and  show  that  fiscal  decentralization  is  linked  with  various 
indicators  of  governance,  such  as  corruption,  rule  of  law,  and  governmental 
effectiveness. In particular their results point in the direction that governance can be 
enhanced through decentralization of expenditure functions to sublevels of government. 
Moreover, it seems that the higher the subnational share of expenditures, the higher the 
index  of  governance.  The  considerable  improvement  of  this  study  consists  on  the 
consciousness raising that governance is not only affected by fiscal decentralization but 
also by how subnational expenditures are financed. The authors however suggest the 
need for caution in the use of decentralization for improving governance. De Mello and 
Barenstein  argue  that  for  decentralization  to  be  a  catalyst  of  better  government 
performance and quality of life, it is necessary to have the appropriate  political and 
economic  institutions  to  prevent an  excessive capture  of  the benefits  of  government 
provision by local elites, and to ensure that the sublevels of government are operating 
under a hard budget constraint.  
Similar results were reported by Huther and Shah (1998) who, using panel data, find that 
fiscal decentralization is associated with enhanced quality of governance as measured by 
citizen participation, political and bureaucratic accountability, social justice, improved 
economic management and reduced corruption. The positive correlation between all the 7KHWKHRU\RIILVFDOIHGHUDOLVPDQGVRPHDSSOLFDWLRQV 55
 
 
components of the index of governance and the composition of government expenditures 




Empirical evidence of the effect of fiscal decentralization on macro management and 
fiscal imbalance is still scant at present. One of the most quoted study in this area is the 
cross-country  analysis  of  Ebel  and  Yilmaz  (2002),  who  estimate  the  impact  of  the 
various measures of decentralization on economic stability and growth, and public sector 
size. Their main result underlines how the plurality of indicators of decentralization has 
markedly different effects on economic performance. Due to the fragility of estimation 
results  Ebel  and  Yilmaz  hence  suggest  to  be  cautious  when  selecting  the  fiscal 
federalism variable in an empirical application, because the implications of making the 
wrong  choice  ensue  critical  consequences.  Therefore,  the  analysis  of  the  impact  of 
decentralization  on  macroeconomic  indicators  requires  qualitative  and  quantitative 
techniques that take into account the institutional structures of countries.  
A positive relationship between fiscal decentralization and macro management is found 
by Shah (1998). His results point in the direction that decentralized fiscal systems offer a 
greater potential for improved macroeconomic governance than centralized systems. The 
reasons for this lie in the obligation of having a greater clarity in the roles of various 
players  and  decision  makers,  and  in  the  greater  transparency  in  rules  governing 
interactions. 





This chapter has provided an analysis of the traditional arguments of the theory of fiscal 
federalism  underpinning  the  importance  of  a  decentralized  public  setting.  The  most 
important motivations for decentralization are the proximity of the local government to 
the preferences expressed by the local population, thus a minor information gap than a 
central government; the behavior of jurisdictions, which is alike to the behavior of firms 
in a competitive market environment and allows citizens to pick up the community they 
think  it  is  best;  the  Leviathan  hypothesis,  namely  tax  payers  are  not  exploited  by 
government  bureaucrats;  and  the  possibility  of  experimenting  specific  policies  in 
geographically delimited areas, hence delimiting the probability of a failure or spreading 
the  chance  of  a  success  to  all  the  other  sub-layers  of  government.  From  a  political 
viewpoint  local  officials  act  more  in  the  interests  of  their  citizens  because  they  are 
responsible for the outcomes obtained and the chance of being re-elected depends on the 
results achieved.  
The  attention  has  then  turned  to  other  arguments,  which  support a  more  centralized 
organization  of  the  state.  Criticism  on  fiscal  federalism  can  be  summarized  by  five 
points:  the  potential  existence  of  externalities  that  are  not  internalized  by  the  local 
jurisdiction; economies of scale that are not fully exploited; the “race-to-the bottom” 
fear, which leads to a “destructive” and potentially dangerous behavior of sublevels of 
government;  the  lack  of  subnational  officers  to  access  updated  and  comprehensive 
information;  and  the  potential  for  corruption  that  stems  from  the  proximity  of  local 
officials to private local groups, who lobby for their own interests. 
New important contributions in the fiscal federalism theory are given by the so-called 
second generation studies, which draw on different analytical tools of other disciplines 7KHWKHRU\RIILVFDOIHGHUDOLVPDQGVRPHDSSOLFDWLRQV 57
 
 
in order to face specific problems that were not tackled in the first generation studies, as 
for example why the local officials should act like “benevolent dictators” in the interests 
of their citizens. 
The  final  part  of  the  chapter  has  analyzed  the  empirical  literature  of  fiscal 
decentralization  in  different  sectors.  The  literature  provides  mixed  results  and  some 
studies reach inconclusive  outcomes,  but  there  is  almost  a  clear  evidence  that  some 
potential gains derive from decentralization for economic growth and service delivery.  
 





Every  country  contemplating  reform  of  its  health  care  system  faces  a  series  of 
fundamental questions: what is the best way to structure the health sector? Should the 
health system be left to free market principles or is the government action required? 
How to define a national health policy? All these questions arise because health care is a 
good of a complex nature: political authorities strive to reach the goals of efficiency in 
the  use  of  resources,  effectiveness  in  the  quality  of  care  given  the  technologies  at 
disposal, and equity in the access to health care. These objectives are substantially in 
conflict  with each  other.  International  comparisons throughout  history  show  that  the 
achievement of one of these goals threatens the fulfillment of at least one of the other 
two objectives. For example in the United States the level of health technologies is the 
highest among developed countries, insuring the maximum level of health effectiveness. 
Yet this comes at a price of equity because part of the population is uninsured and hence 
has no access to the health care system. The accomplishment of the maximum level of 
quality in the American system goes to the detriment of an equal access to the health 
care providers guaranteed to the whole population. 
The goals outlined in the different health policies of national governments vary with 
time (Cutler, 2002). After the Second World War and up to the mid 1970s governments’ 
primary objective was to guarantee equity of access and universal coverage to the whole 
population. Physicians were paid fee-for-service (FFS) on a retrospective basis and a 
global budget was available for all hospitals. Because the main focus for politicians was 'HFHQWUDOL]DWLRQKHDOWKSROLF\DQGWKHOHYHORIKHDOWKH[SHQGLWXUH 59
 
 
equity, other goals such as efficiency were not taken into consideration; there existed no 
budget constraints, and this contributed to the growth of health expenditure.  
Health policies came under severe strains at the beginning of the 1980s. There were 
basically two reasons for this: first, the economy slowed down (especially after the oil 
shocks). Second, in the political arena this period saw the birth of anti-welfare political 
movements, in a way symbolized by the figures of Margaret Thatcher in Britain and 
Ronald Reagan in the United States, who pushed for the free market ideology as the 
soundest  basis  to  structure  all  social  and  economic  programs,  including  health  care 
(Hacker,  2004).  In  order  to  control  health  expenditure,  which  was  the  second  most 
expensive area of the welfare state behind public pension programs, governments started 
implementing new regulatory and budgetary controls. Rationing services became one of 
the bedrock characteristic of all health care systems (Wilsford, 1995). There was the 
introduction of co-payments for patients and supply regulation became more intense (for 
instance in the form of capitation formulas, fixed budgets, and expenditure caps applied 
to hospitals).  
The 1990s have been characterized by less rationing, which had caused in the former 
decade  a  decrease  in  the  quality  of  services  provided  and  long  waiting  lists,  hence 
dissatisfaction of people towards their own national health care system. Competition and 
decentralization came to the fore as means to revamp and enhance the performance of 
health care systems. Funding and/or managing responsibilities started to be transferred 
to sub-layers of government (i.e. to regions in Italy or to the autonomous communities in 
Spain). The process of decentralizing funding and/or management responsibilities in the 
health care sector has generated considerable interest. Both the World Bank (1987) and 
World Health Organization (1978) have argued that decentralization can make health 
systems function more efficiently and can increase community involvement in oversight 
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accompanied in larger democratization processes and good governance efforts, which 
have helped  promote  greater political stability  and  local  government  responsiveness. 
Decentralization  has  also  attempted  to  remove  inefficient  levels  of  bureaucracy, 
allowing  for  faster  and  more  appropriate  decision  making  for  local  circumstances. 
Through the process of decentralization countries have tried to improve their efficiency 
and constrain costs; in fact, the share of GDP accounted for by health spending in all 
OECD countries has been considerably high and structural reforms of national health 
policies  have  dominated  the  political  agendas  of  advanced  industrial  states  as  never 
before. 
This chapter is structured as follows: section 3.2 examines the market failures and the 
role of the state in health care. Paragraph 3.3 outlines the concept of health policy and a 
description of the typology of health care system is given in section 3.4. Section 3.5 will 
deal with the delicate topic of the allocation of health policies by level of government. 
Here, country cases will be analyzed in order to give a more comprehensive idea of the 
evolution  of  this  sector  across  developed  countries.  The  evolution  of  health  care 
expenditure of OECD countries is set forth in paragraph 3.6. The issues of spending 
control and improvement of efficiency will be put forward in section 3.7. Conclusions 




Health care is a good of a complex nature. Not only it is concerned with the goals of 
equity, efficiency, and effectiveness: for many analysts there is concern for equality in 
the distribution of resources for a particular good, rather than well-being in general. This 'HFHQWUDOL]DWLRQKHDOWKSROLF\DQGWKHOHYHORIKHDOWKH[SHQGLWXUH 61
 
 
is what Tobin (1970) denoted as “specific egalitarianism”.
26 For instance, the British 
NHS, along with many other health services, was founded on the proposition of equal 
access to treatment. Health care comprises all those services performed by health care 
professionals  and  providers  (physicians,  ambulatories,  hospitals)  for  the  purpose  of 
promoting, maintaining, or restoring health. In addition to personal health care, health 
services  include  measures  for  health  protection,  health  promotion,  and  disease 
prevention (World Health Organization, 1998). 
Health  care  is  generally  considered  by  the  society  a  merit  good.  The  free  market 
principle is hence not applicable because it alone cannot perform all economic and social 
functions. For this reason the government has to step in and correct such market failures, 
which represent all those situations where markets do not efficiently organize production 
or  allocate  goods  and  services  to  consumers.  If  market  forces  are  left  alone,  the 
perceived public interest is not attained, and this implies that the role of the state is 
needed (Stiglitz, 1999). 
27 The main market failures in health care can be summarized in 
the following nine points: 
·  Health  care  generates  externalities,  both  positive  and  negative  (Arrow,  1963). 
Improved health provision and health care reduces absenteeism and creates a better 
quality of life and higher living standards.  
 
                                                 
26 Specific egalitarianism is a belief that some goods, but not necessarily all resources, should be spread 
equally across society. 











  Where  substantial  positive  externalities  exist,  the  good  or  service  may  be  under 
consumed or under provided since the free market may fail to take into account their 
effects. This is because the marginal social benefits (MSB) of consuming the good 
are bigger than the marginal private benefits (MPB). Good quality health care brings 
positive spillover effects both for the recipient of the care but also their families and 
associates.  A  well  functioning  health  care  system  also  reduces  the  scale  of 
absenteeism  from  work  due  to  sickness  and  illness.  Figure  3  depicts  how  the 
provision and  consumption  of  health  care  services  leads  to  an  increase  in  social 
benefits and a reduction in social costs. 
  There are also examples of negative externalities arising in the health care sector. 
For instance the poor and unhealthy living conditions of determined layers of the 
population can entail negative externalities in the form of an outburst of an epidemic. 





















·  There are returns to scale and scope in hospital services, meaning that in smaller 
cities and rural areas the local general hospital would have a monopoly power if the 
provision of health care was left to the private market (Connolly and Munro, 1999). 
·  The  asymmetry  of  information  is  a  severe  problem  that  emerges  in  health  care 
(Connolly and Munro, 1999; Arrow, 1963). Patients are not in a position to value if 
their medical consumption is doing any good in their health status. They rely on 
physicians’  decisions.  The  informational  asymmetry  problem  is  conveniently 
captured  in  the  health  status/health  care  distinction.  The  consumer/patient  values 
health status per se, not health care, but health status cannot be bought. Rather the 
patient buys health care in the expectation that it will contribute to health status. The 
normal consumer sovereignty assumption is missing here and the provider/doctor is 
much better informed than the consumer/patient about decisions concerning health. 
·  Asymmetry of information is central to agency issues: there is an agency relationship 
between  the  doctor  and  the  patient  since  the  patient  delegates  decision  making 
authority to the doctor (Arrow, 1986; Mooney and Ryan, 1993; McGuire, 2000). The 
reason  behind  such  delegation  is  that  patients  recognize  that  they  are  relatively 
Cost and 
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uninformed about most appropriate decisions to be made and this problem is solved 
by use of an informed agent. 
·  The  fact  that  physicians  know  more  about  medicine  than  patients  can  lead  to 
supplier-induced demand, a situation where patients are encouraged to buy  more 
medical  care  than  it  is  strictly  necessary  (Labelle  et  al.,  1994;  Phelps,  1986; 
Reinhardt, 1985; Rice and Labelle, 1989). In order to maximize his profit the doctor 
recommends services that he would not prescribe if he was acting as a perfect agent. 
Normal supply and demand of services without inducement form a standard demand 
model,  with  movement  along  the  demand  curve  as  supply  increases.  Supplier-
induced demand involves a shift of the demand curve, so that as supply increases, 
demand also increases. 
·  In the health insurance market the problem of moral hazard emerges (Pauly, 1968; 
Zweifel and Manning, 2000). It results in a change of behavior of consumers/patients 
in  response  to  the  existence  of  a  health  insurance.  Since  health  insurance 
compensates  for  expenditure  on  health  care  services,  the  moral  hazard  problem 
refers to a tendency for such expenditures to be larger if a given individual or group 
is insured. Moral hazard can be manifested in two ways: ex-ante moral hazard arises 
prior to the sickness. Assuming that individuals can reduce the probability of falling 
ill through preventive measures, it can be postulated that insurance coverage, which 
lowers the cost of treatment at the point of consumption, renders being sick a less 
undesirable state, thereby weakening individuals’ incentives to avoid the sick state. 
Conversely, ex-post moral hazard occurs once the individual has become sick. The 
insurance coverage renders the cost of medical cures lower at their point of use, 
which gives rise to greater demand from the patient than would be the case if he had 'HFHQWUDOL]DWLRQKHDOWKSROLF\DQGWKHOHYHORIKHDOWKH[SHQGLWXUH 65
 
 
to  pay  all  his  costs  out-of-pocket.
28  A  further  distinction  is  between  static  and 
dynamic moral hazard. The first one refers to the incentives of overconsumption of 
medical  services,  given  the  technology  present  on  the  market.  The  second  one 
emerges  if  the  insurance  allows  access  to  new  medical  technologies,  offering an 
incentive to the patient to ask for access to the most recent (and thus most expensive) 
technologies. 
·  In  the  context  of  health  insurance  the  problem  of  adverse  selection  arises  from 
asymmetry of information between the buyer and the seller of the insurance policy 
(Cutler and Zeckhauser, 1997). The buyer of insurance may have better information 
about  his  risk  status  than  the  seller.  In  the  extreme,  if  sellers  were  unable  to 
discriminate among buyers at all, they might offer a single type of contract whose 
premium equaled the expected per-capita loss averaged over the community as a 
whole. This entails that all low-risk buyers are overcharged, paying more than an 
actuarially fair premium (plus appropriate load factor). They are subsidizing high-
risk  buyers,  who  pay  less  than  their  expected  loss.  Moreover,  this  makes  the 
insurance policy too expensive for low risk customers, who therefore may choose 
not to buy any health insurance.
29 
·  Insurance companies can tend to “select” good risks and direct bad risks to other 
companies. This practice is know as cream skimming or cherry picking (Newhouse, 
1984;  Pauly,  1984).  In  a  system  where  premiums  are  community-rated,  health 
insurance companies will have a greater incentive to select those population groups 
with minor health risks (such as young and healthy people) rather than higher risks 
as for example the elderly, unemployed, and chronically sick. The problem of cream 
                                                 
28 The distinction between ex-ante and ex-post moral hazard has first been made by Ehrlich and Becker 
(1972).  
29 Please refer to Evans (1984) for a more comprehensive analysis. 66    &KDSWHU
 
 
skimming also happens in a context of selective contracting: health insurers are not 
interested in offering costly health services for the chronically sick or those people in 
need of expensive medical treatments, in order to not attract such bad risks in their 
insurance plan.
30 
·  The health insurance market has a strong propensity to create monopolies or cartels, 
which  lead  to  excess  profits,  poor  quality  products,  and  underproduction  (Hsiao, 
1995).
31 Insurance operations call for sophisticated technical knowledge and ample 
equity  capital,  requirements  that  create  barriers  to  entry  into  the  industry. 
Consequently,  insurance  companies,  once  established,  tend  to  adopt  various 
monopolistic practices, including cartels, unless governments establish and enforce 
strong anti-trust laws. 
All these afflictions call for a need to state regulation in the health care sector. The role 
of  government  intervention  however,  goes  beyond  the  role  of  regulator,  into  the 
definition of the national health policy, which comprises both production and funding of 




According to Longest’s (1998) definition, “Public policies are authoritative decisions 
made in the legislative, executive, or judicial branches of government intended to direct 
or  influence  the  actions,  behaviors,  or  decision  of  the  others.  When  public  policies 
                                                 
30 Selective contracting is the practice by which health insurers enter into participation agreements only 
with certain providers (and not with all providers who qualify) to provide health care services to their 
health plan participants. 
31 The insurance market has increasing returns to scale due to the fact that it can diversify the risk by 
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pertain to or influence our pursuit of health, they become health policies”. Generally, 
health policies affect or influence groups or classes of individuals (such as physicians, 
the  poor,  the  elderly,  or  children)  or  types  or  categories  of  organizations  (such  as 
medical schools, managed care organizations, integrated health care systems, medical 
technology producers, or employers). Thus health policy is a very large set of decisions 
reached through the public policy making process. 
The definition of health policy of the World Health Organization (WHO, 1998) is the 
following: “A formal statement or procedure within institutions (notably government) 
which  defines  priorities  and  the  parameters  for  action  in  response  to  health  needs, 
available resources and other political pressures”.  
Both  definitions  highlight  the  importance  of  the  government,  which  is  one  of  the 
principal  actor  involved  in  shaping  the  national  health  policy.  By  government  one 
understands any representative or part of the governing administration. It is important to 
note that many other actors are involved in the definition of a national health policy. 
First, providers of care comprise a large number of medical and non-medical personnel 
and  services:  physicians,  nurses,  pharmacists,  lab  technicians,  hospitals,  clinics, 
policlinics,  as  well  as  their  professional  associations  or  interest  groups.  Second, 
purchasers of health services, i.e. public or private health insurances, the state and/or 
local authorities in national health systems, households and/or patients paying out-of-
pocket for their medical services, and social services institutions covering determined 
population groups. Third, the private sector, typically the pharmaceutical industry and 
the producers of medical devices. Finally, health pundits, think tanks, research institutes, 
and universities. All these actors contribute to formulate a national health policy.  68    &KDSWHU
 
 
Health policy hence refers to decisions, plans, and actions that are undertaken to achieve 
specific health care goals within a national society. The major aspects of health care 
policy involve:
32 
·  Funding of services: it refers to the generation and collection of funds for health 
care,  i.e.  taxes,  social  insurance  contributions,  or  co-payments,  as  well  as  their 
pooling and redistribution to the payers, namely sickness funds or health authorities. 
Through  these  different  methods  of  financing  the  health  care  system,  one  can 
distinguish then between three different types of systems: the Beveridge model, the 
Bismarck  model,  and  the  private  insurance  model.  Section 3.4  will  highlight  the 
main differences and peculiarities of each of these three systems. 
·  Remuneration of providers: it includes budgeting, diagnostic related groups (DRGs) 
systems, and all remuneration issues closely related to the organization of the health 
care system. 
·  Human resources training: it considers education, training, numbers and planning of 
medical and non-medical personnel in the health care system. 
·  Quality  improvement:  this  should  include  tools  like  guidelines,  evidence-based 
medicine, peer reviews, re-certification of physicians, measurability of outcomes, 
patient  safety,  medical  errors  and  malpractice,  public  disclosure  of  provider 
performance data, benchmarks, and best practice.  
·  Benefit basket: this refers to the benefits covered (for instance the inclusion of dental 
care services), and all decisions related to (new) technologies. 
                                                 
32 A more in-depth description of health policy issues can be found in Walt’s book (1994). Moreover, the 
Health  Policy  Monitor  website  www.healthpolicymonitor.org  gives  broad  indications  of  the  common 
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·  Access: it concerns the access by individual to health care, including problems such 
as rationing, waiting lists, strategies for reducing disparities in health care, etc. 
·  System organization: it includes all developments aimed at the reconfiguration of 
health care providers. It is also about steering functions and responsibilities in the 
organization of the health care system (funding, remuneration, and service delivery). 
·  Long term care: this is about the organization of care for the elderly. It includes 
nursing  homes,  home  or  institutionalized  care,  and  specific  treatment  measures 
(mental  health,  geriatrics,  gerontopsychiatry).  All  questions  related  to  human 
resources in this sector, and quality management are also addressed here.  
·  Pharmaceutical policy: it relates to matters of drug pricing policy, generic drugs, 
pharmaceutical research, and drug innovations.  
·  Role of the private sector: this section controls developments occurred in the private 
sector, as for example vertical and horizontal integrations, hospital chains, etc.  
·  Prevention  and  public  health:  the  first  one  comprises  all  initiatives  or  policy 
approaches geared towards primary and secondary prevention.
33 Public health aims 
at improving health, prolonging life and improving the quality of life among the 
whole population, through health promotion, disease prevention and other forms of 
health intervention.  
It thus follows that health policy decisions affect all medical health care: they result in 
regulations affecting the quality of services provided by hospitals, the training of health 
                                                 
33 Kenkel (2000) defines three categories of prevention: primary preventionis related to the decrease in 
the  probability  of  a  disease  occurrence;  secondary  prevention is  related  to  actions  that  reduce  the 
consequences  of  the  disease  once  it  has  occurred;  and  tertiary  prevention  concerns  the  reduction  of 
disabilities in chronic diseases. Preventive care includes diverse measures such as vaccination, healthy 
diet, regular exercises, regular check-ups for acute diseases and regular symptomatic control of chronic 
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professionals,  the  safety  and  effectiveness  of  pharmaceutical  medications,  and  the 
coverage for medical care for the elderly, disabled, and needy. They also affect many 
aspects of personal  medical care, including access to doctors, insurance coverage of 
particular medical services and procedures, the confidentiality of medical records, and 
the ability of consumers to plan for health care after retirement.  
To put in practice a health policy, key players first need to define the problem to be 
tackled, decide on a goal, and then look at alternative options to meet the goal. They 
need to take into consideration the impact of such policies on patients/consumers of 
care, providers of health care, and those paying for them. They also need to consider the 
best way to assure that goal: in some cases a new law and/or regulation is needed; in 
other cases it may call on professional associations to establish guidelines of clinical 
practice. Health policy discussions also occur within a political framework, subject to 
the voices of consumers, insurers, providers of care, and lobbyists. Policy makers need 
to work with existing laws and programs, so for example expanding or reducing the 
number of people who are eligible for a particular health program. Alternatively, they 
can try to implement more radical changes in the system, a process that may be more 
difficult, by taking a look at international experiences and programs and adapting such 




The previous section has pinpointed the numerous aspects that have to be taken into 
consideration  while  formulating  a  national  health  policy.  One  of  these  points,  the 
funding of services, needs further attention. In fact, health care systems throughout the 
world can be classified in three different types based on their predominant source of 'HFHQWUDOL]DWLRQKHDOWKSROLF\DQGWKHOHYHORIKHDOWKH[SHQGLWXUH 71
 
 
funding (Hoffmeyer and McCarthey, 1994). The Beveridge model is based on taxation 
and is normally referred to as National Health System (NHS). The Bismarck model is 
mainly funded by premiums paid to social health insurers and is referred to as Social 
Health Insurance (SHI) system. The private insurance model is funded by premiums 
paid into private insurance companies. However, this latter model is found only in the 
United States among developed countries. 
Both NHSs and SHI systems pursue the same goals, that is to provide an optimal mix of 
access to medical care, quality in health outcomes, and cost efficiency. However, the 
inner organization of the system itself is different.  
In the Beveridge model, funding is mainly based on taxation and is characterized by a 
centrally  organized  national  health  service  with  services  largely  supplied  by  public 
health  providers  (hospitals,  GPs,  etc).  The  health  care  budget  competes  with  other 
government spending priorities. Countries with a NHS widely accept the role of the 
public sector as the main provider of funds. Most NHSs tend to be integrated systems: 
this implies that the central government and public providers are a unique identity. In the 
integrated  systems  money  does  not  follow  the  patient,  therefore  consumer  choice  is 
typically curtailed, with no choice of hospital or specialist, gatekeeping, and expenditure 
priorities set by providers. Physicians are normally paid through a capitation system or 
with salaries. Waiting lists for particular surgeries tend to be long and the level of public 
satisfaction towards the health care sector is lower than in SHI systems (Blendon et al., 
2001). Some new developments of integrated NHS have moved towards the creation of 
a split between purchasers and providers of services (for example UK in the 1990s). 
The main actors in countries characterized by a social insurance are the insured/patients, 
third-party payers  (sickness  funds),  providers of  care,  and  the  contribution  collector. 
These actors are all linked by a correlating set of relationship and together they shape the 
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social and mandatory insurance. In the Bismarck model health premiums are usually 
linked to a working activity. Those who work pay the health insurance, and the worker’s 
family can benefit of the insurance policy too. Sickness funds compete with each other 
and are on a non-profit basis. The notion of universal coverage in SHI countries is a 
recent phenomenon, being health coverage voluntary for high-income earners in some 
countries (for example Germany and the Netherlands). Health premiums are normally 
related  to  wages,  although  in  Switzerland  premiums  are  community-rated.
34  Most 
physicians are paid fee-for-service, not giving hence that much of an incentive to slow 
down costs. The health care system is in most cases either a reimbursement system, a 
contracting  system  or  a  mix  of  the  two.  In  the  reimbursement  system  patients  are 
charged  for  health  services,  but  then  reclaim  their  expenditure  from  insurers.  Since 
sickness funds do not have any contract with providers of care, there is little incentive 
for  these  latter  to  control  outlays.  The  contract  system  refers  to  a  situation  where 
providers (e.g. hospitals) enter into direct contract with purchasers (e.g. insurers) over 
the services they will supply. With multiple insurance funds, competition between them 
gives  the  consumers  some  power  over  the  range  and  quality  of  treatment  on  offer. 
Gatekeeping does not exist (only in the Netherlands) and the insured have an ample 
margin of choice, because they have the ability to select among contracted providers 
and,  in  some  countries,  among  different  sickness  funds.  The  level  of  citizens’ 
satisfaction with their own health care system is higher than in NHS countries, probably 
due to the ample decision power of citizens. 
In the private insurance model, funding of the system is based on premiums paid to 
private insurance companies. Competing health insurances set their premiums according 
to  the  risk  characteristics  of  each  individual,  or  groups  of  individuals,  through 
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employment. Health insurance is not mandatory, and people with a low income are often 
unable to afford insurance. This system, in its pure form, exists in the United States, 
where  an  estimated  14%  of  the  population  (Docteur  et  al.,  2003a)  is  without  an 
insurance coverage. The US government provides and finances health care for people 
with  low  income  (Medicaid)  and  for  elderly  patients  (Medicare).  Some  recent 
developments in the private insurance model have gone in the direction of the creation 
of so-called “consumer driven health insurance plans” (sometimes also referred to as 
“defined  contribution  health  plans”  or  “consumer-oriented  health  plans”),  where  an 
employer  provides  limited  funding  and  a  menu  of  benefit  options  from  which  an 
employee  can  choose.  In  addition,  employees  can  generally  supplement  employer-
provided funding in order to buy additional benefits or higher levels of coverage. In 
other words, those individuals opting for plans with rich benefits may have to contribute 
significant  amounts  of  their  own  money  in  addition  to  the  employer’s  contribution. 
Those who opt for bare-bones health plans contribute less out of their own pocket.  
All these systems have undergone several changes in these last years as the demand for 
health  care  kept  outstripping  the  funds  available.  This  is  partly  related  to  ageing 
populations,  increasing  costs  and  demand  for  new  (and  more  expensive)  medical 
technology. Reforms basically focused on market-based incentives as a means to contain 
outlays and improve the allocation of resources. Other countries opted for decentralizing 
specific functions (financing, management and delivery of health services) to sub-layers 
of government or to specifically new created agencies.  





The features of the economic theory of fiscal federalism are multifaceted and opposing. 
As already stressed in sections 2.2 and 2.3, there exist both pro-decentralization and pro-
centralization arguments that should help deciding about the allocation of some specific 
tasks to a defined level of government. Moreover, empirical suggestions are ambiguous 
and often end up with mixed results (see paragraph 2.6).  
The allocation of health policy to a level of government is far from being crystal clear. 
In fact, if for some policy areas it is well acknowledged that these should be assigned to 
the national/central level (e.g. national defense, monetary and fiscal policy, industry, 
energy or agriculture), for other fields (health, education, social policy, and research) the 
optimal allocation is controversial and remains an open chapter. Different countries have 
opted for decentralizing specific health functions to sublevels of government, with the 
aimed goals of increasing the local autonomy and giving more space to local voice. In 
this way people experience an empowerment of their position within the system and the 
responsiveness to local needs should become higher, so as the quality of health care. 
Health decentralization is typically a process through which operating responsibilities 
are allocated to a lower sublevel of government, while both strategic policy making and 
responsibility for overall outcome remains normally a national government priority. The 
essence behind this process is to increase the decision space of the local level for the 
local  level,  so  that health  systems  can  be  more  responsive  to  local needs  and  more 
efficient in the provision of health services. An important dimension to be considered 
while decentralizing the health sector is that the nature of the social environment is a 'HFHQWUDOL]DWLRQKHDOWKSROLF\DQGWKHOHYHORIKHDOWKH[SHQGLWXUH 75
 
 
crucial  aspect  and  an  important  factor  that  should  not  be  underestimated  in  the 
realization of the policy vision (Atkinson, 2002).
35  
The  scope  of  this  paragraph  is  threefold:  first,  to  focus  on  the  present  studies  that 
analyzed the allocation of health policy by level of government; second, to comprehend 
how decentralization has been structured; and third, to set out the implementation of 
decentralization, describing the criteria used for classifying the health organization of 




As outlined above, there exist some policy areas that should be assigned to the central 
government, while some other policy chapters cannot be assigned to one single level of 
government, because that would not be optimal. One such example is the environmental 
policy. In the context of the European Union (EU) for instance, scale effects as well as 
the  setting  of  EU  environmental  standards  require  an  important  involvement  of  the 
Union  itself,  which  is  a  supranational  level  of  government.  However,  various 
externalities may take place and have an effect on different levels of government, what, 
in turns, calls for a decentralization of such a policy. 
The allocation of health policy still remains controversial. On the one hand, theoretical 
arguments about the consideration of heterogeneous local preferences, and effects of 
interjurisdictional competition push for decentralization of these functions (Alesina et 
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al., 2001; Smekal, 2001). On the other hand, adverse effects of subnational provision of 
the stock of human capital (Ter-Minassian, 1997), and avoidance of R&D duplication 
(Hoeller et al., 1996) depict strong reasons for an assignment to the central level of 
government. Some unitary states have located health responsibilities to lower levels of 
government (e.g. Finland), while some others still lodge health care at the central level 
(e.g. Greece). Federal states are by definition characterized by a marked decentralization 
of functions to sub-layers of government (e.g. Switzerland).
36 Note that the difficulty of 
establishing the exact allocation of health policy by level of government persists in all 
these three cases. As Banting and Corbett (2002) and Hacker (2004) stress, there is one 
function in health care, namely the distribution function, which is almost never left to 
sub-layers of government but is pursued at the central level. Equity seems to be a duty of 
the  center,  because  a  centralized  commitment  manages  to  maintain  the  “social 
citizenship” across the whole country.  
Alesina et al. (2001) construct a set of indicators to measure the policy making role of 
the European Union in a selected number of policy domains, including health care. Their 
focus is on whether a supranational body, such as the EU, should intervene in shaping 
health policies, or whether these latter must be left to national and subnational entities. 
Their  main  theoretical  argument  points  out  that  the  EU  should  focus  there  where 
economies  of  scale  are  large  and  the  internalization  of  externalities  is  applicable. 
Functions  should  be  delegated  to  national  or  lower  levels  of  government,  if  the 
heterogeneity of preferences is predominant relative to the benefit of scale. For their 
analysis the authors use Eurobarometer data.
37 Alesina et al. calculate their own index as 
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system.  This  country  runs  counter  to  the  generally  accepted  association  that  federalism  equals 
decentralization of functions. 
37 Eurobarometer is a public opinion survey conducted, twice a year, face-to-face with a representative 
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an average between those respondents who want health to be a shared responsibility of 
the state and the EU, those who want it to be a national responsibility, and those who are 
undecided about the right allocation of this policy area. The results point in the direction 
that  health  is  perceived  in  all EU  countries  as  a  national  matter. Note  that  in  those 
countries where health decentralization is more marked (Sweden, Finland, Denmark) the 
population is less willing to share responsibilities for health with a supranational body. 
Alesina  et  al.  subsequently  report  the  results  of  a  different  aggregation  measure  of 
country preferences: they show how many votes a proposal to centralize a policy domain 
would hypothetically get, if member governments were to vote in the European Council 
according  to  the  outcome  of  the  Eurobarometer  survey.  Even  with  this  different 
aggregate index, it appears that health would be voted to be undertaken at the national 
level. The researchers conclude by stating that the assignment of health policy should be 
given  to  national  entities  because  this  allows  to  exploit  economies  of  scale  and 
knowledge  spillovers  across  jurisdictions.  The  support  of  subnational  levels  is  also 
advisable because it involves local preferences and backgrounds.  
Hoeller et al. (1996) review fiscal relations within the EU in the context of the theory of 
fiscal federalism and of the principle of subsidiarity. The authors claim that cooperation 
between  member  states  of  the  EU  would  help  avoiding  duplication  of  services  and 
overcoming imperfections. The supranational level is more appropriate when high-risk 
capital is involved, when R&D costs are high, and when economies of scale play an 
important role. For all these reasons health should then be allocated to a supranational 
body, with the supporting role of the central governments of each member state. 
Letelier  (2001)  studies  the  impact  of  fiscal  decentralization  on  education and health 
services. He estimates a Tobit model that regresses DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) 
efficiency scores on explicative variables. He deals with cross-country data for a sample 
of 55 countries. The point of departure of the analysis is that a decentralized structure of 78    &KDSWHU
 
 
government should be of more help in improving the quality of locally provided public 
goods, namely school education and primary health. The main results point out that a 
more decentralized setting produces a significant improvement on the efficiency of both 
education and health services, although the quality of public health services is improved 
to a  statistically  less robust  degree.  Health policy  issues  should  thus  be  allocated at 
subnational levels of government. 
Shah (2002) focuses on the role of different levels of government, civil society, and the 
private sector in shaping the health policy, and takes into consideration developing and 
transition economies.  Out  of a  sample of  33  countries  health appears  in  the area  of 
shared responsibility of the central government and its sublevels. Shah underlines that 
health  policies,  when  more  than  one  layer  of  government  is  involved,  tend  to  be 
typically uncoordinated. The role of the center should then be to set minimum standards 
in regional-local services, and this for two reasons: firstly, there is an advantage to the 
nation as a whole from such standards as these will contribute to the free flow of goods 
and  services,  labor  and  capital,  and  reduce  wasteful  interjurisdictional  expenditure 
competition, and will therefore improve the gains from trade from the internal common 
market. Secondly, setting standards serve national equity issues. Shah highlights that, as 
an alternative to centralized controls, some governments have opted for relating higher 
to  lower  jurisdictions  through  results-oriented  lines  of  accountability.  The  example 
reported is the model of health decentralization developed in Brazil. Results-oriented 
contracts are developed between the central government that provides funds, and local 
clinics  that  provide  health  services.  Such  contract  system  institutionalizes  greater 
autonomy for local governments than do other decentralization regimes, holding them 
accountable  for  their  results,  nonetheless  not  binding  their  processes.  An  overall 
conclusion  of  the  paper  is  that  citizen  voice,  choice  and  exit  options  are  critical 
conditions for the success of decentralized decision making. All levels of government 'HFHQWUDOL]DWLRQKHDOWKSROLF\DQGWKHOHYHORIKHDOWKH[SHQGLWXUH 79
 
 
should  be  involved  in  the  administration  and  delivery  of  health  services;  however, 
subnational entities are the most appropriate layer to allocate health policies, while the 
center is more suited for a supportive role, in particular for policy standards and control.  
Ter-Minassian (1997) takes a more critical position towards decentralization of health 
care.  According  to  her,  there  can  be  some  significant  efficiency  costs  from 
decentralization in the case of adverse effects of subnational provision of the stock of 
human  capital.  The  fear  is  that  sub-layers  of  government  may  lack  managerial  and 
organizational  skills.  Moreover,  inefficiencies  can  arise  from  duplication  of  health 
services in the case of local provision. For these reasons the national level is the more 
appropriate layer for allocating health responsibilities. A supranational level (such as the 
EU) may also play an important role in the definition of health policy standards. The 
author remarks that the choice of the appropriate level of administration for health care 
services depends crucially on the type of services: preventive and public health clearly 
being provided best at the local level. Others depend crucially on the administrative 
capabilities of the country, as well as the financing arrangements.  
Table  1  reports  the  main  conclusions  of  the  abovementioned  studies  and  shows  the 
allocation of health policy to different levels of government and supranational entities.  





$XWKRUV 68% 1$7 6835$
Alesina et al. (2001)  X  X   
Hoeller et al. (1996)    (X)  X 
Letelier (2001)  X     
Shah (2002)  X  (X)   
Ter-Minassian (1997)  (X)  X  X 
SUB:  Subnational  level  of  government  (regions,  provinces,  cantons,  etc.), 
NAT:  National-central level,  SUPRA:  Supranational  level  (e.g.  the  EU). X: 
unreserved responsibility of the respective level, (X): supporting involvement 
of the respective level. 
 
To recap there is not unanimity when deciding about which level of government is the 
most appropriate to allocate health policy. In the last decades different countries have 
taken steps in the direction of decentralizing and devolving health responsibilities to 
sub-layers of government. In particular, some countries have opted to decentralize only 
managerial and delivery functions to sublevels of government, while for other countries 
the  process  of  decentralization  has  been  more  marked  and  has  involved  a  shift  of 
managerial,  delivering  and  also  financial  functions  downwards.  The  following 
paragraphs will pinpoint how the process of decentralization should be structured and 






Health reformers pursue decentralization largely to increase health sector performance, 
but in many cases governance and political goals also figure importantly. The following 
list, drawn primarily from Bossert et al. (2000), enumerates frequently cited objectives: 
·  Increase service delivery effectiveness through adaptation to local conditions and 
targeting to local needs. 
·  Improve  efficiency of resource utilization by incorporating local preferences into 
determination of service mix and expenditures. 
·  Increase cost-consciousness and efficiency of service production through closer links 
between resource allocation and utilization. 
·  Increase  health  worker  motivation  through  local  supervision  and  involvement  of 
service users in oversight, performance assessment, etc. 
·  Improve accountability, transparency, and legitimacy by embedding health service 
delivery in local administrative systems. 
·  Increase  citizen  participation  in  health  service  delivery  by  creating  systems  and 
procedures for involvement in planning, allocation, oversight, and evaluation. 
·  Increase  equity  of  service  delivery  by  enabling  marginalized  and  poor  groups  to 
access  health  care  providers  and  to  influence  decisions  on  service  mix  and 
expenditures. 
·  Increase  the  role  of  the  private  sector  in  health  service  delivery  by  separating 
financing of health care from service provision. 82    &KDSWHU
 
 
Almost all decentralization strategies include several of these objectives, and in fact 
many of them are complementary. However, there can also be trade-offs, tensions, and 
conflicts.  For  example,  deconcentrating  units  of  a  health  ministry  may  increase  the 
efficiency of resource allocation by allowing health facility managers to make decisions 
about  purchasing  supplies  or  replenishing  medicine  stocks,  but  may  not  empower 
service users and beneficiaries to have a say in allocation decisions. Local staff of the 
ministry may resist community input on the grounds that such participation is costly and 
that health professionals know best what services and medications should be provided, 
when, and by what level of health manpower.  
In a decentralized health care context there are two or more layers of government that 
are  responsible  for  governing  a  health  care  system.  Therefore  there  is  often  a  co-
responsibility of roles. The central government applies in most cases an equalization 
mechanism  in  order  to  secure  roughly  comparable  levels  of  services  at  roughly 
comparable levels of taxation; specific “health standards”, such as for example in Italy, 
are  fixed  by  the  center  with  the  requirement  that  they  must  be  homogeneously 
guaranteed within national borders. But when the center basically retains the power to 
levy taxes, there are often situations of unfounded mandates, that is, when determined 
actions imposed by the federal or state government on lower levels of government are 
not accompanied by the money needed to fund the action required. This, in turns, creates 
possible conflicts and situations of tension between the layers of government that should 
be taken into consideration beforehand.  
Decentralization across the health care systems of developed countries has taken place to 
a  variety  of  different  actors.  It  is  possible  to  distinguish  between  territorial 
decentralization, namely when responsibilities are referred to local organizations that 
have well defined geographical boundaries; and functional decentralization, that is when 
authority is transferred to a specialized local office (Rondinelli, 1981). The model of 'HFHQWUDOL]DWLRQKHDOWKSROLF\DQGWKHOHYHORIKHDOWKH[SHQGLWXUH 83
 
 
territorial units (regions, counties, municipalities) depends on the history, traditions, size 
of the country, social and economic factors. Some examples are Sweden, where county 
councils  and  municipalities  have  a  long  tradition  of  providing  public  services,  and 
Switzerland,  where  the  principle  of  federalism  is  deeply  rooted  in  the  history  and 
traditions  of  the  country.  Functional  decentralization  takes  place  when  authority  is 
transferred to newly established units that may have separate legal status (Mills, 1994). 
The health care sector in Britain has been fragmented into separate organizational units, 
NHS trust hospitals and Crown Health Enterprises with a distinct legal identity. Ireland 
has created 8 Regional Health Boards that are responsible for the overall organization of 
health care services. 
Any  decision  to  decentralization  in  health  care  raises  three  major  issues:  to  whom 
authority  should  be  given,  what  tasks  of  delivery  of  health  care  systems  should  be 
decentralized, and with which regulatory controls. Starting from the seminal work of 
Rondinelli (1981), most literature subsequently kept identifying four standard types of 
decentralization (deconcentration, delegation, devolution, and privatization) based on the 
combination of the level of autonomy and location of accountability between local and 
central government (Litvack et al., 1998). When deconcentration takes place the central 
government disperses responsibilities for certain services to its regional branch offices, 
which implement decisions taken at the center. This is a weak form of decentralization 
because the central government keeps in effect substantial authority in decision making 
and  management  of  public  functions.  Deconcentration  has  generally  taken  place  in 
unitary states, although it can also exist for some functions in federal states, when the 
center maintains a strong interest in ensuring delivery of a particular service. Examples 
of  deconcentration  are  found  in  the  primary  care  trusts  in  Britain,  which  are  still 
accountable  to  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Health,  and  in  Poland  (Golinowska  and 
Tymowska,  1995).  The  Norwegian  hospital  sector  showed  the  features  of 84    &KDSWHU
 
 
deconcentration,  prior  to  recentralization  in  2002.  Portugal  is  another  example  of  a 
country that experienced deconcentration: notwithstanding the creation of five health 
administrations,  in  practice  responsibility  for  planning  and  resource  allocation  has 
remained highly centralized. 
Delegation of power is present in many European health care systems and refers to a 
situation in which the central government transfers responsibility for decision making 
and administration of public functions to local governments or agencies, which executes 
certain tasks on behalf of the center. In this case regional authorities or agencies have a 
great deal of discretion in decision making. Germany’s social insurance system depends 
heavily  on  self-regulating  private  non-profit  sickness  funds  and  professional 
associations. In the Netherlands, policy traditionally has been prepared and implemented 
by a massive neo-corporate bureaucracy, bringing together government agencies, quasi-
governmental organizations (the advisory and executive agencies), the private national 
organizations  of  suppliers  and  providers,  and  the  insurers.  Delegation  has  mainly 
occurred in the cure-sector, that is, acute care and both specialist and general medicine.
38 
Britain  also  experienced  delegation  by  introducing  an  internal  market  in  which 
purchasers  and  providers  were  separated.  Austrian  social  insurance  funds  have  the 
strongest planning and regulatory power in primary health care. 
Devolution is the most profound form of decentralization because the center transfers 
substantial  authority  for  decision  making,  finance,  and  management  to  regional 
governments that are accountable to their constituents. Devolution is very widespread in 
the  Nordic  region  of  Europe.  Some  examples  are:  Norway  (prior  to  recentralization 
started at the beginning of 2002), Finland and Sweden, but also Spain (in 7 out of 17 
regions till 2002), and Italy that started decentralizing health care in the year 2000 with a 
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Legislative  Decree  that  prescribed  the  abolition  of  the  National  Health  Fund  to  be 
replaced by various regional taxes. 
Privatization implies the transfer of responsibilities, previously carried out by the center, 
from public to private enterprises. Privatization of service management is experienced in 
the hospital sector in Sweden (Görans Hospital in Stockholm). Privatization of primary 
health care providers and pharmacies has occurred in Czech Republic  and Hungary. 
Poland had a process of privatization in the dental care sector, private medical practices 
and  pharmacies.  Generally,  privatization  has  been  the  major  means  utilized  for 
decentralization in health care in the former Soviet Union countries too. 
The  second  major  decision  to  be  taken  into  account  concerns  the  tasks  to  be 
decentralized in the service delivery of health care systems. There is a rich variety of 
examples across European countries. Perhaps the only function in health systems that 
has been rarely decentralized is the responsibility for strategic policy making, which 
remains lodged in the central government.
39 The range and degree of decentralization is 
very diverse across countries. Primary health care, nursing home services and home care 
providers  are  normally  much  decentralized.  In  some  cases  municipalities  run  these 
services (e.g. the nursing home sector is regulated by communes in Switzerland), while 
in  some  other  cases  this  task  is  pursued  by  large  non-profit  but  also  for-profit 
organizations (as in the Netherlands). With respect to the hospital sector in Denmark, 
Sweden,  Italy  and  Spain,  hospitals  are  either  owned  or  supervised  by  regional 
governments or counties. In Finland, these are controlled by municipalities. In countries 
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making,  such  as  the  planning,  operation  and  construction  of  hospitals,  the  elaboration  of  health  and 
hygiene policies, the regulation of hospital external care, the management of medical and paramedical 
schools, the registration and control of drugs, activities in the field of health prevention and promotion, 
and  regulation  of  patients’  rights  are  all  under  the  authority  of  cantons.  As  Hacker  (2004)  states, 
Switzerland has long been characterized by the  most anemic government role in health policy of all 
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that have a social insurance system, most hospitals are private non-profit in ownership, 
and managed by local boards of trustees. 
The central government is the institution in charge of monitoring and supervising the 
health  care  dimension  even  when  decentralization  reaches  its  maximum  level  in  a 
particular nation. In order to ensure acceptable and equal outcomes across differently 
managed  decentralized  bodies,  governments  rely  on  a  wide  variety  of  regulatory 
measures.  Health  sector  regulation  encompasses  areas  like  licensing  of  provider 
institutions and medical and health professionals; control of communicable diseases and 
epidemics;  regulations  pertaining  to  sera,  vaccines,  poisons  and  food  quality; 
establishing legal malpractice and/or physician discipline systems; establishing macro-
level  financial  expenditure  controls;  and  more  recently,  in  Britain  and  Sweden, 
monitoring and evaluating clinical performance (Saltman et al., 2002). Spain passed a 
law in 2003 that balances decentralized regional control over health funding (although 
this is still limited) and production with national government concerns about the quality 




Some relevant factors affecting the implementation of a decentralization strategy in a 
country  are  the  basic  structure  of  the  state  itself  (federal  versus  unitary),  and  the 
typology of the health care system (NHS versus SHI). 
The essential characteristic of federations is that they are composed of two (or more) 
tiers of government and operate within a constitutional structure that combines shared 
rule through common institutions for certain specific purposes, and regional self-rule 'HFHQWUDOL]DWLRQKHDOWKSROLF\DQGWKHOHYHORIKHDOWKH[SHQGLWXUH 87
 
 
through the government of the constituent territorial units for certain specific purposes.
40 
Thus,  federal  states  (for  example  Germany  or  Switzerland)  have  a  Constitution  that 
clearly  defines  the  separate  policy  and  law-making  responsibilities  assigned  to  the 
national as against the regional governments. The national government is in no position 
to  modify  or  remove  those  powers  constitutionally  assigned  to  the  lower  tiers  of 
government.  Quite  differently,  unitary  states  have  Constitutions  and/or  operating 
principles  (as  in  the  case  of  the  United  Kingdom,  which  does  not  have  a  written 
Constitution)  that  assigns  nearly  all  regular  policy  and  law-making  authority  to  the 
national  government.  Some  specific  policies  can  be  handed  over  by  the  central 
government to the subnational units but this does not imply that such responsibilities 
will be located for always at the lowest tiers. On the contrary, the central state maintains 
its power to modify or withdraw its decision if it so decides. The most striking and 
recent example in the health care sector is Norway. This unitary country traditionally 
had a highly decentralized health care system. For more than 30 years responsibilities 
for  providing  and  planning  specialized  care  were  devolved  to  the  19  counties.  This 
period came to an end on January 1
st, 2002 when the Norwegian central government 
took over responsibility and ownership of all public somatic and psychiatric hospitals. 
With this unexpected move Norway seems to go against the stream of decentralization in 
the organization of OECD health care systems. 
Another pivotal characteristic that affects the implementation of decentralization is the 
nature  of  the  health  care  system  of  a  country.  With  the  exception  of  the  US,  the 
remainder  of  OECD  countries  can  be  categorized  as  either  National  Health  Service 
(NHS) or Social Health Insurance (SHI). As explained in section 3.4 there are some 
differences between these two health care organization models: NHS are mostly public 
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integrated,  funding  is  collected  through  general  taxation,  the  population  is  entirely 
covered, the choice of provider is limited and GPs act as gatekeepers. SHI schemes are 
based  on  a  reimbursement  or  contract  system,  are  funded  mainly  through  health 
insurance premiums paid to sickness funds, coverage is not 100% in all countries, and 
the insured are free to choose any provider. 
Yet this division between NHS and SHI has become blurred in some cases. The British 
NHS and the Canadian insurance system are more alike than different. The financing 
arrangements are similar: the central government in the UK and the provinces in Canada 
are the main funding actors and pay for services directly. The real difference is in the 
ownership of medical facilities; mainly public in Britain and mostly private in Canada.
41 
To  mention  another  example,  New  Zealand  with  77.5%  public  funding  in  2000  for 
health  care,  is  closer  to  the  insurance-funded  European  health  care  systems  such  as 
France and the Netherlands, than the British tax-funded health system with 85% public 
funding  (WHO,  2001).  NHSs  are  mainly  tax-based  financed:  they  are  very  much 
decentralized  in  the  Nordic  countries  of  Europe,  it  is  becoming  a  responsibility  of 
regional governments in Italy and Spain, and it is highly centralized in Greece, Ireland, 
New Zealand, Portugal and the UK. Most tax-based health care systems rely on the 
single-payer  characteristic.
42  Some  recent  trends  in  tax-based  health  care  system  in 
western Europe are the splitting of purchaser and provider (the United Kingdom), and 
the delegation of responsibilities from the central to the regional governments (Spain 
and  Italy).  SHI  systems  are  financed  primarily  by  health  insurances  and  partly  by 
taxation.  Austria,  France,  Germany,  Luxembourg  and  The  Netherlands  fund  their 
                                                 
41 The reference is to primary health care services. Most GPs in Canada are private practitioners who work 
in independent or group practices and enjoy a high degree of autonomy. On the contrary, in the UK most 
GPs are registered as part of the NHS. 
42 A general definition of single-payer system would be the financing of health care expenditure for a 
nation’s entire population through a single source, normally the government, with funds collected through 
progressive taxation of citizens and businesses. 'HFHQWUDOL]DWLRQKHDOWKSROLF\DQGWKHOHYHORIKHDOWKH[SHQGLWXUH 89
 
 
systems  mainly  through  social  insurances.  Australia  and  Canada  fund  health  care 
principally through taxation. Generally those countries with SHI rely on the multi-payer 
system.
43  SHI  countries  normally  have  a  contribution  collector,  that  can  be  the 
government  itself (Belgium,  France  and  the  Netherlands),  a  union of  sickness  funds 
(Luxembourg), or the individual sickness funds (Austria, Germany and Switzerland). 
Sickness funds act as third-party payers and establish contracts with providers, who are 
usually  a  public-private  mix.  The  insured  (population)  have  a  pre-determined 
membership  in  sickness  funds  in  some  countries  as  Austria,  France,  Luxembourg, 
Germany (till 1995), and the Netherlands (till 1992). Such membership depends on the 
principle of occupation in most cases. In other states like Belgium, Switzerland, the 
Netherlands  (since 1993),  and  Germany  (since  1996)  people  can  freely choose  their 
funds, so that these latter are in competition. In fact, comparing the number of sickness 
funds in 1992 and 2002 in these countries one acknowledges a strong reduction in their 
number: from 127 to 100 in Belgium, from 191 to 93 in Switzerland, from 27 to 24 in 
the  Netherlands,  and  from  1223  to  355  in  Germany.  The  incentive  to  merge  in 
competitive environments clearly becomes attractive. 
To conclude the nature and type of decentralization that is possible to implement is 
contingent  upon  the  basic  constitutional  structure  of  the  state  itself.  Furthermore, 
decisions about decentralizing specific functions are typically first made on a general 
policy  level,  with  implications  for  the  health  care  sector  coming  afterwards.  Health 
decentralization  has  occurred  both  in  NHS  and  in  SHI  systems.  However, 
decentralization  in  some  NHS  systems  (especially  Nordic  countries)  has  occurred 
                                                 
43 A multi-payer system has more than one actor paying for health care expenditure in a country. It is 
based on insurance fund that pay for care within a public regulatory framework. The multi-payer systems 
generally create the greatest diversity of coverage across citizens and, in some cases, even exclude from 
statutory protection wealthier citizens, who are expected to insure themselves and are not automatically 
covered otherwise (the Netherlands and Germany).  90    &KDSWHU
 
 
entirely inside the public sector, while in SHI countries it has involved private non profit 




The classification of a country as health centralized or health decentralized is done in 
two steps in this analysis. The first step takes into consideration the nature of the health 
care organization of a nation, that is whether the system is organized as a NHS or a SHI 
system. If the identification of a health care system as a NHS or SHI is straightforward, 
the second step, which regards the level of decentralization of health care, takes into 
consideration two criteria: 
1.  The first criteria concerns the organization and overall management responsibilities. 
In other words the focus is on the determination of the sublevel of government that is 
in  charge  to  plan,  organize,  deliver  and  manage  health  care  services.  The 
organization  of  the  system  implies  the  planning  and  design  of  the  institutional 
features,  it  includes  formulating  policies,  defining  priorities  and  their  respective 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation. 
2.  The second  criteria takes into consideration the financing viewpoint, that is who 
provides health care organizations with the financial resources that are required to 
carry out a general range of health-related activities. Financing of health services can 
take place through taxation, public social insurance, private insurance and out-of-
pocket payments. Both taxation and public social insurance can be a central or a 
local duty. 
Some  OECD  countries  show  full  territorial  decentralization,  so  that  both  criteria 
(management and funding) are responsibilities of the local government. This is a typical 'HFHQWUDOL]DWLRQKHDOWKSROLF\DQGWKHOHYHORIKHDOWKH[SHQGLWXUH 91
 
 
situation in Scandinavian countries and Switzerland, which show a high devolution of 
health responsibilities in the organization of their health care systems.
44
 Other countries 
have  opted  for  full  decentralization  of  organizational  and  managerial  skills  but  the 
central government still retains the assignment to fund the system. Some examples are 
Spain and Italy.
45
 In other nations the central government retains the power to fund and 
organize the health care system (e.g. Belgium and Luxembourg). This gives birth to 
three possible cases that can be analyzed and they are represented in table 2. 
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The empirical part of this study focuses on a sub-group of OECD countries, namely the 
former  EU  15  Member  States,  Australia,  Canada,  New  Zealand,  Norway,  and 
Switzerland. The descriptive analysis will also take into consideration data of the United 
States, which is considered separately because the country does not belong either to a 
NHS or a SHI classification. This set of countries was chosen for the reliability, better 
availability and quality of data provided by the OECD Health Data 2004. An additional 
                                                 
44 Note that Norway underwent a major reform in the organization of its health care system in 2002. Prior 
to this reform, Norway had a main centralized funding system and a highly decentralized management of 
health  responsibilities,  which  were  attributed  to  the  counties.  After  the  reform  Norway  has  removed 
responsibilities from the counties to large health regions run by boards appointed by  the Minister of 
Health. 
45  Italy  experienced  an  important  reform  in  the  health  sector  in  the  late  1990s  that  called  for 
decentralization of health affairs. This change is gradually moving financing responsibilities from the 
center to the regional governments. It is believed that by assigning financial responsibilities to regions 
future soft-budget constraint problems should be avoided. 92    &KDSWHU
 
 
reason for the choice of this sample of countries is the possibility of learning from each 
other’s experiences, given the fact that all countries have well established and developed 
economic and political systems. By focusing on these selected states we analyze similar 
realities, where there is a relatively high per-capita income and most people have a high 
standard of living with access to goods and services than in developing countries.  'HFHQWUDOL]DWLRQKHDOWKSROLF\DQGWKHOHYHORIKHDOWKH[SHQGLWXUH 93
 
 
Based on the criteria set out previously, the following matrix shows the classification of 
the 20 OECD countries in four clusters, for the period 1990-2000. A more in-depth 






























                                                 
46  Spain  is  a  peculiar  country  because  the  process  of  devolution  of  health  responsibilities  to  the 
autonomous  communities  (AC)  lasted  about twenty  years.  This  process  has  reached its  end in  2002. 
Before 2002 Spain was characterized by an “asymmetric federalism”. Some AC had complete authority 
over health matters; other AC did not. Spain has been catalogued as a centralized country for the period 
1990-2000 because devolution was a piecemeal process and took considerable time and effort to take 
place. The way in which responsibilities were given to AC varied considerably and this generated high 
confusion in the overall system (European Observatory, 2000). 
47 Despite the fact that Australia is catalogued as a SHI country, most financial resources for health care 
are collected via taxation. However, most resources are levied through a specific tax (compulsory health 
insurance levy), which is a specific tax of the Medicare program and cannot exceed 1.5% of the disposable 
income. It can be considered on a par with a health insurance premium. Furthermore, Clemente et al. 
(2004)  classify  Australia  as  a  SHI  country  in  their  study  on  international  stability  of  health  care 
expenditure. Banting and Corbett (2002) also describe Australia as a SHI system.  
48  In  Canada  most  resources  for  health  care  are  collected  via  taxation.  However,  in  some  Canadian 
provinces there is a system of health sickness funds and hence the population pays health premiums. 
Moreover, Clemente et al. (2004) and Banting and Corbett (2002) describe the Canadian health care 





Table 3 reports five SHI countries with a decentralized health care setting. All of them 
share the characteristic of a strong health policy decentralization; however, there exist 
some important differences. 
Australia is a federal government divided into 6 states and 2 independent territories. Its 
health care system is complex and has many types of services and providers, and a range 
of  funding  and  regulatory  mechanisms.  The  Commonwealth  (that  is,  the  National 
Government) funds rather than provides health services, financing the bulk of the health 
system, and subsidizing pharmaceuticals and aged residential care. States also have a 
role  in  funding  the  system,  although  it  is  smaller  relative  to  the  Commonwealth. 
Australia  has  a  mainly  tax-funded  system  financed  through  general  taxation  and 
compulsory  tax-based  health  insurance.  The  Commonwealth  is  the  main  body 
responsible for collecting revenues, being empowered under the Constitution to collect 
income taxes. The states, and to a minor extent local governments, are responsible for 
the bulk of outlays. The administration and management of the health care system is in 
the hands of the states. States’ governments administer much of the health care system, 
particularly  public  hospitals  and  public  health.  They  also  license  private  hospitals, 
although the  extent of regulation varies considerably, with the more  market-oriented 
governments preferring lighter regulation. The states are responsible for registering and 
regulating health professionals too. Local governments have only limited health care 
functions. The Australian health care system is thus very decentralized with respect to its 
administration, being the states empowered to administer and deliver health services. Its 
funding  is  principally a  responsibility of  the Commonwealth,  although  states  have  a 
minor role too. In other words, fiscal and functional responsibilities are divided, leaving 
space to the so-called “vertical fiscal imbalance” that refers to the disparity between the 'HFHQWUDOL]DWLRQKHDOWKSROLF\DQGWKHOHYHORIKHDOWKH[SHQGLWXUH 95
 
 
taxing  capacity  and  the  revenue  needs  of  the  two  tiers  of  government.
49  Historical 
reasons have driven Australian health decentralization: the Commonwealth took over 
more responsibility for health and social services since federation in 1901, but left to 
states the planning of the health care system in order to respond better to local needs, 
especially  of  those  territories  with  a  high  density  of  aboriginal  population  (who 
generally experience worse health status) and those states scarcely populated.
50 
Austria is a federal republic and consists of 9 states (Länder). More than two thirds of its 
health  care  system  is  funded  through  social  insurance  contributions  and  general  tax 
revenue. Approximately one third is paid by private households directly. Health care 
services  are  delivered  by  public  bodies,  non  profit  organizations,  for  profit  private 
organizations  and  individuals.  The  federal  government  delegates  the  tasks  of  public 
health administration to the Länder. Both layers of government have agreed to ensure 
health care delivery. Responsibility for enacting legislation and implementation lies with 
the nine Länder: with regard to hospitals, the federal government only formulates the 
basic  law  and  has  the  sanitary  supervision,  while  Länder  are  charged  with  its 
implementation. The Länder, in turn, delegate their responsibilities for emergency care 
and social services. The responsible Länder authorities usually delegate the provision of 
                                                 
49 Intergovernmental relations involve ongoing negotiations both over funding and respective functional 
responsibilities. Further, the division of intergovernmental responsibilities is not permanently fixed. Please 
refer to the seminal works of Bradford and Oates (1971 a,b) and Bailey (1999) for a comprehensive 
description of the economic theory of intergovernmental grants. 
50 People in rural and remote areas not only suffer from poorer health than their metropolitan counterparts, 
but they may also experience significant problems in accessing health care services due to difficulties in 
recruiting and retaining health professionals in rural communities. Steps have been taken in recent years to 
address  these  challenges,  including  the  0RUH 'RFWRUV %HWWHU 6HUYLFHV component  of  the  1999–2000 
Federal Budget. The initiative included greater incentives for general practitioners to practice in rural 
areas; an increase in the level of support and education for health professionals in rural areas; and an 
increase in rural health services. 96    &KDSWHU
 
 
social services to welfare organizations.
51 In the inpatient sector territorial authorities 
have a great deal of planning and regulatory power, the responsibilities of the Länder 
being defined by the Austrian Constitution. Since insurance funds and hospital owners 
no longer negotiate the standard daily rates to finance the operating costs of hospital 
care, and since the financial resources of the social health insurers are now budgeted, the 
relatively small planning and regulatory authority of social insurers in the hospital sector 
has become marginal. But the social insurance funds are involved in health planning. If 
one disregards the territorial authorities’ responsibilities for training, the social insurers 
have the greatest planning and regulatory power in the primary care sector. This also 
applies to drugs and pharmaceuticals, although the federal government has substantial 
regulatory authority in this sector as well. The strong leadership of the Länder both in 
the administration and funding of the system characterize Austrian health federalism. 
Social  insurance  funds  also  play  an  important  role  in  the  scenario  as  they  plan and 
regulate the system.
52 The development of the Austrian health care system is strictly 
linked with historical reasons, namely the establishment of the welfare state within the 
territory of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. 
Canada has a predominantly publicly financed, privately delivered health care system 
that is best  described  as  an interlocking set  of  10  provincial  and  2 territorial  health 
insurance schemes. It combines elements of a “liberal” ideology – doctors are not state 
employees but independent actors with private relationships with their patients – and a 
more “social democratic” vision – through the public financing of health services and 
                                                 
51  Welfare  organizations  refer  to  the  large  number  of  different  institutions  that  deliver  services  to 
disadvantaged or marginalized people in the society. This category comprises very small organizations as 
well as institutions operating on a nationwide scale (ex. Red Cross Organization).  
52 They award contracts to doctors, assess drugs, dressing materials, remedies, etc. for entry into the 
approval  list  of  drugs  and  therapeutic  products,  and  negotiate  fees  to  doctors  and  other  suppliers  of 
medical and therapeutic services. 'HFHQWUDOL]DWLRQKHDOWKSROLF\DQGWKHOHYHORIKHDOWKH[SHQGLWXUH 97
 
 
government oversight to ensure equal access.
53 This system fits the characteristics of a 
social insurance model; however, the term “national health insurance” is a misnomer 
that has been given because of the autonomous role of provinces in health issues. The 
Canadian health care system is very much decentralized and financed primarily through 
taxation,  both  provincial  and  federal,  personal  and  corporate  income  taxes.  In  two 
provinces  however  there  are  health  insurers,  so  citizens  pay  a  health  premium  that 
mainly finances health care within their province. Federal funding is transferred to the 
provinces as a combination of cash contributions and tax points (taxing power). At a 
national level the system is highly devolved, with almost all responsibility for service 
delivery assigned to the provinces. This includes also financial responsibilities, though 
with some assistance from the federal government (financial transfers). The hands-on 
management of health services is fundamentally the responsibility of each individual 
province or territory. Through their respective central health ministries or departments of 
health,  they  plan, finance and evaluate  the  provision of  hospital care,  physician  and 
allied health care services, some aspects of prescription care and public health. They also 
supervise  responsibilities  delegated  to  other  nongovernmental  agencies.  The  federal 
government’s  role  in  health  care  involves  the  setting  and  administering  of  national 
principles or standards for the health care system (i.e. Canada Health Act), assisting in 
the financing of provincial health care services through financial transfers, and fulfilling 
functions  for  which  it  is  constitutionally  responsible.
54  Canadian  health  federalism 
                                                 
53 See Maioni (2002). 
54 The Canada Health Act establishes the principles upon which the health system must be based in order 
for provincial governments to receive full federal transfers. These principles are: 
·  XQLYHUVDOLW\ requires that the plan must entitle 100% of the insured population to insured services on 
uniform terms and conditions; 
·  FRPSUHKHQVLYHQHVV  requires  that  all  insured  health  services  provided  by  hospitals  and  medical 
practitioners be covered by the plan; 
·  DFFHVVLELOLW\ means that health services must be provided without barriers, including additional charges 
to insured patients for insured services; 98    &KDSWHU
 
 
exhibits  the  same  characteristics  across  the  country  and  yet  also  reflects  provincial 
priorities.  No  two  programs  are  exactly  similar  in  terms  of  organizational  structure, 
planning, regulation, management, financing or supplementary health service coverage. 
Funding and administration of health are in the hands of provinces and territories. This 
high decentralization of the system is due to the federal nature of the state itself and to a 
willingness to adjust to local preferences, being Canada a country where two different 
ethnical groups coexist (French- and English-speaking). 
The German political system is characterized by federalism (sharing of power between 
16 Länderand the federal government) and corporatism. The responsibilities for health 
reflect this. They are shared between the federal government, the Länderand corporatist 
bodies  (representative  bodies  of  the  professionals,  providers  and  the  insurers). 
Corporatism has several important aspects. Firstly, it hands over certain rights of the 
state as defined by law to corporatist self-governed institutions. Secondly, the corporatist 
institutions  have  mandatory  membership  and  the  right  to  raise  their  own  financial 
resources under  the  auspices of, and regulation by the  state.  Thirdly, the  corporatist 
institutions  have  the  right  and  obligation  to  negotiate  and  sign  contracts  with  other 
corporatist institutions and to finance or deliver services to their members. The health 
care  system  is  predominantly  funded  through  social  health  insurance  contributions. 
Ambulatory  care  is  delivered  by  private  office-based  physicians  (generalist  and 
specialists)  and  hospital  inpatient  care  is  provided  by  a  mix  of  public  and  private 
providers (only a small proportion of total beds are in for-profit hospitals). Legislative 
authority lies principally with the Länder, except in areas for which this authority is 
explicitly given to the federal level. The Länder are responsible for maintaining hospital 
                                                                                                                                                
·  SRUWDELOLW\ ensures health coverage for insured persons when they move within Canada or when they 
travel within Canada or abroad; 
·  SXEOLFDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ requires that the plan must be administered and operated on a nonprofit basis by 
an accountable public authority appointed or designated by the provincial government. 'HFHQWUDOL]DWLRQKHDOWKSROLF\DQGWKHOHYHORIKHDOWKH[SHQGLWXUH 99
 
 
infrastructure, delivering and organizing public health services,
55 and for the education 
of undergraduate medical, dental and pharmaceutical schools. They also supervise the 
regional physicians’ chamber as well as the regional physicians’ association(s) and the 
sickness funds operating in the Land. Some Länder have established joint institutions to 
enable  them  to  perform  certain  tasks.
56  Overall,  the  German  health  care  system  is 
characterized by strong federalism. At first sight the considerable power of the Länder
might look like a case of devolution but this is not a true description as powers were 
never passed down from the federal level to the Länderthe latter had existed before the 
Federal  Republic  (which,  in  fact,  was  founded  by  them).  Instead,  the  opposite  of 
devolution took place in Germany: the Länderpassed certain rights and responsibilities, 
as defined in the Constitution, to the federal level and retained others. The assignment of 
administrative  functions  (deconcentration)  to  other  sublevels  of  government  is  not 
widespread  due  to  the  fact  that  almost  all  Länder  administrations  do  not  have  any 
additional sub-layer of administrative offices, because all political units from the local 
level upwards have their own autonomous, elected representatives and governments. 
The Swiss Confederation is a federal republic made up of 26 cantons that are sovereign 
in  all  matters  that  are  not  specifically  designated  the  responsibility  of  the  Swiss 
Confederation by the federal Constitution. The health care system is financed primarily 
by cantons and municipalities. The Confederation has rarely intervened in the set-up of 
                                                 
55 This is subject to certain federal laws concerning diseases that can be dangerous and harmful to public 
safety. 
56 For example the Länder of Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg, Hessen, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, 
and  Schleswig-Holstein maintain  the  Academy  of  Public Health  Services in Düsseldorf  to train their 
public health physicians. A similar academy is run by Bavaria with the support of Baden-Württemberg, 
Rhineland-Palatinate, the Saarland, Saxony, and Thuringia (so that only Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 
and Saxony-Anhalt run their training for public health physicians independently). A joint institution of all 
Länderis the Institute for Medical and Pharmaceutical Examination Questions which is responsible for 
preparing and evaluating written examinations in the undergraduate education of physicians, dentists and 
pharmacists. 100    &KDSWHU
 
 
the health policy and much of the responsibility for financing, organizing and delivering 
health care has fallen to other actors including cantons, municipalities, private insurance 
companies and private providers. The organization and management of the system is 
also a cantonal responsibility. There coexist 26 different health care systems within the 
country.  The  canton  is  usually  the  body  responsible  for  planning,  although  some 
agreements  exist  between  cantons  for  planning  coordination.  Nevertheless,  a 
supraregional  or  even  nationwide  consensus  about  hospital  planning  is  not  present 
nowadays.  Health  insurance  has  become  mandatory  for  the  whole  population  only 
recently  (in  1996  with  the  enactment  of  the  Federal  Health  Insurance  Law,  FHIL), 
compared to other developed countries. Health premiums are not related to risk and 
income;  this  creates  lively  discussions  in  the  civil  society  about  equity  issues,  as 
premiums  are  a  heavier  burden  on  poor  households.  Each  canton  has  established  a 
system of subsidies to be given to low-income households, but they all differ from each 
other. Thus 26 different subsidy plans exist within the country and the conditions to be 
eligible for them vary considerably. Cantonal activities in the field of health care can be 
summed  up  by  four  categories:  regulation  of  health  matters  (licensing  of  health 
professionals,  authorization  to  open  a  medical  practice  or  pharmacy,  and  control  of 
medicines), provision of health care (hospitals and nursing home care, although the latter 
is frequently delegated to the municipalities, negotiation and agreement of fees between 
service  providers  and  associations  of  sickness  funds,  organization  and  planning  of 
emergency, rescue and disaster-aid services, provision of basic and specialty medical 
training, and regulation of training in paramedical occupations, which is then delegated 
to  the  Swiss  Red  Cross),  disease  prevention  and  health  education,  and  the 
implementation of federal laws. 
The  principle  of  federalism  in  Switzerland  is  strongly  anchored  in  the  federal 
Constitution and deeply rooted in people’s feelings. As Hacker (2004) affirms, the Swiss 'HFHQWUDOL]DWLRQKHDOWKSROLF\DQGWKHOHYHORIKHDOWKH[SHQGLWXUH 101
 
 
central  government  is  the  most  “anemic”  among  developed  countries  in  the  field  of 
health care. Historical reasons lie behind the organization of the state and of health care 
as a reflex. In order to satisfy local needs and reflect ethnic differences (there are four 





This brief review of SHI countries shows that there is not a common pattern in health 
policy. Switzerland appears immediately as the most decentralized country, where both 
funding and management responsibilities are assigned to sub-layers of government. The 
role of the Confederation has always been very limited; the biggest move being the 
introduction of the FHIL that made health insurance compulsory in 1996. 
Austria and Germany appear to share many similarities. Länder in both countries are 
responsible  for  the  organization  of  the  health  care  system  and  its  funding.  In  both 
countries health insurances play a very important role also in terms of financing. Such 
role is probably more marked in Germany, being the level of corporatism higher. 
The  Canadian health  care  system has  many  similarities with  a  NHS.  Most  financial 
resources are collected through taxation, both at the central and provincial level. There is 
a strong decentralization when it comes to the organization, planning and delivery of 
health services, being the 10 provinces separate entities. In this respect, Australia is also 
similar. The bulk of funds is collected by the Commonwealth through taxation. Financial 
resources are mainly provided by the center and to a limited extent by the states. As in 
the Canadian example, the organization of health services has been delegated to the sub-





Table 3 shows that Nordic European countries have a strong decentralized health care 
setting.  Most  health-related  activities  and  services  are  planned  and  managed  at  the 
lowest  level  of  government.  Denmark,  Sweden,  Norway,  Finland,  and  Ireland  have 
historically  been  highly  decentralized.  Other  countries  with  a  NHS  that  started 
delegating health care functions to sub-layers of government in the 1990s are Italy and 
Spain.
57 
After the abolition of the health insurance scheme in 1973 Denmark changed to a single 
payer system, with counties assuming full responsibility for health care. The system is 
mainly tax-funded, with the exception of those services that are paid in part or full by 
patients (such as prescription drugs, or dental care), and by voluntary insurance. The 
degree of public influence at the decentralized level is high in Denmark due to direct 
elections for county councils. However, county councils are somewhat constrained in 
decision  making  by  national  framework  legislation  and  annual  budget  agreements 
between the government and the association of county councils specifying average tax 
levels and to some extent also introducing new initiatives and setting targets on specific 
activity  areas.
58  In  1970  the  parliament  delegated  responsibility  for  financing  and 
                                                 
57 Note that the case of Spain is  more complex because some autonomous communities (ACs) were 
already given substantial regulatory powers during the 1980s, while other communities obtained them in 
the 1990s. The whole process has been completed only recently, namely in 2002.  
58 The annual national budget negotiation has been increasingly used by the central government as a 
means of reaching agreement on the development of the health sector, in addition to setting the overall 
economic framework. By highlighting priority areas such as heart surgery, cancer treatment or waiting 
lists, and making available earmarked grants to assist the counties and municipalities in achieving targets 
such as reducing waiting times for surgery, increasing the number of heart bypass operations or expanding 
psychiatric services, the central government is able to exert some influence over the direction of the health 
sector. Although these targets are not legally binding, the practice of earmarking funds reduces local 
autonomy to set priorities and the counties have therefore frequently expressed dissatisfaction with this 'HFHQWUDOL]DWLRQKHDOWKSROLF\DQGWKHOHYHORIKHDOWKH[SHQGLWXUH 103
 
 
providing almost all health care in Denmark to counties and municipalities. Since then, 
most decisions regarding the form and content of health care activity have been taken at 
county and municipal level. Counties own and run hospitals and prenatal care centers. 
Most county councils have set up committees on health and social affairs and hospital 
committees  to  oversee  their  health  care  responsibilities.  They  also  finance  general 
practitioners,  specialists,  physiotherapists,  dentists  and  pharmaceuticals.  The 
responsibilities of the 275 municipalities are nursing homes, health care professionals, 
municipal dentists and school health services; all these activities are financed by taxes. 
As health is largely a county  responsibility, most national legislation concerning the 
health sector does not specify how it should be organized or which services should be 
provided.  Legislation  concerning  health  care  at  a  local  level  is  only  slightly  more 
specific.  The  most  specific  rules  pertain  to  preventive  activities  such  as  vaccination 
schemes  and  health  check-ups  for  pregnant  women.  It  is  clear  from  the  previous 
description that historical paths and cultural reasons lie behind the factors that have 
driven decentralization in Denmark. Its long tradition of public welfare provision and 
decentralization of welfare administration goes back to the eighteenth century. A serious 
fear connected to such a decentralized system that recently emerged is about the unequal 
access to health services in different counties. In fact, it seems that politicians have been 
more  concerned  about  local  self-governance  than  territorial  equity  in  their  decisions 
(European Observatory on Health Care Systems, 2001). 
Decentralization is a key word when describing the Swedish health care system. The 
country is divided in 21 counties, which have full financial and planning responsibilities. 
An important role for the central government is to establish basic principles for health 
services through legislation and recommendations. The most important of these was the 
                                                                                                                                                
system, claiming that it breaks with the fundamental principle of decentralized health care in Denmark 
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Health Care Act of 1982, which has been revised several times since then, and that cites: 
“Every county council shall offer good health and medical services to persons living 
within its boundaries. […] In other respects too, the county council shall endeavor to 
promote the health of all residents. […]”.
59 Other laws regulate the responsibility and 
obligations of personnel, confidentiality, the qualifications needed to be able to practice 
medicine and rules on how to handle patient records. In general, county councils and 
local  municipalities  enjoy  a  considerable  degree  of  autonomy  in  relation  to  central 
government: they are in charge of the health care delivery system from primary care to 
hospital care, including public health and preventive care; they have overall authority 
over the hospital structure and responsibility for all health care services delivered; they 
also regulate the private health care market, which is, however, small in Sweden because 
of  minimal  citizen  interest  and  perceived  need.  County  councils  are  in  charge  of 
controlling the establishment of new private practices and the number of patients private 
practitioners  can  see  during  a  year  and  they  own  most  health  facilities.  Local 
municipalities are responsible for delivering and financing long-term care for the elderly 
and  the  disabled  and  for  long-term  psychiatric  care.  They  are  not  subordinated  or 
accountable to the county councils, and they can impose their own taxes to finance their 
activities  (as  well  as  county  councils).  Overall  historical  and  cultural  reasons  have 
shaped the health care system. Sweden has a long tradition of a welfare state and since 
the  nineteenth  century  health  matters  were  the  county  councils’  and  municipalities’ 
primary duties. 
Norway is a Scandinavian country constituted by 19 counties. As all other Nordic states, 
the decade 1990-2000 was characterized by a highly decentralized health care system, 
                                                 
59 The 1982 Health Care Act was an important landmark for several reasons. It completed the successive 
process of transferring responsibility for all health services provision from the national level to the county 
council level and made them responsible for preventive care and health promotion, and formalized the 
needs-based approach to health care planning. 'HFHQWUDOL]DWLRQKHDOWKSROLF\DQGWKHOHYHORIKHDOWKH[SHQGLWXUH 105
 
 
which  was,  and  still is, financed  mostly  by  taxation  and  out-of-pocket  expenditures. 
Broadly speaking, the division of responsibilities and duties among the three tiers of 
government  was  the  following.  Counties  were  responsible  for  hospitals,  pharmacies, 
specialized outpatient medical care and treatment; municipalities dealt with primary care 
and treatment, health promotion, care of the elderly and of the (mentally) handicapped; 
finally, the central government had responsibility for law and regulation and for a few 
very specialized hospitals. In order to cover expenditures, municipalities and counties 
could draw on local taxes in addition to block grants and earmarked grants from the 
central  government.
60  The  Parliament  determined  counties’  and  municipalities’  fiscal 
situation and annual transfers. This system, however, underwent a major reform in 2002. 
Norway broke with the tradition of decentralizing functions to sub-layers of government 
by abolishing the existence of counties and moving responsibilities to the national level 
and state appointed regional boards. One of the reason for this countercurrent reform has 
been  the  difficulty  faced  in  controlling  health  expenses,  especially  because,  from  a 
formal point of view, financing responsibility was central while spending responsibility 
was  decentralized  (although  counties  and  municipalities  could  also  levy  their  own 
taxes).  The  main  reasons  behind  this  marked  decentralization  were  historical  and 
cultural. The philosophy behind it was that decentralization was an expression of applied 
democracy. It brought decision making closer to those who were affected and promoted 
popular participation in local political affairs. The rationale for the division of tasks 
between municipalities and counties was based on economies of scale and the principle 
of subsidiarity: services were attributed to municipalities unless it was significantly more 
                                                 
60 Block grants from the central government to municipalities and counties were not classified as financing 
by the state, but by local government. The reason for this is that block grants were meant to be a source of 
financing for local activities in general (education, local infrastructure, health, etc.). It was in the local 
government’s own sphere of authority to prioritize among the different services. The provision of health 
care was among the most resource-consuming responsibility of municipalities and counties (European 
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efficient for them to be provided at the county level (alternatively, the central level) 
because of economies of scale. This credo reached its end in 2002.  
Finland is constituted by 6 provinces and 448 municipalities. These latter have the main 
responsibility  by  law  for  arranging  basic  services  as  education,  social  and  health 
services. The Primary Health Care Act in 1972 established health centers that can be 
defined as a functional unit or organization providing primary curative, preventive and 
public health services to its population. Primary health care is thus organized fully by 
municipalities. With respect to secondary and tertiary health care, hospitals are the main 
providers.  All  hospitals  in  Finland  are  owned  by  a  federation  of  municipalities,  i.e. 
hospital districts. The health care system has developed gradually, and no exact point of 
time can be identified for the introduction of the tax-financed system. Both the central 
state and municipalities can levy taxes: in 1999, about 43% of total health costs were 
financed by the municipalities, about 18% by the central state, 15% by the National 
Health  Insurance  (NHI),
61  and  about  24%  by  private  sources,  mainly  households 
(European  Observatory  on  Health  Care  Systems,  2002).  State’s  revenues  consists 
primarily of a progressive income tax and indirect taxes. Municipalities’ taxes are a 
fixed  proportion  of  income,  which  can  vary  from  municipality  to  municipality  (the 
average is 17.5% of the taxable income). The Finnish health decentralization is very 
highly  marked.  Municipalities  are  in  charge  of  managing,  organizing,  planning,  and 
financing health care services and activities. The tradition of devolving responsibility to 
municipalities has a long history in Finland, evolving over several centuries. Finns have 
always appreciated to have such a decentralized health care system because it allows 
                                                 
61 Part of the total cost of health care is financed by the statutory NHI scheme that is run by the Social 
Insurance Institution, with about 400 local offices all over the country. The Social Insurance Institution 
falls under the authority of Parliament. Although the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health (Insurance 
Department)  prepares health insurance legislation  (for  example, legislation  on  sickness  and  maternity 
benefits that are paid through the NHI), the Social Insurance Institution is a distinct institution separate 
from the ministry. 'HFHQWUDOL]DWLRQKHDOWKSROLF\DQGWKHOHYHORIKHDOWKH[SHQGLWXUH 107
 
 
local decision making, and this is valuable in a country where the population is very 
dispersed on a big territory. In fact, municipalities often have a very small population: 
75% of them have fewer than 10,000 inhabitants and 20% have fewer than 2,000. This 
possibly creates problems with the assurance of sufficient managerial and medical skills 
for providing health care services and it can cause an economic risk, namely that one 
costly  treatment  could  break  the  economy  of  a  small  or  medium-size  municipality. 
However,  in  order  to  face  this  problem,  an  equalization  mechanism  within  hospital 
districts has been put in place. 
A marked degree of decentralization in the health care sector is experienced in Ireland. 
The Regional Health Boards (and prior to this, the counties) are the bodies responsible 
for the planning, management and delivery functions of health services. The system is 
mainly tax-financed and the role of providing financial funds is a responsibility of the 
central government, while local taxation is not significant. The level of decentralization 
has been a key criticism of the Irish NHS. In order to reduce fragmentation, duplication 
of activities, promote consistency, establish clear lines of accountability  and place  a 
national  focus  on  service  delivery  since  2005  the  level  of  decentralization  has  been 
considerably reduced, by replacing the Regional Health Boards by one national Health 





Decentralization has been a cornerstone of Ireland and the Nordic countries of Europe 
for more than 30 years. The NHS country cases show that although these states have a 
long experience of health decentralized models, the degree of diversification of their 108    &KDSWHU
 
 
organization is ample. Sweden and Denmark are the most similar health systems: in both 
countries there is a high financial and managerial involvement of counties, which are the 
principal layer of government involved in health issues. In Sweden municipalities also 
play an important role in elderly care services. A much higher degree of decentralization 
is  reached  in  Finland,  where  the  assignment  of  health  (and  most  social  services) 
responsibilities is given to municipalities. Being municipalities rather small in terms of 
number of inhabitants, many of them co-share some health services, and this possibly 
allows to reach economies of scale. Norway was the most diverse example of devolution 
among the Scandinavian countries before 2002, being health financing a responsibility 
of  all  three  layers  of  government,  although  the  central  state  had  a  much  higher 
involvement. The reform in 2002 has brought a complete change of this philosophy: 
municipalities  do  not  run  anymore  any  health  services  and  5  larger  regions  have 
substituted tasks pursued by the 19 counties. The Norwegian situation resembles the 
Irish one. In Ireland there has been a long-standing tradition of assigning managerial and 
planning  responsibilities  to  the  regional  health  boards.  The  central  state  was  mainly 
concerned  with  providing  financial  funds  to  the  system.  Also  Ireland  recently 
experienced (in 2005) a recentralization of its health care system, as the regional health 
boards have been replaced by a national body. From these two experiences one can infer 
that the split of funding and managerial tasks is difficult to maintain in the long-run. It is 
easy to see that this set-up creates problems related to soft budget constraint and of 
“blame  game”;  sublevels  of  government  are  unsatisfied  of  the  amount  of  financial 







Health care costs have steadily increased in the last decades: the level of health care 
spending varies widely across countries, ranging from a maximum of US$ 4,869 per 
capita in the USA to a minimum of US$ 1,567 per capita in Spain in the year 2001.
62 
With concern  over  increased  strains for  health spending,  public  policy  has  aimed  at 
easing  this  constraint  by  achieving  higher  output  at  lower cost.  To  reach  this  end a 
number  of  policies  have  been  introduced,  most  often  focusing  on  institutional 
arrangements and incentives facing providers of care. 
The share of GDP accounted for by health spending gives a broad indication of the 
resource costs of health care and of the burden on public finances. This quota has tended 
to rise rapidly in the post-war era. Figure 5 gives an overview of the GDP share for 
health of some selected OECD countries during the period 1980-2000. 
 
                                                 
62 See OECD Health Data 2004. In this analysis the country taken into consideration are a sub-group of 
OECD countries, and namely: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland,  the  United  Kingdom,  and  the  United  States.  This  group  was  selected  because  of  better 
availability and quality of data. 110    &KDSWHU
 
 





























It can be easily depicted that the USA is the country that spends the most on health care 
reaching the quota of 13.1% in 2000, as compared to an estimated average of OECD 
countries of 8%. US health spending has been consistently higher than that of other 
countries  since  tracking  began  in  1960,  predating  the  creation  of  Medicare  and 
Medicaid, but the gap to the OECD average widened markedly during the 1980s and 
early 1990s. Thereafter, as generally abroad, spending stabilized relative to GDP so that 
the gap remained broadly unchanged. However, at the end of the decade, growth in 
health expenditure began to outpace income again, reaching almost 14.6% of GDP in 
2002, according to official estimates. The next highest spending nations are Switzerland 
(11.1%) and Germany (10.9%). 
Furthermore, it seems that there is a relationship between income per capita and health 
care expenditure per capita. Yet the USA is a noticeable outlier, spending far more on 'HFHQWUDOL]DWLRQKHDOWKSROLF\DQGWKHOHYHORIKHDOWKH[SHQGLWXUH 111
 
 
health than this relationship could indicate (figure 6). Luxembourg instead seems to be 
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In table 4 the quota of GDP spent for health care is represented in the selected OECD 
countries during the decade 1990-2000. Countries with a NHS and a SHI system are 
now separated. Subsequently, they are divided according to the organization of their 
system (decentralized versus centralized). It can be immediately noticed that throughout 
the decade decentralized countries characterized by a SHI system have always tended to 
spend  more  resources  on  health  than  centralized  states. This  quota has  always  been 
significantly higher than those nations with a NHS. In general, NHS with centralized 112    &KDSWHU
 
 
funding  and  management  of  the health  care  system tended  to  spend the  least  at  the 
beginning of the 1990s, but this gap diminished with the NHS decentralized countries as 
from the mid-1990s on. Note that if a country is spending more it does not mean that it is 
inefficient or that the provision of health care services is ineffective. Centralized NHS 
might well be spending less but concomitantly they might be offering less services and 
benefits than SHI decentralized countries. As outlined previously, NHS normally restrict 
the choice of consumers by imposing a gatekeeping system, while in most SHI states 
patients  have  more  decision  power  and  can  freely  choose  among  a  multitude  of 
providers. 
The United States is represented separately; the US is a unique health care system in the 
OECD  area.  It  does  not  have  a  national  social  insurance  system  and  14%  of  the 
population  (according  to  the  last  estimates)  is  without  an  insurance  coverage.  The 
country spends vastly more than the average of OECD countries (13.1% of GDP in 
2000) but its major critics is that Americans are at risk of being uninsured at some point 
in their life. The issues of incomplete insurance coverage and escalating costs continue 
to  present  fundamental  challenges  to  US  policy  makers.  Because  of  the  system’s 
diversity, decentralization and private nature, fewer policy levers exist at the national 
level to address these problems than in many other OECD countries. Therefore, reforms 
have  tended  to  proceed  incrementally  and  on  a  piecemeal  basis,  state  by  state  and 
program by program. The private sector also plays a critical force driving change in both 





            
6RFLDO+HDOWK,QVXUDQFH6+,                           
'HFHQWUDOL]HG                                 
Australia  7.8 8 8.1 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.9
Austria  7.1 7.1 7.5 7.9 7.9 8.6 8.7 8 8 8 8
Canada  9 9.7 10 9.9 9.5 9.2 9 8.9 9.1 9.1 9.2
Germany  8.5  9.9 9.9 10.2 10.6 10.9 10.7 10.6 10.6 10.6
Switzerland  8.5 9.2 9.6 9.6 9.8 10 10.4 10.4 10.6 10.7 10.7
$YHUDJH           
&HQWUDOL]HG                                 
Belgium  7.4 7.8 8 8.1 7.9 8.7 8.9 8.5 8.5 8.7 8.7
France  8.6 8.8 9 9.4 9.4 9.5 9.5 9.4 9.3 9.3 9.3
Luxembourg  6.1 5.9 6.2 6.2 6.1 6.4 6.4 5.9 5.8 6.1 5.6
Netherlands  8 8.2 8.4 8.5 8.4 8.4 8.3 8.2 8.6 8.7 8.6
$YHUDJH           
1DWLRQDO+HDOWK6\VWHP1+6                        
'HFHQWUDOL]HG                                 
Denmark  8.5 8.4 8.5 8.8 8.5 8.2 8.3 8.2 8.4 8.5 8.3
Finland  7.8 8.9 9.1 8.3 7.7 7.5 7.6 7.3 6.9 6.9 6.7
Ireland  6.1 6.5 7.1 7 7 6.8 6.6 6.4 6.2 6.2 6.4
Norway  7.7 8.1 8.2 8 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.8 8.5 8.5 7.7
Sweden  8.2 8.1 8.3 8.6 8.2 8.1 8.4 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.4
$YHUDJH           
&HQWUDOL]HG                                 
Greece  7.4 7.2 7.9 8.8 9.7 9.6 9.6 9.4 9.4 9.6 9.4
Italy  8 8.3 8.4 8.1 7.8 7.4 7.5 7.7 7.7 7.8 8.2
New Zealand  6.9 7.4 7.5 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.5 8 7.9 8
Portugal  6.2 6.8 7 7.3 7.3 8.3 8.5 8.6 8.6 8.7 9
Spain  6.7 6.9 7.2 7.5 7.4 7.6 7.6 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5
United Kingdom  6 6.5 6.9 6.9 7 7 7 6.8 6.9 7.2 7.3
$YHUDJH           
United States  11.9 12.6 13 13.3 13.2 13.3 13.2 13 13 13 13.1
6RXUFH2(&'+HDOWK'DWD 
With respect to the public share of GDP spent on total health expenditure Germany, 
France and Canada are among the OECD countries that spend a larger quota (Figure 7). 
The Netherlands, the United States and Italy belong to countries that have lower public 114    &KDSWHU
 
 
expenditure on health in the OECD group. Overall, there is not a marked difference 
between SHI and NHS countries. On the one hand, there are no particular differences 
between the four health care system organizations from a state/public viewpoint; on the 
other  hand,  it  is  plausible  to  think  that  the  main  differences  arise  when  the  private 
expenditure  is  taken  into  account.  The  average  of  public  expenditure  for  the  period 
1990-2000  is  6.2%  of  GDP  for  decentralized  SHI  systems,  while  it  is  6.1%  for 
centralized SHI countries. Decentralized NHS countries have an average of 6.3% and 
centralized  NHS  have  5.4%.  The  US  shows  an  average  of  5.7%  of  public  health 
expenditure in the decade 1990-2000. Public spending, which represents about three-
quarters of total health care spending on average over the OECD area, increased more 
slowly  than  for  total  health  spending  during  the  1980s  and  1990s,  reflecting  a 



































There is general agreement about the fact that supply and demand factors have driven 
aggregate health care spending. With respect to production resources some significant 
differences are witnessed in the number of practicing physicians per 1,000 inhabitants. 
In particular, countries where physicians are paid fee-for-service (FFS) show a higher 
density of doctors: 3.9 in Belgium, 3.3 in France, 4.5 in Greece, 3.4 in Norway, and 3.6 
in  Switzerland.  Yet  the  number  of  physicians  is  particularly  high  also  in  other  two 
countries: Italy (4.4) that pays through a capitation system, and Portugal (3.2) where 116    &KDSWHU
 
 
doctors are mostly salaried. In particular, Italy has always shown one of the highest 




    
6RFLDO+HDOWK,QVXUDQFH6+,
'HFHQWUDOL]HG
Australia  2.2  2.4  2.5  2.5
a 
Austria  2.2  2.7  3.2  3.3 
Canada  2.1  2.1  2.1  2.1 
Germany  2.8
b  3.1  3.3  3.3 
Switzerland  3  3.2  3.5  3.6 
Average     
&HQWUDOL]HG
Belgium  3.3  3.5  3.9  3.9 
France  3.1  3.2  3.3  3.3 
Luxembourg  2.0  2.2  2.5  2.6 
Netherlands  2.5  -  3.2  3.1 
$YHUDJH    
1DWLRQDO+HDOWK6\VWHP1+6
'HFHQWUDOL]HG
Denmark  2.9  3.0  3.2  3.3 
Finland  2.4  2.8  3.1  3.1 
Ireland  2.0
b  2.1  2.2  2.4 
Norway  2.6
b  2.8  2.9  3.4 
Sweden  2.9  2.8  3.0  - 
$YHUDJH    
&HQWUDOL]HG
Greece  3.4  3.9  4.5  4.5
a 
Italy  -  3.9  4.1  4.4 
New Zealand  1.9  2.0  2.2  2.1 
Portugal  2.8  2.9  3.2  3.2
a 
Spain  -  2.5  3.1  2.9 
United Kingdom  1.5  1.8  2.0  2.1 
$YHUDJH    
United States  1.8  2.0  2.2  2.4
a 
6RXUFH2(&'+HDOWK'DWD
a: data from 2001; 
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Throughout  1980-2000  all  OECD  countries  (but  the  UK)  have  experienced  a  strong 
reduction in the number of acute beds available per 1,000 inhabitants (Table 6). The 
cause  for  this  must  be  searched  in  the  development  of  infrastructures  for  outpatient 
treatments. In general, for the period 1980-2000 countries with a SHI health care system 
tend to have a higher density of beds; 5.9 in decentralized systems and 5.2 in centralized 
ones. NHS show an average equal to 3.9 (decentralized) and 4.4 (centralized). Table 6 









b  4.2  3.8  3.7
a 
Austria  7.1  6.6  6.3  6.1 
Canada  4  4.3  3.3  3.2
a 
Germany  10.1
b  9.7  9.1  9
a 
Switzerland  6.5  5.5  4.1  3.9 
Average     
&HQWUDOL]HG
Belgium  4.9  4.7  -  - 
France  5.2  4.6  4.1  4.0
a 
Luxembourg  6.8  6.2  5.9  5.8 
Netherlands  4.3  3.8  3.5  3.3
a 
$YHUDJH    
1DWLRQDO+HDOWK6\VWHP1+6
'HFHQWUDOL]HG
Denmark  4.1  3.9  3.5  3.4
a 
Finland  4.3  4.0  2.4  2.3 
Ireland  3.3  3.2  3.0  3.0 
Norway  3.8  3.3  3.1  3.1 
Sweden  4.1  3.0  2.4  - 
$YHUDJH    
&HQWUDOL]HG
Greece  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0 
Italy  6.2  5.5  4.3  4.6
a 
New Zealand  8.0  6.2  6.1  - 
Portugal  3.4  3.3  3.3  3.2
a 
Spain  3.3  3.0  2.8  - 
United Kingdom  2.8  4.0  3.9  3.9 
$YHUDJH    
United States  3.7  3.3  2.9  2.9 
Sources:  OECD  Health  Data  2004; 
a:data  from  2001; 







Efforts by governments to contain costs and slow the growth of expenditure over the last 
two decades have relied on three sets of policies: regulation of prices, wages and health 
care production resources; caps on health care spending; shifts of costs onto the private 
sector,  especially  through  increasing  cost-sharing  by  patients  (Docteur  and  Oxley, 
2003b). 
Most OECD countries have chosen the possibility to regulate prices and/or volumes of 
health  care.  In  particular,  those  countries  with  a  public-integrated  system
63  have 
controlled  wages  both  in  the  hospital  and  ambulatory  sector  (Denmark  [hospitals], 
Finland, Ireland [hospitals], Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom [hospitals]). Portugal 
and Sweden, in order to contain costs, have downsized the staff during the 1990s. In 
particular, Portugal has cut down the number of top management positions. A number of 
countries  has  chosen  to  set  fees  directly  with  health  care  providers  (for  instance 
Australia,  Belgium,  France,  Japan,  Luxembourg,  and  Canada).  Reforms  in  the 
ambulatory  care  in  Germany,  the  hospital  sector  in  Austria,  and  in  Belgium  have 
adjusted prices as a function of the volume of care so as not to exceed a fixed budget 
ceiling. In particular, Belgium has adopted a growth limit restricting the annual growth 
of expenditure to 1.5% in real terms from 1995. Administrative price setting has been 
probably the most widespread means in most countries for pharmaceutical drugs. As 
reported by Jacobzone (2000) all of the countries covered by his report experienced 
                                                 
63 A public integrated system is characterized by compulsory or voluntary health insurance or third-party 
funding in which both the insurance and provision of health care is supplied by the same organization in a 
vertically integrated system. Before the purchaser-provider split, the UK was considered the classical 
example of an integrated model. (European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies) 120    &KDSWHU
 
 
pharmaceutical  price  freezes  in  the  1990s.
64  Most  states  have  responded  to  these 
restrictive measures for example by increasing volumes to compensate for limiting wage 
(and price) increases (for instance the ambulatory care in Australia, France, Japan, and 
the  hospital  sector  in  Sweden);  providing  higher  cost  services  (for  example  more 
expensive diagnostic tests as in France, Germany and the United States); up-rating of 
patients into higher cost classifications (e.g. Medicare in the USA) or shifting services in 
areas where there are no price controls. For instance, in the United Kingdom and Ireland 
hospital consultants increase their wages by “redirecting” their patients onto their private 
practices. This, in effect, reduces public outlays for health care, but it does not help 
curbing total health expenditure. 
With respect to the regulation of health care production resources many countries have 
set  a  QXPHUXV FODXVXV  on  medical  faculties  in  order  to  slow  down  the  number  of 
physicians. The number of doctors per capita has diminished as a result but remains 
positive in virtually all countries. The number of practicing physicians in the ambulatory 
sector is also controlled by limits on the number of doctors able to bill public insurer 
(Denmark  and  the  Netherlands),  and  by  professional  associations  (Germany  and 
Austria).
65  Canada  and  Sweden  have  reduced  the  support  stuff.  In  making  further 
adjustments in the medical personnel some countries should start to be cautious and not 
push these measures too far; the United Kingdom, Canada, and Denmark are having 
nowadays  difficulties  in  increasing  the  supply  of  health  care  because  of  the  limited 
                                                 
64 The countries covered by Jacobzone’s analysis (2000) are: Austria, Belgium, two provinces of Canada, 
the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. 
65  Such  constraints  have  not  always  shown  to  be  successful.  Italy  has  experienced  an  increase  by 
approximately 25% in the number of doctors and dentists from 1987 and 1994, even though there was 
officially a freeze on hiring. As shown in table 5, the number of physicians still remains in Italy one of the 
highest in the OECD area. 'HFHQWUDOL]DWLRQKHDOWKSROLF\DQGWKHOHYHORIKHDOWKH[SHQGLWXUH 121
 
 
number of available doctors and nurses. As a consequence, there might be some upward 
pressures on wages, which does not translate into an increase of services provided.  
Table 7 reports some statistics over the density of total health employment. 
 






      
$86 28.0  28.8  31.6  31.8  33.6  34.2 
% 16.1  18.1  20.5  -  -  - 
&$1 -  -  36.8  36.3  36.9  37.0 
),1 23.9  27.9  32.3  38.6  46.4  46.9 
) -  -  -  31.2  31.2  30.9 
' -  -  -  -  29.9  30.4 
*5( 9.0  11.4  13.5  14.1  -  - 
,5/ -  -  19.0  21.0  25.7  29.2 
, 15.1  16.7  17.7  -  -  - 
/8; -  -  -  12.4  -  - 
1/ 21.6  21.1  22.2  23.8  26.9  28.0 
1= -  -  17.0  -  -  - 
3 9.1  10.2  11.0  11.9  -  - 
( -  -  -  14.6  17.0  17.1 
6 50.5  51.5  52.7  39.0  -  - 
&+ -  42.7  -  51.5  -  - 
8. 20.8  21.6  23.7  29.5  30.6  32.1 
86$ 23.2  26.4  31.1  34.7  36.8  37.5 
6RXUFH2(&'+HDOWK'DWD'DWDXQDYDLODEOHIRU$XVWULD1RUZD\DQG'HQPDUN
                                                 
66  Number  of  full-time  equivalent  persons  employed  (including  self-employed)  in  health  services, 
including  “contracted  out”  staff  and  excluding  pharmaceutical  and  medical  equipment  manufacturing 
employees. Administrative staff, private for-profit and non-profit medical benefit insurers are included. 
Health professionals working outside health services are excluded (e.g. physicians employed in industry). 
Full-time equivalent conversions vary across countries but are taken, unless otherwise noted, to be 35 
hours or more per week. (Definition taken by OECD Health Data 2004).  
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With  respect to  the  hospital  supply  in the  last  two  decades  there  has  been  a  strong 
reduction in the number of available acute beds in almost all countries (table 6). As 
discussed  above,  this  reduction  is  due  to  health  policies  that  have  emphasized  the 
concentration of acute care in larger hospitals, which are able to achieve and exploit 
economies of scale and scope. In addition, countries are also making progress towards a 
better balance between long-term nursing care beds and acute care beds, and increased 
services  aimed  at  encouraging  the  elderly  to  remain  in  their  own  homes  as  long  as 
possible. 
The second set of health policies mostly used by governments are the budgetary caps. 
These instruments have been widely used in order to keep an eye on health expenditure. 
They  were  first  directed  at  the  hospital  sector,  and  only  subsequently  they  have 
addressed both the ambulatory  and the pharmaceutical sectors. This policy has been 
successful in a number of countries like Denmark, Ireland, New Zealand, Canada, and 
the  United  Kingdom,  characterized by  single-payer  system  and  integrated  models  of 
health  care  financing  and  supply.
67  A  few  SHI countries (the  Netherlands, Belgium, 
France, and Luxembourg) have also established indicative budgets, but these imposed 
limits have rarely been respected. In other states, where supply is organized at lower 
levels  of  government,  the  central  authorities  have  limited  the  amount  of  inter-
governmental  transfers (Canada  and  Finland)  or  set limits  on  tax  increases  at  lower 
levels of government (Denmark and Sweden).  
New  budget  controls  have  moved  from  retrospective  payments,  namely  paying  the 
provider on the basis of costs, to prospective or forward-looking payments. This has 
simply meant that providers are given a hard-budget constraint, while being expected to 
                                                 
67 The health care system organization influences these measures. For instance, spending under capitation-
based payment system in the ambulatory sector is easier to control than under fee-for-service payment 
arrangements. Single-payer countries also manage to control their costs greatly than multi-payer states. 'HFHQWUDOL]DWLRQKHDOWKSROLF\DQGWKHOHYHORIKHDOWKH[SHQGLWXUH 123
 
 
continue to adjust supply to meet the increasing demand for care. However, these budget 
constraints  may  carry  with  themselves  some  undesirable  effects.  Where  budgets  are 
allocated  independently  of  output,  there  is  no  financial  cost  if  output  falls  or 
compensation  for  higher  costs  if  output  increases.  In  some  cases  budgets  are  given 
according to historical costs. This may favor inefficiencies and hinder the geographical 
distribution of scarce resources on the basis of a need. In some countries (Denmark, 
France,  and  Greece)  any  savings  are  then  asked  back  by  payers,  so  providers  are 
stimulated to spend their budget up to the ceiling. In any case, most governments (Italy, 
Greece, Portugal, and New Zealand) have found themselves obliged to finance the cost 
of overruns when faced with a bankruptcy of hospitals. In general, health policies now 
take into account not only budget settings but also the levels of efficiency and output 
across hospitals and differences in needs across geographical areas. 
The third measure frequently pursued by governments throughout the 1980s and 1990s 
has  been  an  increase  in  patients’  cost  sharing  for  medical  care  and  out-of-pocket 
expenditure (see table 7).
68 Yet it must be stated that greater co-payments by patients 
have  generally  affected  the  pharmaceutical  sector,  while  payments  for  inpatient  and 
doctors visits have been less widespread. In Australia co-payments have been increased 
progressively in the 1990s as a demand-side cost containment strategy; out-of-pocket 
expenditure  (mainly  for  pharmaceuticals)  and  private  insurance  now  account  for 
approximately  one  third  of  revenue  for  Australian  health  care  expenditure.  Belgium 
froze the  price  of  pharmaceuticals in  1992,  1993,  and  1996-1999.  Cost  containment 
measures in Canada have also focused on an increase in co-payments and deductibles for 
                                                 
68 As signaled by Docteur and Oxley (2003b), more significant increases in cost sharing were introduced 
in  Austria  (1988,  1996,  1997),  Belgium  (1992-1995),  Finland  (1990-1995,  2002),  France  (1970s  and 
1980s), Germany (1990s), Italy (1995), the Netherlands (1997 but reversed in 1999), Portugal and Sweden 
(1990s). In some other countries (Australia, Belgium and the United Kingdom) patients were shifted from 
hospitals into nursing homes, where the share of co-payment is higher. 124    &KDSWHU
 
 
the insured. France has adopted different and numerous measures of cost containment in 
the last 25 years, both on the demand and supply sides. Such measures have not been 
easy  to  implement  in  a  context  of  FFS  payment  for  doctors,  retrospective 
reimbursement,  and  unrestricted  freedom  of  choice  of  patients.  Measures  to  limit 
demand  basically  focused  on  increased  cost  sharing,  although  in  1993  France 
experienced the last increase. Germany chose to increase co-payments for inpatient care, 
rehabilitative  care,  pharmaceuticals,  medical  aids,  and  transportation  to  the  hospital. 
Luxembourg extended co-payments for treatments in 1983. Consumer co-payments on 
pharmaceuticals  were  also  intended  to  manage  consumer  demand  and  contain 
expenditure  in  New  Zealand.  Overall,  the  number  of  drugs  not  reimbursed  has 
augmented, mainly for “comfort” drugs or those without a proven therapeutic value. In 
general, higher co-payments have been experienced for branded products, as a number 
of countries has taken pro-active policies to encourage the introduction and consumption 
of generics (for example Italy, Germany, Switzerland, Scandinavian countries and the 
Netherlands).  Some  other  countries  have  introduced  reference  price  systems,  which 
reimburse patients on the basis of the lowest price generic substitute or the lowest priced 
drug in a given therapeutic class (Docteur and Oxley, 2003b).
69 
On the whole, increases in co-payments and out-of-pocket expenditure are likely to have 
some undesirable effects on access and may bring additional social costs. In order to 
attenuate these alleged drawbacks, many countries have secured access to their health 
care system by exempting vulnerable groups (the poor, the chronically sick, and the 
elderly who consume the bulk of health care services) from co-payments and out-of-
pocket  expenditure;  by  setting  ceilings  on  annual  spending  for  individuals  or  for 
households (Sweden); and by allowing complementary insurance to cover the increase in 
                                                 
69 This is the case in the province of British Columbia in Canada, Denmark (1993), Germany (1989), Italy 
and the Netherlands (1996), New Zealand (1980s) and Sweden (1993).  'HFHQWUDOL]DWLRQKHDOWKSROLF\DQGWKHOHYHORIKHDOWKH[SHQGLWXUH 125
 
 
cost-sharing (France). However, the reverse of all these procedures is that such measures 
increase the administrative cost of cost-sharing schemes and this may reduce the net 
fiscal savings. 
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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   
$86 16.6  16.5  18.5 
$ -  14.6  18.6 
&$1 14.4  15.8  15.8 
'. 16.0  16.3  15.9 
),1 15.5  20.5  20.4 
) 11.4  10.8  10.4 
' 11.1  10.0  10.5 
,5/ 16.5  15.5  13.5 
, 15.3  24.4  22.6 
/8; 5.5  6.2  7.7 
1/ -  -  9.0 
1= 14.5  16.2  15.4 
1 14.6  15.2  14.5 
( -  23.5  23.5 
&+ 35.7  33.0  32.9 
8. 10.6  10.9  - 
86$ 20.1  15.0  15.2 
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Health care is a special good in many ways, not least because of the degree of state 
intervention in its provision. Health care is perceived by the society as a merit good that 
has to be provided with the goals of equity, efficiency, and effectiveness. In all OECD 
countries,  but  the  United  States,  the  government  has  taken  active  steps  in  the 
organization,  setting  and  delivery  of  health-related  services.  State  intervention  is 
desirable because the market mechanism does not work properly with health care and a 
number of market failures arise. The government sets a national health policy, which 
comprises important topics such as the funding and remuneration, the system overall 
organization (NHS vs. SHI), the pharmaceutical policy, prevention and public health, 
etc. Such decisions imply a precise allocation of health policy to different sub-layers of 
government. To date there is not a clear-cut evidence of how health tasks should be 
allocated. There exists no single pattern: different historical, cultural, administrative and 
political circumstances have led to varying practices of health care decentralization, and 
thus of functions to be covered by each level of government. The analysis has set out 
that being a federal or unitary state, having a single-payer or multi-payer system play a 
role in the choice of decentralizing health functions. Experiences across OECD countries 
show that decentralization can take on a variety of different features. The decision taken 
by the government to decentralize is a first step in a series of choices among complex 
policy options, and depends on an equally complex set of internal context, namely some 
necessary  pre-conditions  that  facilitate  the  implementation  of  decentralization:  the 
availability of an operating institutional framework and trained personnel at the lowest 
tiers of government, but also some historical conditions, like the fact that a specific 
population is used to have services delivered locally (e.g. Switzerland or the Nordic 
countries).  'HFHQWUDOL]DWLRQKHDOWKSROLF\DQGWKHOHYHORIKHDOWKH[SHQGLWXUH 127
 
 
What emerges in a first descriptive analysis is that decentralized SHI countries incur 
higher  health  expenditure  than  the  remaining  three  classifications  (centralized  SHI, 
decentralized NHS, and centralized NHS). It is worth to point out that one must not 
construe that a country is performing bad if it is spending more than others. In this 
preliminary descriptive analysis the focus is on the level of costs of selected OECD 
countries for the period 1990-2000. There is no regard for other important aspects of a 
health care system, such as the quantity and quality of services provided, the public’s 
satisfaction  with  health  services,  the  access  to  the  system,  etc.  SHI  countries  are 
spending more because they offer greater decision power to citizens, who can select 
their  provider  and  experience  almost  no  waiting  lists  for  accessing  some  specific 
technologies. NHS countries limit the choice of services and providers to the population, 
for  instance  through  gatekeeping,  and  this  entails  more  cost  control  (Gerdtham  and 
Jönsson, 2000).  
It is of primary importance to assess and evaluate the advantages and disadvantages 
connected to decentralization. Decentralizing some aspects of health care is a decision 
that  must  be  kept  dynamic  and  evolving  in  time.  For  example,  recent  small  but 
noticeable trends towards re-centralization, apart from Norway (in 2002) and Ireland (in 
2005), are Finland with discussions about re-centralizing specialized medical care, and 
Sweden with an ongoing discussion as to whether or not it is necessary to have three 
different levels of government in the organization of the health care system. Much of the 
success of health federalism depends on the development of appropriate coordination 
mechanisms and structures for learning the different experiences across decentralized 
units, and for improving the quality and performance of the overall health care system of 
a country.  
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The reform of health care delivery services is an important ongoing process in many 
countries  of  the  developed  world.  The  growth  of  health  care  expenditure  and  the 
consistent and increasing share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) devoted to health has 
become a topic subject to comments and discussions among policy makers, academics 
and people working in this field. 
A common trend in different countries has been to decentralize organizational and/or 
financing  responsibilities  of  the  health  care  sector  to  sub-layers  of  government. 
Decentralization involves the transfer of responsibilities from a central government to 
lower  levels  of  government  or  autonomous  or  semi-autonomous  organizations 
(Rondinelli et al., 1983). It can take on a variety of forms, depending upon the nature of 
the functions that are decentralized, the extent of control over those functions by local 
governments, and the type of institution to which responsibilities are transferred. The 
rationales and objectives of decentralization are often varied and ambitious: the stated 
goals of health sector decentralization generally include improving effectively service 
delivery,  securing  a  better  allocation  of  resources  according  to  needs,  involving  the 
community in decisions about priorities and facilitating the reduction of inequities in 
health.  Even  so,  decentralization  per  se  does  not  guarantee  improved  health  sector 
efficiency or improved health system outcomes. Numerous conditions, often overlooked, (PSLULFDODQDO\VLVRI2(&'FRXQWULHV  129
 
 
influence  the  success  of  decentralization  processes,  including  local  managerial  and 
technical capacities, systems of accountability, clear and transparent legal frameworks 
that delineate the division of responsibilities, and sufficient funding to fulfill mandates 
and to meet local priorities. All these conditions are necessary for a successful health 
decentralization.  
The goal of this chapter is to shed light on the effect of multi-level governance on the 
level of health expenditure.
70 The main determinants of health care expenditure will be 
investigated  through  an  empirical  application.  In  particular,  the  focus  will  be  on  20 
OECD countries for the decade 1990-2000. Those countries partaking in the analysis are 
a sub-sample of the OECD group. The selected countries have been chosen because the 
data availability and accuracy is more detailed and shows no break in series; moreover, 
all nations belong to either a NHS or a SHI system, and have well established economic 
and political systems that make them more comparable.
71 
Both  centralized  and  decentralized  health  care  settings  have  experienced  steady 
increases in the share of economic and financial resources given to health, and the level 
of costs has grown regardless of the system organization (OECD Health Data, 2004). 
However, an interesting aspect is that some scholars believe decentralization to enhance 
cost control and hence meet budgetary goals more easily (Mills et al., 1990). A different 
strand  of  analysis  considers  decentralization  a  possible  way  to  shift  costs  from  one 
governmental level to the other (Banting and Corbett, 2002; Crivelli et al., 2003).  
The  arguments  supporting  decentralization  as  a  means  to  control  costs  rely  on  the 
assumption that a multi-level governance system makes cost containment more precise 
                                                 
70 An interesting contribution relating to this topic is the paper of Wilson (2004) that reports the Canadian 
experience. 
71 Note that the 20 OECD countries are the following: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. 130    &KDSWHU
 
 
for different reasons (Mills et al., 1990). First, programs are more targeted to the needs 
of the local population, thus any kind of financial waste should be avoided. Second, in a 
local  context  the  community  can  mimic  the  role  of  a  supervisor,  “punishing”  local 
politicians by not re-electing them, if they perform badly, or alternatively “rewarding” 
them,  if  they  fulfill  their  commitments.  If  constituents  perceive  that  the  local 
government is wasting resources they will probably feel uncomfortable about it. Third, 
the presence of two (or more) tiers of government makes control more efficient, through 
stronger supervision by the upper levels. 
However, other authors claim that a decentralized setting inherently causes cost shifting 
problems between layers of government.
72 A recent analysis of Banting  and Corbett 
(2002)  on  health  policy  and  federalism  reveals  that  federal  institutions
73  add  an 
additional  layer  of  complexity  to  cost  containment.  Their  point  of  departure  is  that 
federal states have faced more serious difficulties in containing cost pressures in the last 
four decades than unitary states. One of the main conclusions is that attempts to contain 
health  spending  in  one  area  simply  shifts  the  pressures  elsewhere  in  the  system. 
According to the researchers, federal settings are more prone to cost shifting because the 
private sector plays a bigger role in federations, and the participation of two levels of 
government  in  shaping  public  health  programs  increases  the  chances  that  cost 
containment will involve cost shifting between governments. This, in turns, can become 
a  sort  of  “blame  game”  between  the  governmental  tiers:  in  fact,  no  one  takes  its 
responsibilities  for  excessive  spending  but  rather  “blames”  the  other  layers  of 
overspending  financial  resources.  Crivelli  et  al.  (2003)  support  the  view  of  the  cost 
shifting  problem  with  decentralization.  By  examining  the  health  care  system 
                                                 
72 An interesting contribution of cost shifting in health care is given by Meyer and Johnson (1983). 
73 Federal institutions must be understood as countries where there are two (or more) different tiers of 
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organization in Switzerland, the researchers point out that a multiplicity of third-party 
payers in the system and a high level of decentralization make it extremely complex to 
follow internal financial flows, which in turns create greater difficulties in establishing 
the role of each single component, creating a cost shifting problem. They claim that 
since nobody is entirely responsible for the health care budget, it is easier sometimes to 
obtain a reduction in a single body’s financial share, rather than committing oneself to a 
more  rational  use  of  financial  resources.  This  encourages  a  shifting  of  costs  at  the 
expense  of  another  payer  and  discourages  an  effective  rationalization  of  health 
expenditure. 
The goal of this chapter is to give some answers via an empirical analysis to a series of 
positive questions:  Is  the  level  of  health  care expenditure  higher  in a  centralized  or 
decentralized  setting?  Does the  overall organization  of the  health  care  system,  NHS 
versus SHI, have an effect on the level of health costs? 
This chapter is organized as follows: section 4.2 will briefly reckon the criteria used for 
classifying the 20 OECD countries. The international literature on the determinants of 
health care expenditure will be set forth in section 4.3. The econometric model will be 
specified  in  section  4.4  and  the  different  techniques  to  analyze  pooled  cross-section 
time-series data will be presented in section 4.5. Data and estimation results will follow 
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(decentralized vs. centralized, NHS vs. SHI) on the level of costs for a determined time 
period (1990-2000). 
In order to test this hypothesis, through the use of econometric techniques, the first step 
is  to  identify  the  characteristics  of  the  health  care  system  of  each  OECD  country 
partaking in the analysis. As outlined in paragraph 3.5.4 this study will use two criteria 
to classify health decentralization, and they are briefly reported here: 
1.  The organization and overall management responsibilities. Who actually manages 
the system? To which level of government is given the responsibility to plan and 
regulate the health care system and deliver health care services? 
2.  The funding of the system. Are sub-layers of government in charge of collecting 
financial resources to be spent on health, or is this a central duty? 
Overall three different categories can be identified to which countries can belong: the 
first category is characterized by the presence of a central management and funding of 
the  health  care  system;  the  second  category  describes  a  situation  where  the  system 
financing  is  centralized  but  the  delivery  and  management  of  care  is  decentralized; 
finally, the third category represents the case of decentralized management and funding. 
For the purposes of this study, a health care system has been considered to be centralized 
if it belonged to the first category; decentralized if it belonged either to the second or 
third category. The reason for this choice lies in the fact that even if a country has the 
features of a decentralized management and centralized funding, there is anyway  an 
important  aspect  of  decentralization  of  competences  that  has  taken  place  within  its 
boundaries and on which it is interesting to pursue empirical analyses. In the sample of 
OECD countries there are four states (Australia, Canada, Ireland, and Norway) that have 
such characteristics. Although in all of them the center is basically involved in funding 
health care, local governments are then in charge of organizing and delivering health (PSLULFDODQDO\VLVRI2(&'FRXQWULHV  133
 
 
services, and they enjoy a rather ample margin of maneuver in the allocation of funds in 
the different health activities.  
Note that the level of health decentralization has been associated to the overall health 
care system organization (that is, NHS or SHI). Hence it follows that these two concepts 
have been linked together. One might question how it is possible to separate the effect of 
a NHS or SHI system, and the effect of (de)centralization, when these two concepts are 
merged. My belief is that these concepts are intrinsically inseparable: decentralization 
happens necessarily in a NHS or SHI setting. It is true that there are some exceptions to 
this rule, as  for  example Denmark. The Danish health care system has always been 
highly decentralized and underwent an administrative reform in 1973, which changed 
the whole system from a SHI to a NHS, but notwithstanding this fact decentralization 
has  always  been  on  the  top  of  the  political  agenda.  Hence  in  this  specific  case 
decentralization was already present before the set-up of the health system. However, in 
all other countries of analysis the decision of decentralizing health care functions has 
come after the system was already built. The interesting aspect of this study is thus to 
consider the level of health care expenditure of the four emerging typologies of health 
care systems. 
The resulting four country clusters are the following: 
·  1+6FHQWUDOL]HG: Greece, Italy, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain,
74 United Kingdom. 
·  6+,FHQWUDOL]HG: Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands. 
·  1+6GHFHQWUDOL]HG: Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway, Sweden. 
                                                 
74 As explained in the previous chapter, Spain has been clustered as a NHS with a centralized set-up for 
the decade 1990-2000. However, it is worth to point out that in the estimations of the econometric model 
for OECD countries, when the dummy for Spain has been changed into a NHS decentralized health care 
system, the results were similar. 134    &KDSWHU
 
 
·  6+,GHFHQWUDOL]HG: Australia, Austria, Canada, Germany, Switzerland. 
For a comprehensive description of the health care system of each of the 20 countries 
please refer to Annex 1. The main sources of information are the European Observatory 
on Health Care Systems (Brussels), national web sites of the Department/Ministry of 




In the last decades all OECD countries have experienced a steady increase in the health 
care expenditure and in the share of GDP spent on this sector. This trend has affected the 
bulk of countries and caused some alert in health economics. A body of literature started 
to examine the main determinants of health care expenditure and, thanks to the use of 
econometric methods, suggestions on variables that have an impact on health costs have 
been given.  
International studies on health care expenditure can be divided in two main approaches: 
cross-section with bivariate or multivariate regressions using a single year or several 
years (Newhouse, 1977; Leu, 1986; Parkin et al., 1987; Gerdtham, 1992a,b) and panel 
data regressions covering a large number of countries over long time periods (Hitiris and 
Posnett, 1992; Hitiris, 1997; Gerdtham et al., 1998). These latter studies benefit from a 
much larger sample size, permitting the inclusion of a wider range of variables. Most 
studies have estimated the relation between per-capita health care expenditure and its 
determinants,  namely:  the  proportion  of  population  over  65  and  under  5,  per-capita 
GDP, the public finance share of health care spending, urbanization, and the number of 
practicing physicians per capita. (PSLULFDODQDO\VLVRI2(&'FRXQWULHV  135
 
 
The  first  generation  of  studies  at  the  international  level  has  focused  mainly  on  the 
estimation of the elasticity of health care expenditure with respect to per-capita GDP. 
Newhouse (1977) regresses per-capita medical expenditure on per-capita GDP on 13 
OECD countries and finds income elasticity for health care spending greater than one, 
thus leading to the conclusion that medical care is a luxury good. On the basis of these 
results the author made two strong inferences: the first one was that other factors but 
income (for instance, the method for reimbursing the physician) need not be included 
since they are of marginal significance. The second strong assumption was that health 
care is a luxury good (since its elasticity is above one) and this could be explained by the 
fact that, at the margin, the demand for health care may relate more to caring, namely the 
subjective components of health, than to curing or physiological health.  
Because  of  the  bias  caused  by  possible  omitted  explicative  variables,  some  other 
researchers have introduced a larger set of factors that may have any significant impact 
on national health expenditure. Newhouse’s finding has been later confirmed by Leu 
(1986), who finds income elasticity higher than one, using cross-sectional data for 19 
OECD  countries.  However,  the  author  introduces  in  his  analysis  a  set  of  important 
variables (dummy variables) for countries with a national health system and countries 
based on a public insurance scheme, dummy variables where there is direct democracy, 
and variables that reflect the public offer of health services. Gerdtham et al. (1992a) 
used  a  single  cross-section  of  19  OECD  countries  in  1987  and  reported  per-capita 
income, urbanization, and the share of public financing to total health expenditure as 
positive and significant variables, with a reported income elasticity of 1.33. Thus, the 
result of health being a luxury good was confirmed again. 
The second generation studies use panel data combining cross-country and time-series 
data on a sample of OECD countries. A main feature of the studies belonging to this 
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production  capacity  of  health  services.  Hitiris  and  Posnett  (1992)  used  panel  data 
observations from 20 OECD countries over the period 1960-1987 and found a strong 
and  positive  correlation  between  per-capita  health  spending  and  GDP  with  income 
elasticity at about unity. Other variables were included in the model and the share of 
over 65 in the population was found to be positive and significant. Hitiris (1997) focuses 
his analysis on the determinants of health care expenditure for a sample of 10 member 
states of the EU for 32 years. He applies two different methods of estimation, both of 
which take account and correct different aspects of econometric problems arising from 
the nature of statistical observations originating from markedly different countries. In 
particular, he first uses a cross-sectionally heteroskedastic and time-wise autoregressive 
model,  and  subsequently  implement  the  model  allowing  for  cross-sectional  units 
interdependence, correlated and time-wise autoregressive disturbance terms. His results 
shed  light  on  the  existing  divergence  of  health  care  expenditure  between  European 
countries because of differences in the level of GDP per head and demographic factors. 
According to Hitiris, health care convergence can occur only in the longer run when “a 
harmonious  and  balanced  development  of  economic  activities,  …  the  raising  of  the 
standard of living and life, and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among the 
Member States” are realized. Gerdtham et al. (1998) used a panel data set for 22 OECD 
countries over the period 1970-1991, including in the model variables such as the per-
capita number of physicians and the regulatory set-ups of each single country. Amongst 
the  non  institutional  factors,  only  GDP  and  tobacco  consumption  generally  have  a 
significant impact on health expenditure: the elasticity on tobacco consumption indicates 
that health expenditure would increase by about 1.3% if tobacco consumption increased 
by  10%.  Countries  with  primary  physicians  as  gatekeepers  for  inpatient  care  have 
consistently  lower  health  expenditure  (costs  drop  by  16%).  Public  reimbursement 
systems tend to be less expensive than public contract systems. Countries that reimburse 
their  physicians  by  capitation  appear  to  experience  lower  health  expenditure;  the (PSLULFDODQDO\VLVRI2(&'FRXQWULHV  137
 
 
proportion  of  inpatient  care  expenditure  tends  to  be  positively  related  to  health 
expenditure; the public sector is relatively more important than the private sector and 
helps lowering costs. Furthermore, it seems that the number of doctors swells health 
expenditure in systems that reimburse their physicians by fee-for-service. In contrast 
with other studies, the estimated income elasticity is lower than one (0.74). This is the 
most complete study at the international level. 
Barros  (1998)  focuses  his  study  on  the  determinants  of  growth  of  aggregate  health 
expenditure.  The  study  has  its  starting  point  in  previous  literature  but  looks  at 
differences across countries in growth, and not in levels, of health expenditure. Barros 
basically  uses  the  same  explanatory  variables,  but  obtains  different  results.  Health 
system  characteristics  usually  believed  to  influence  health  expenditure  growth,  like 
population  ageing,  the  type  of  health  system  and  existence  of  gatekeepers,  are  not 
significant. The only exception is income, with elasticity below but close to one. 
It is important to stress that the econometric studies on international comparisons of per-
capita  health  care  expenditure  face  some  methodological  problems.
75  One  of  them 
relates to the assembling of all data, which is a daunting task and can be accomplished 
with errors of observation. Moreover, some data are difficult to compare because they 
are  normally  collected  for  operational  reasons  rather  than  research  purposes.  The 
rigorous assessment of the quality (accuracy and reliability) of cross-national data is 
difficult. There is thus an ample scope for imperfect reliability of data with respect to 
international comparisons due to different classifications and definitions.  
Another problem concerning the cross-national dataset is that spending data in national 
currencies have to be translated into PPPs (Purchasing Power Parities) expressed in US 
dollars. However, one should bear in mind that the PPP exchange rates are much more 
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stable than the highly variable spot exchange rates used by accountants to aggregate the 
financial reports of international companies.
76  
The third problem of international comparisons, as underlined by Gerdtham and Jönsson 
(2000), is the weak theoretical base for the determinants of aggregate health expenditure, 
which provides little guidance as to the possible explanatory variables and the casual 
mechanisms  involved.  There  is  thus  a  lack  of  theory  and  an  “atheoretical”  basis  of 
macroeconomic analysis of health expenditure. The bulk of models have been developed 
on microeconomic concepts but they have been employing macrodata, which gave rise 
to the problem of aggregation and misspecification arising from omitted variables or 
inadequate functional form.  
Several variables may appear at first sight to be closely related to one another. The 
problem  of  multicollinearity  may  thus  be  severe  and  can  tend  to  confound  the 
measurement of separate effects of individual regressors on expenditure and it can make 
it harder to obtain significant estimates. Furthermore, the coefficient obtained by the 
regression may be highly sensitive to the deletion or the addition of other regressors in 
the model.  
It is worth noting that the classical distinction between supply and demand in health care 
is not so clear as it is in other markets. The role of the physician can be perceived as the 
patient’s agent who advises on health care needs and treatments, and as a key supplier of 
health services. The goal of being healthy is then an argument of the utility function both 
for the patient and for the physician. Another element that makes the distinction between 
supply and demand complicated is that health services are usually provided on the base 
of needs and not on willingness to pay, given the fact that health is a merit good and the 
                                                 
76 A spot exchange rate is determined every moment through international trade in goods, services and 
securities. A PPP exchange rate is an analytic construct formed by pricing out the given basket of goods 
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welfare states are concerned with the goal of equal access to medical services for every 
citizen. The public provision of most health services is coupled with some forms of non-
price rationing, such as the waiting lists.  
Another  problem  on  which  Roberts  (1999)  sheds  light  on,  is  that  cross-sectional 
comparisons  implicitly  impose  the  assumption  of  homogeneous  relationship  across 
countries, which may appear unrealistic because preferences can be heterogeneous as 
well as the production functions. Moreover, different authors in these last years have 
investigated  the  issue  of  non-stationarity  of  variables  (Roberts,  2000),  unit  root  and 
cointegration tests (Okunade and Karakus, 2001; Herwartz and Theilen, 2003) in the 
context of the determinants of health care expenditure at the international level.
77 
Of course all these methodological limitations should be taken into consideration in the 
analysis; however, the use of panel data undoubtedly gives some more advantages than 
simple  cross-section  or  time-series  data  (see  paragraph  4.5).  Notwithstanding  the 
presence of  these problems,  the  results  obtained so  far  by  international  studies  give 
important insights on the determinants of health care expenditure and can be a useful 
tool for analyzing the surge of health costs.  
 
                                                 
77 A stationary time-series is one whose mean and variance do not change over time. If variables in a 
regression are non-stationary, then the implication is that the regression may be spurious. If the error term 
is  stationary,  then  the  two  variables  are  co-integrated  with  the  error  term  representing  short  term 
deviations from test relationship. Tests for stationarity exist but their power is limited by both the quality 
and the time span of the data (Mills, 2004; Hendry, 1986; Davidson and Mackinnon, 1993; and Muscatelli 
and Hurn, 1992). Recent research suggests that stationarity may not be a serious problem in panel data, 





In this study a single equation approach is used to model per-capita total health care 
expenditure. The model takes into consideration economic, demographic, and structural 
factors as determinants of the level of costs. Note that the novelty of this research is the 
inclusion in the model specification of dummy variables that describe two features: first, 
whether a country is based on a NHS or a SHI scheme; second, whether the health care 
system organization is centralized or decentralized following the two criteria previously 
set out.
78 This analysis covers the period 1990-2000 and is carried out on a group of 20 
OECD countries, which has been selected for the quality and accuracy of available data. 
Hence panel data will be used.  
Following previous model specifications and taking into consideration the availability 
and quality of data, the following parsimonious health expenditure model is specified: 
THEit = I(GDPit, PHYit, BEDSit, A19it, A80it, UNit, PYLLit, NHSc, NHSd, SHId, SHIc, T) 
[1] 
where subscript L stands for the country and Wfor the year. Moreover, 
THEit =   Total per-capita health expenditure; 
GDPit =   Per-capita GDP; 
PHYit =   Density of physicians per 1,000 inhabitants; 
BEDSit =  Density of acute beds per 1,000 inhabitants; 
                                                 
78 Leu (1986) introduced in his model specification a dummy variable for countries with a national health 
system and the results pointed in the direction that these latter tend to have lower expenditure than non-
national health systems. (PSLULFDODQDO\VLVRI2(&'FRXQWULHV  141
 
 
A19it =   Percentage of population aged below 19 years;
79 
A80it =   Percentage of population aged over 80 years;
80 
UNit =   Unemployment rate; 
PYLLit =   Potential  years  of  life  lost  -  all  causes  related  to  health  per  100,000 
inhabitants below 70 years. It is an important variable because it can be 
considered as a proxy for the outcome/quality of a health care system. It is 
a summary measure of premature mortality that provides an explicit way of 
weighing deaths occurring at younger ages, which are, a priori, preventable. 
Such deaths should thus not occur in the presence of timely and effective 
health care. A negative sign from estimations is expected, since if PYLL 
increases then THE decreases.
81 
NHSc =   Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the country has a National Health 
System  (NHS)  and  a  centralized  structure  of  its  health  care  system,  0 
otherwise. However, note that this category will be taken as the reference 
group and therefore it cannot be included in the econometric specification. 
                                                 
79 The OECD Health Data 2004 collects data of people aged under 14 and under 19 years. A19 was chosen 
in order to identify the effect of teenagers on total health care expenditure. 
80 The OECD Health Data 2004 collects data of people aged over 65 and over 80 years. A80 was chosen 
in order to identify the effect of old-old adults on total health care expenditure. 
81 The calculation of PYLL involves adding up deaths occurring at each stage and multiplying this with 
the number of remaining years to live until a selected age limit (70 years). In order to assure cross-country 
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is the number of deaths at age D, S
￿
￿
￿ refers to the number of persons aged D in a country Lat a time W, 3
￿  
refers to the number of persons aged Din the reference population, and 3
￿  is the total number of persons 
aged 0 to O in the reference population (OECD Health Data 2004). 142    &KDSWHU
 
 
NHSd =   Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the country has a National Health 
System (NHS) and a decentralized structure of its health care system, 0 
otherwise; 
SHId =   Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the country has a Social Health 
Insurance  system  (SHI)  and  a  decentralized  structure  of  its  health  care 
system, 0 otherwise; 
SHIc =   Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the country has a Social Health 
Insurance system (SHI) and a centralized structure of its health care system, 
0 otherwise; 
T =   Time variable that should capture the cost differences over time owing to 
changes in medical technology or to other factors that may influence the 
development of health costs at the national level. 
The functional form chosen to estimate model [1] is the log-log or Cobb Douglas form. 
Such  a  choice  allows  to  answer  questions  about  elasticities  and  has  been  used  in 
previous studies (e.g. Gerdtham et al., 1998). By applying the double log functional 
form, expression [1] can be written as: 
ln THEit =  0 + 1 ln GDPit 2 ln PHYit 3 ln BEDSit 4 ln A19it 5 ln A80it + 





The empirical analysis of the econometric model [2] will use panel data. A panel data set 
contains  repeated  observations  over  the  same  units  (individuals,  households,  firms), (PSLULFDODQDO\VLVRI2(&'FRXQWULHV  143
 
 
collected over a number of periods. The availability of repeated observations on the 
same  units  allows  economists  to  specify  and  estimate  more  complicated  and  more 
realistic  models  than  a  single  cross-section  or  a  single  time  series  would  do.  With 
additional, and more informative data (one has a large number of data points), one can 
obtain more reliable estimates, an improved efficiency of econometric results and can 
test for more sophisticated behavioral models (Hsiao, 2003). 
Another  advantage  of  panel  data  sets  is  their  ability  to  control  for  individual 
heterogeneity (Baltagi, 1999); they make it possible to analyze changes on an individual 
level. For example, if one considers a situation in which the average consumption level 
rises with 2% from one year to the other, panel data can identify whether this rise is the 
result of, for example, an increase of 2% for all individuals or an increase of 4% for 
approximately one half of the individuals and no change for the other half. Panel data 
are thus suitable to explain not only why individual units behave differently, but also to 
model why a given unit behaves differently at different time periods.  
Panel data enables to control for omitted variables that are persistent over time. “By 
utilizing information on both the inter-temporal dynamics and the individuality of the 
entities being investigated, one is better able to control in a more natural way for the 
effects of missing or unobserved variables” (Hsiao, 2003). Thanks to panel data it is 
possible  to  implement  country-specific  effects  that  allow  to  take  into  consideration 
unobservable differences that are systematically related across individuals and are fairly 
constant over time. The inclusion of these effects is not only an optional tool in order to 
get more information about individual- or time-specific characteristics of the panel, it is 
a way to check and control the presence of mismeasured or/and unobserved variables 
that are correlated with the explanatory variables. 
Panel data are better able to study complex issues of dynamic behavior (Baltagi, 1999). 
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at a particular point in time. Repeated cross-sections show how this proportion changes 
over time. But it is only with a panel data set that one can estimate what proportion of 
those who are unemployed in one period remain unemployed in another period. Thus, 
panel data develop a full and reliable life history (e.g. family formation, employment 
patterns, etc.).  
Drawbacks related to panel data are more of practical nature: the data collection tends to 
be  more  complex  and  often  panel  data  sets  may  suffer  from  missing  observations. 
Furthermore, the time-series dimension may tend to be short, especially when dealing 
with macro-economic level, since definitions of variables may differ substantially from 
one state to the other. For example, heterogeneous definitions exist about some issues 
even  in  Nordic  countries  of  Europe,  which  have  similar  GDP,  social  systems,  and 
cultural background. The definition of, say health expenditure, may also change over 
time within a single country. Differences in definitions of specific issues can hence take 
place both among countries and within a  country  over a determined period of time. 
Thus,  many  variables  cannot  be  utilized  because  of  lack  of  data.  Another  problem 
concerning the cross-sectional dataset at the macro level is that spending data in national 
currencies have to be translated in PPPs (Purchasing Power Parities) expressed in US 
dollars. Furthermore, the choice of the monetary conversion factor critically influences 
the results one can obtain with estimations (Huber, 1999). 
Panel data methods are appropriate  when data are for a number of countries over a 
number of years because it is possible to estimate both the effects of inputs, such as 
health  expenditure, and  the  country-specific  effects  of  unobserved  factors  that differ 
across panels (Gravelle et al., 2003). There are two sources of variation in panel data 
that provide different information: the  ZLWKLQ YDULDWLRQ, which considers the variation 
within  panels  (countries)  over  time;  and  the  EHWZHHQ YDULDWLRQ,  which  considers  the 
variation across panels (countries). An important preliminary analysis before estimating (PSLULFDODQDO\VLVRI2(&'FRXQWULHV  145
 
 
parameters is to calculate the within and between variation of all variables in the data 
set. In fact, if the within variation is sufficiently high, then one can choose to use the 
Fixed Effects estimator (also called the within group – or LSDV – estimator), since this 
latter only takes account of the within variation of variables.
82 As noted by Baltagi and 
Griffin (1984), if the between variation for the  relevant  explanatory variables in the 
model greatly exceeds the within variation, then OLS becomes a preferred estimator. In 
fact, the relatively small within variation leads to feasible GLS estimates that are very 
different from the LSDV estimates. Because the precision of the LSDV estimator is 
proportional to the within variation, such estimates where the data set contains relatively 
small  within  variation,  will  have  large  standard  errors.  Under  these  circumstances 
estimates  will  lack  precision  and  the  statistical  tests  that  are  conventionally  used  to 
discriminate between models may be misleading (Deaton, 1997). 
There  are  mainly  four  popular  approaches  for  analyzing  panel  data:  Ordinary  Least 
Squares (OLS) and the panel data models – fixed effects (FEM) and random effects 
(REM), and the Kmenta approach, also known as the Parks-Kmenta approach. The first 
three approaches are more oriented to panel data where the number of observations is 
bigger  than  the  number  of  temporal  dimension  (N>T);  the  last  approach  is  more 
convenient to use when T>N. Note that the main limit of OLS is that the constant is 
assumed to be constant across all units, and that the effect of any given regressor on the 
dependent variable is constant across observations. These two restrictions are likely to 
be a problem in panel data analysis because one observes heterogeneity across units and 
over  time.  Of  course  it  is  possible  to  test  for  the  presence  or  absence  of  an  error 
component  (either  fixed  or  random),  and  this  helps  the  researcher  to  choose  the 
                                                 
82 Note, however, that the choice of the Fixed Effects Model does not only depend on the within variation 
of variables. Contrary to the Random Effects Model for example it does not impose any restrictions upon 
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appropriate econometric technique. The following sections will explain the advantages 




The FEM is a linear regression model in which the intercept terms vary cross-sectionally 
(over the individual units). Thus, the common formulation of the model assumes that 
differences across units can be captured in differences in the constant terms. In the REM 
it is assumed that the individual term of the regression is a random factor, which is 
independently and identically distributed over individuals. Both models present some 
advantages and limitations in their use: very often it is convenient to think about the 
application of the econometric method on a specific data set, and this holds particularly 
for FEM versus REM, where the nature of data retrievement (random or fixed) is of 
crucial relevance.  
Table  9  reports  the  main  advantages  and  limitations  of  using  FEM  and  REM 






·  The major advantage of a fixed effects 
analysis  is  that  it  controls  for  any 
unmeasured time invariant differences 
between  units  (for  example,  when 
analyzing  individuals  it  controls  for 
constant  preferences  or  personality 
traits  because  it  only  uses  the  within 
person – over time – variation). 
·  In this model the possible correlations 
between  the  individual  effects  and 
regressors are neutralized. This implies 
that it is unnecessary to specify that the 




·  Investigators  make  inferences 
conditional on the effects that are in the 
sample (Hsiao, 1986). 
·  The major limitation is that it is not 
possible  to  include  regressors  in  the 
model that do not vary over time. In 
fact,  the  transformation  (from  each 
observation  the  average  of  the 
observations  for  that  individual  is 
subtracted) wipes out all explanatory 
variable that do not vary over time. 
·  The  dummy  variable  approach  is 
costly in terms of degrees of freedom 
lost. If there was a way to limit such 
loss,  a  more  efficient  estimate  could 
be produced. 
·  The  FEM  only  uses  the  within 
variation  of  variables:  if  the  within 
variation  is  low  than  this  method 
should not be used.  
5(0
·  By saving on degrees of freedom, the 
REM  produces  a  more  efficient 
estimator of the slope coefficients than 
the  FEM.  Moreover,  time-invariant 
variables are not wiped out.  
·  The  major advantage is the  ability  to 
estimate  the  effects  of  unit-level 
characteristics  and the  parsimony  and 
efficiency of the model.  
·  Investigators  make  unconditional 
inferences  with  respect  to  the 
population of all effects (Hsiao, 1986).  
·  One of the most important assumption 
in  the  REM  is  that  the  individual 
effects  are  uncorrelated  with  the 
regressors.  If there  is  correlation  the 





The cross-sectionally heteroskedastic and timewise autoregressive model (i.e. Kmenta, 
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dealing  with  time-series  and  cross-sectional  data.  Concerning  time-series  data,  for 
example, one can possibly assume that disturbances can be autoregressive, though not 
necessarily heteroskedastic. With respect to cross-sectional data it is frequently assumed 
that the regression disturbances are mutually independent but heteroskedastic. Kmenta 
(1986) has suggested four possible ways of handling pooled time-series of cross-sections 
that are heteroskedastic and autocorrelated: (1) the common autocorrelation term, (2) the 
varying  autocorrelation  term,  (3)  cross-sectionally  heteroskedasticity,  (4)  cross-
sectionally correlated term. Note that since cross-sectional correlation must be estimated 
in this model, panels must be balanced and the number of time periods should be bigger 
than the number of panels, that is 7!1. The Kmenta model is estimated using a Feasible 
Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) estimator. 
The FGLS correction for panel studies proceeds, as usual, by a first round of OLS and a 
second round of weighted OLS (WOLS), with weights being inversely proportional to 
the  estimated  variances  for  each  panel.  It  is  well  known  that  corrections  for 
autocorrelation usually lead to increased standard errors of coefficients, while the results 
for heteroskedasticity can go in both directions. Any kind of WOLS procedure tends to 
downweight observations with large residuals and to emphasize observations with good 
fit. Thus, those countries with a “bad” fit, namely with large variance estimates, incur an 
even  worse  fit  in  the  Parks-Kmenta  model,  while  the  fit  for  good  countries  even 
improves.  
Beck and Katz (1995) state that the Parks-Kmenta approach shows inaccurate standard 
errors,  and  they  therefore  suggest  another  method  of  estimation,  which  corrects  for 
standard errors. They show, through Monte Carlo simulations, that the OLS with Panel 
Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE) produces more accurate standard errors and performs 
well even in the presence of complicated panel data structures. It should be reminded, (PSLULFDODQDO\VLVRI2(&'FRXQWULHV  149
 
 






There are generally two purpose tests to decide which model is best to be used in a 
context of panel data analysis.  
First, the question to be answered is whether a group specific error component actually 
exists. To do this, one computes the /DJUDQJH0XOWLSOLHU/0WHVW for the presence or 
absence of an error component (either fixed or random). For a one component model 




2(1)               [19] 
If the null hypothesis is accepted the error component is zero and one should choose 
OLS  over  either  FEM  or  REM.  If  the  null  hypothesis  is  not  accepted  the  error 
component are not zero and one should choose either the REM or the FEM over the 
OLS model. It must be stated, however, that the OLS is normally rejected in a context of 
panel  data  analysis,  as it  does  not  capture  any  heterogeneity  among  individuals  and 
across time. Moreover, OLS yields estimates of the parameter standard errors that are 
incorrect. 
How  to  choose  between  REM  and  FEM?  The  test  to  be  applied  is  the  so-called 
+DXVPDQWHVW(HT). Hausman (1978) has suggested this test for the null hypothesis that 
                                                 
83 In particular Beck and Katz (1995) claim that the FGLS formula for standard errors assumes that the 
error process is known, not estimated. In many applications this is not a problem but it is in a context of 
time-series  cross-sectional  data  because  the  error  process  has  a  large  number  of  parameters  to  be 






￿ are uncorrelated. The general idea of a HT is that two estimators are compared: 
one which is consistent under both the null and alternative hypothesis and one which is 
consistent  (and  typically  efficient)  under  the  null  hypothesis  only.  A  significant 




2(N¶)     N¶= number of predictors     [20] 
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If the null hypothesis is not accepted the option is for the  FEM in the econometric 




Baltagi  (1986)  suggests  two  different  tests  to  allow  to  distinguish  between  an  error 
component  model  and  the  Parks-Kmenta  model.  Recall  that  the  error  component 
disturbances are homoskedastic, while the Kmenta type disturbances are heteroskedastic 
(such  that  they  might  have  different  variances  across  ranges  or  subsets  of  nations). 
Therefore an  easy way  to understand which  model is best to use is to implement a 
Bartlett’s test for homoskedasticity applied to OLS residuals. Baltagi argues that such 
test performs well, given that the right decision (not rejecting homoskedasticity) for the 
error components structure is right between 96 and 100% of the time. On the other hand, 
if the true disturbances are of the Kmenta type, the test rejects homoskedasticity 73 to 
100% of the time. 
Similarly, one can distinguish between the two models through the use of a test for serial 
correlation (when errors are not independent from one period to the other). Note that (PSLULFDODQDO\VLVRI2(&'FRXQWULHV  151
 
 
providing that serial correlation exists is not enough, since both error structures admit its 
existence. However, for Kmenta the serial correlation decays over time, while for the 
error  component  disturbances  it  is  constant  over  time.  A  well  performing  test  that 
distinguishes  between  the  two  models  is  a  Durbin-Watson  statistics  on  the  within 
residuals. 
As outlined previously, the Kmenta model is principally used with pooled time-series 
cross-sectional model (TSCS).
84 This implies that such model should best be used when 
the number of time periods exceeds the number of panels. Alternatively, if N>T the error 
component models should be applied. Moreover, one should also look  at the within 
variation of the regressors (Filippini et al., 2005). If there is a reasonable percentage for 




As Verbeek (2004) states, the computation of the goodness of fit in a panel data context 
is unusual and uncommon. One reason is that one can give a different meaning to the 
explanation of the within and between variation in the data. A second reason is that the 
R
2 (or adjusted R
2) makes sense only when the model is estimated through the OLS 
technique. In fact, the R
2 statistics is an OLS concept that it is useful because of the 
unique way it breaks down the total sum of squares into the sum of the model sum of 
squares and the residual sum of squares. When the model is estimated with GLS and/or 
FGLS, the total sum of squares cannot be broken down in the same way, making thus 
the R
2 statistics less useful as a diagnostic tool for GLS-FGLS regressions. Specifically, 
                                                 
84 Note that TSCS is the term used for indicating that T>N, or “temporal dominant pool”. When N>T, that 




2  statistics  need  not  be  bounded  between  0  and  1  and  does  not  represent  the 
percentage  of  total  variation  in  the  dependent  variable  that  is  accounted  for  by  the 
model.  Additionally,  eliminating  or  adding  variables  in  a  model  does  not  always 
increase or decrease the computed R
2 value.
85 This is the reason why the R
2 statistics is 
not reported in the software Stata 8.0 when the Kmenta model is performed. 
When modeling a FEM and/or a GLS Stata 8.0 reports three different values for the R
2 
statistics: 
1.  The R
2 overall: this is the standard R
2 from regressing Y on X. It is the proportion of 
the variation in, say, health care expenditure, explained by the model. 
2.  The R
2 between: it is the R
2 from the regression of the means of Y on the means of X 
(the between estimator).
86 It is the proportion of the variation in health expenditure 
across  countries  explained  by  the  variation  (across  countries)  in  the  independent 
variable. 
3.  The  R
2  within:  it  amounts  to  the  R
2  from  the  following  prediction  equation 






￿ [ [ \ \ - - - .  It  is  the  proportion  of  the  variation  in  health  expenditure 
within countries across years explained by the variation (within countries) in the 
independent variable. 
 
                                                 
85 Please refer to the Stata web site: www.stata.com  
86 The between estimator exploits the between dimension of the data (differences between panels), and is 
determined as the OLS estimator in a regression of individual averages of \ on individual averages of [ 


































The econometric model specified in equation [2] is a combination of cross-section and 
time-series data for 20 OECD countries covering the period 1990-2000 (11 years), thus 
resulting in 220 total number of observations.
87 Data were collected primarily through 
the  OECD  Health  Database  2004.  Where  missing  they  have  been  integrated  with 
contacts established with National Statistical Departments of different countries. For the 
conversion of monetary variables, i.e. per-capita health expenditure and income, national 
GDP price indexes (100=1995) have first been used as deflators, and then Purchasing 
Power  Parities  (PPPs)  for  the  base  year  (1995).  Because  monetary  variables  are 
expressed in PPPs they provide more complete and meaningful cross country and time-
series comparisons (Kravis et al., 1982). 
The  time-invariant  variables  in  model  [2]  are  the  dummy  variables  describing  the 
general  setting  of  the  health  care  system  (either  NHS  or  SHI)  and  its  degree  of 
(de)centralization (NHSd, SHId, SHIc). It is worth to point out that some variables show 
a high within variation, in particular potential years of life lost (36%), unemployment 
rate (23%), and GDP per capita (16%). The other variables in the model all show a 
within variation equal to or lower than 15%, and namely: percentage of people aged 
below 19 in the total population (15%), density of acute beds (11%), percentage of old-
old adults (10%), and physician density (8%). Table 10 provides a descriptive statistics 
of the variables in model [2]. 
                                                 
87  The  reader  should  be  reminded  that  the  sample  of  OECD  countries  includes:  Australia,  Austria, 
Belgium,  Canada,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Greece,  Ireland,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  The 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom. 
The total number of observations drops off to 217 since for Belgium there exists no data on the potential 








Total  Health  Expenditure 
per capita (THE) 
US $ PPP/inhabitant  912.3  1732.8  3050.0 
GDP per capita (Y)  GDP  US  $ 
PPP/inhabitant 
12616  21148  42763 
Physician density (PHY)  Physicians/1’000 
inhabitants 
1.5  2.8  4.5 
Density  of  acute  beds 
(BEDS) 
Beds/1’000 inhabitants  2.4  4.1  10.1 
Under 19 (A19)  Under 19/population  0.197  0.247  0.365 
Over 80 (A80)  Over 80/population  0.022  0.035  0.050 
Unemployment rate (UN)  Unemployed/working 
population 
0.005  0.085  0.314 
Potential Years of Life Lost 
(PYLL) 
Preventable  deaths 
occurring  before  70 
years, all health causes 
2936  4323  6925 
 
The econometric softwares used for the estimation of model [2] are Limdep NLOGIT 
version 3.0 and Stata/SE 8.0. Table 11 reports the results obtained with the OLS model, 
FEM, REM, and Kmenta model.  






























































































































*, **, ***: significantly different from zero at the 90, 95 and 99% confidence level. 
 
The null hypothesis of the Lagrange Multiplier test is not accepted, thus implying the 
presence of an error component, hence that REM/FEM should be preferred to OLS. 156    &KDSWHU
 
 
Subsequently the Hausman test result shows that the REM is to be preferred to the FEM, 
implying that the regressors are exogeneous and that the individual error term (
￿) is 
uncorrelated with X. Furthermore, the REM is more interesting because it is possible to 
observe the impact of the three dummy variables characterizing the overall organization 
of the health care system and its degree of (de)centralization on total health expenditure 
per capita. Being these dummies time-invariant, the FEM does not allow to estimate 
their coefficients. Moreover, the within variation of some parameters in equation [2] is 
very low and this is reflected in the low efficiency of the parameters estimated with 
FEM.  
In order to verify if heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are present two statistical tests 
have been performed: a likelihood-ratio test for panel-level heteroskedasticity, and a 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data set.
88 The result of the likelihood-ratio 
test shows that the hypothesis of homoskedasticity is not accepted at the 95% confidence 
level,  thus  implying  that  there  is  panel-level  heteroskedasticity.
89  Furthermore,  the 
Woolridge  test  for  autocorrelation  shows  that  there  is  first  order  autocorrelation. 
However, the reader should be reminded of the fact that it is not easy to choose between 
a REM and a Kmenta model, because the REM also partly considers heteroskedasticity 
WKURXJKWKHLQGLYLGXDOHIIHFW i), and serial correlation (in the REM it decays over time, 
while  in  Kmenta  it  is  constant  over  time).  As  Filippini  et  al.  (2005)  suggest,  it  is 
important to consider the within variation of the variables. If there is a considerable 
                                                 
88 Note that the commands for performing the Bartlett’s test for homoskedasticity and the Durbin-Watson 
test for autocorrelation, as suggested by Baltagi (1986), work in Stata 8.0 only with time-series models 
and not in a context of panel data analysis. Therefore, these other two tests, suitable for panel data and the 
econometrical  software  Stata,  have  been  implemented.  A  more  comprehensive  discussion  of  the 
Wooldridge  test  can  be  found  in  Wooldridge  (2002).  Moreover,  Drukker  (2003)  presents  simulation 
evidence that this test has good size and power properties. 
89 As a complement to the likelihood-ratio test for panel-level heteroskedasticity, I applied a modified 
Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity in cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression model, and the 
results obtained confirm that there is heteroskedasticity. (PSLULFDODQDO\VLVRI2(&'FRXQWULHV  157
 
 
percentage of it, then FEM or REM may be more appropriate. Given the low within 
variation  of  many  covariates  in  the  model,  more  importance  has  been  given  to  the 
Kmenta results, which confirm the ones of the REM. 
For these reasons, the following comments are based on the estimations obtained with 
the Parks-Kmenta model. However, note that all models presented in table 11 support 
these results. Being model [2] a log-log model coefficients amount to elasticities. 
Per-capita  GDP  has  a  positive  impact  on  total  health  expenditure.  In  particular,  the 
elasticity of GDP is set below one, thus confirming that health is not a luxury but a 
necessity  good.  The  GDP  coefficient  is  positive  and  highly  significant  at  the  99% 
confidence level. A 10% increase in the Gross Domestic Product implies a rise in total 
health expenditure of 6.4%. Other international studies have shown that GDP is the main 
driving force among the determinants of health costs; however, there is little consensus 
regarding  the  elasticity  with  respect  to  per-capita  health  expenditure.  The  estimated 
elasticity seems to have decreased since the beginning of the 1980s, possibly reflecting 
cost-containment policies (Herwartz and Theilen, 2003). In general, earlier studies using 
cross-sectional data found elasticities greater than one (Newhouse, 1977 with elasticity 
ranging from 1.13 to 1.31; Leu, 1986 with 1.21; Gerdtham et al., 1992a with 1.33). More 
recent  studies  using  panel  data  and  a  wider  range  of  explanatory  variables  suggest 
elasticities near to or less than unity (Gerdtham et al. 1998 with 0.74).  
The  second  socio-economic  variable,  namely  unemployment  rate,  is  also  a  positive 
determinant  of  health  expenditure.  When  unemployment  increases  of  10%,  health 
expenditure is likely to increase of 0.2%. Labor market variables, such as unemployment 
or female labor market participation (used as a proxy for informal care) are usually not 
significant in the literature studies. These results, however, show that unemployment is a 
constraint for the improvement of the public sector and by extension the health care 
sector.  It  is  directly  linked  to  health  status  (psychological  distress,  anxiety  and 158    &KDSWHU
 
 
depressive symptoms, disability, major activity limitations, alcoholism, and drinking-
related problems), and hence influences health expenditure (EU, 1995).  
The  structure  of  the  population  contributes  to  total  health  expenditure;  an  ageing 
population is often linked to augmenting health costs (OECD, 1996): the percentage of 
old-old people (aged above 80) has a positive sign and shows a high significance. A 
10%  increase  in  the  over  80  causes  1.2%  rise  in  health  expenditure.  The  under  19 
population  contributes  to  keep  health  costs  down.  The  coefficient  is  statistically 
significant and negative. Probably the reasons for this negative coefficient are that a 
younger population is normally healthier, with a lower risk factor, and with no need of 
expensive treatments. The effects of population age structure are insignificant in most 
studies, although Blomqvist and Carter (1997) find the number of persons over 65 to be 
significant. 
With respect to supply-related variables, the physician density is significant at the 99% 
confidence level and shows that the higher the density of doctors in a country, the higher 
the total per-capita health costs. In more detail, a 10% increase of physician density 
causes  1.5%  increase  of  costs.  The  supply  of  doctors  appears  to  be  associated  with 
higher  outlays  also  in  other  studies  (Gerdtham  et  al.,  1992a  and  b).  This  may  be 
especially the case for countries where doctors are paid on a FFS basis. The variable of 
the density of acute beds does not turn out to be statistically significant. 
The variable measuring the Potential Years of Life Lost is a proxy for the ability of a 
health care system to prevent deaths that should be avoidable below a specific age. It is 
thus a determinant that implicitly gives information about the outcome and efficiency of 
a health care system. It turns out to be negative and statistically significant at the 95% 
confidence level. The idea is that when the mortality amenable to health care increases 
then health expenditure tends to diminish. In other words, it is assumed that when deaths (PSLULFDODQDO\VLVRI2(&'FRXQWULHV  159
 
 
that are, a priori, preventable, rise it is because less money is spent in the health care 
system to forestall such events. 
The dummy variables representing the overall organization of the health care system are 
very interesting. Note that the dummy NHSc (National Health System, centralized) is 
not  included  in  the  model,  because  it  is  taken  as  the  reference  group.  They  are  all 
significant at the 99% confidence level and positive. What is immediately striking is 
that, in general terms, SHI countries tend to experience higher health expenditure. When 
looked  at their level  of  decentralization,  decentralized  SHI  countries  reveal  a  higher 
level of health costs. The dummy for SHI centralized countries is also positive but the 
coefficient  is  lower  than  the  decentralized  counterparts.  The  dummy  for  NHS 
decentralized  states  is  positive  and  its  coefficient  is  the  lowest  and  implies  that, 
controlling  for  all  other  factors,  decentralized  national  health  systems  can  reduce 
expenditure. Of course, this does not imply that NHS are preferable to SHI. As stressed 
several times in this work, the focus of the analysis is on the determinants of the level of 
health expenditure per capita. Hence NHS may well be cheaper but at the same time 
they  might  be  offering  less  in  terms  of  consumer  choice  and  quality  of  care  (these 
characteristics are not captured by the model). These results, however, confirm Leu’s 
(1986), who also found that NHSs can reduce health expenditure. SHI countries may 
experience  more  costs  because  the  specific  relationship  between  the  population,  the 
contribution collector, the third-party payer and the providers distinguish them from the 
other typologies. Sickness funds in social health insurance countries, for example, are 
often self-governed and the government has limited control over them; the population 
has usually a rather free access to providers; etc. These features can be summarized 
around the four principles of solidarity, pluralism, participation, and choice. States with 
a SHI scheme are characterized by a multiple presence of actors and stakeholders that all 
have a decision power within the system. Having a decentralized setting can add another 160    &KDSWHU
 
 
layer of complexity to the whole system, augmenting transaction costs and costs related 
to the set-up of contracts. NHSs avoid such complexity in their structure: their usual 
framework consists of being single-payer, planned and integrated systems. The choice of 
provider is normally restricted through gatekeeping. Even when NHS are decentralized 
they  evidently  succeed  in  spending  less  resources  than  SHI  countries.  Hence,  the 
econometric results confirm the descriptive analysis pursued in Chapter 3. When the 
features  of  health  care  systems  of  different  countries  are  put  together  with  other 
determinants in an econometric model, the results obtained are similar.  
The time variable is positive and statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. 
One  can  imply  thus  that  there  is  a  tendency  in  all  countries  towards  higher  health 
expenditure, and one of the factors leading to this is the presence of medical technology 




This chapter has shed light on the determinants of health care expenditure for the decade 
1990-2000 in 20 OECD countries. After having analyzed the level of decentralization of 
the health care system for all the countries in the sample, they have been clustered in 
four different groups: NHSc, NHSd, SHId, and SHIc.  
The empirical part has highlighted the main determinants of health expenditure and has 
taken  into  consideration  socio-economic  factors  (GDP  and  unemployment), 
demographic factors (the age structure of the population), health supply-related factors 
(density of acute beds and physicians), the Potential Years of Life Lost viewed as a 
means measuring the outcome of the system, and three dummy variables specifying the 
overall organization of the health care system and its degree of (de)centralization. The (PSLULFDODQDO\VLVRI2(&'FRXQWULHV  161
 
 
question investigated was whether decentralized countries have been capable to spend 
less  financial  resources  on  health  care  than  centralized  health  care  systems.  As  the 
theory of fiscal federalism states, it is presumed that decentralization of public services 
and goods allows for more efficiency, so that financial resources are managed according 
to the real needs of the population and wastes are contained. However, as previously 
explained in this study, the concept of decentralization has been linked to the concept of 
a NHS or a SHI system. 
The econometric results show that SHI decentralized countries have a higher level of 
health care expenditure compared with the other countries. One possible reason is that 
SHI states tend to have a health care system with many stakeholders and actors involved. 
Relationships  between  the  state  and  providers  are  all  regulated  through  the  use  of 
contracts. Adding decentralization to a SHI set-up implicitly augments the difficulties 
connected to the establishment of such contracts, so that transaction costs tend to be 
higher.  Furthermore,  there  might  be  problems  with  the  coordination  of  all  actors 
involved in health care and it is plausible to think that with marked decentralization one 
experiences  duplication  of  specific  health  technologies  that  would  presumably  not 
happen in a context of centralization. 
The estimations report that the level of costs in SHI centralized countries has a minor 
tone than decentralized SHI states. Having a centralized funding and management of the 
health  care  systems  probably  avoids  problems  connected  to  cost  shifting  between 
different sub-layers of government. 
NHS decentralized nations appear to be better in containing health costs. Although they 
also experienced a rise in their expenditure, this latter has been consistently lower than 
SHI countries. It must not be forgotten that NHS are vertically integrated and single-
payers; this simplifies financial fluxes between different actors. 162    &KDSWHU
 
 
The other principal results are the following: 
·  Socio-economic variables influence positively health expenditure. A higher GDP 
and unemployment rate swell health expenditure. 
·  The structure of the population impacts on health expenditure. The increasing 
percentage of old-old people is a challenge affecting all developed countries and 
is one of the main reason that cause health costs explosion (OECD, 1996). 
·  Supply-related factors make health costs grow. A higher density of physicians 
increases  health  expenditure.  More  doctors  may  cause  problems  related  to 
supply-induced demand, especially in those countries where the payment system 
is per fee-for-service (Gerdtham et al., 1998).  
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The Swiss Confederation is a federal republic composed of 23 cantons, three of which 
are divided into semi-cantons. Thus, Switzerland is nowadays made up of 26 entities that 
are sovereign in all matters that are not specifically designated the responsibility of the 
Swiss Confederation by the Constitution. Each canton has its own Constitution and a 
comprehensive  body  of  legislation  stemming  from  it.  The  precept  of  the  Swiss 
decentralization is that public policies and their implementation should be allocated to 
the lowest possible tier of government capable of achieving the designated targets. 
The two main characteristics of the Swiss political system are liberalism and federalism 
(Linder, 1994) and these principles also manifest themselves in the Swiss health care 
system, resulting in complicated structures and processes involving public as well as 
private  health  care  provision  and  financing  (European  Observatory  on  Health  Care 
Systems, 2000). The most striking change in the recent decades that has come about is 
the enactment of the Federal Health Insurance Law (FHIL) that entered into force on 
January 1
st, 1996. Since then, health insurance is mandatory for all residents, premiums 
are  community-rated,  and  the  package  of  health  care  benefits  is  defined  by  law. 
Notwithstanding the fact that compulsory health insurance (CHI) covers a broad and 
well-defined range of services, there exist significant differences in the regional health 
care expenditure. These differences partly emerge because the organization of the health 164    &KDSWHU
 
 
care system is under the responsibility and control of the cantons. Decentralization of 
competences and of expenditure responsibility has caused significant differences among 
cantons with respect to per-capita public spending, the regulatory settings, the role of 
private versus public sector, and the level of production capacity. 
The high degree of federalism, which assigns health affairs to local governments, has 
caused consistent differences in the level of public expenditure and health insurance 
costs between cantons. As we shall see in this chapter, the level of per-capita socialized 
health expenditure (SHE) varies widely in Swiss cantons: the percentage of SHE of the 
canton  with  minimum  costs  is  equal  to  37%  of  the  health  expenditure  of  the  most 
expensive canton. The same differences apply in the policy of subsidies. In order to 
reduce  the  social  impact  of  per-capita  health  insurance  premiums,  both  the 
Confederation  and  cantons  intervene  with  means-tested  subsidies.  However,  the 
conditions of eligibility to be a subsidy recipient vary greatly between the 26 cantons. 
This is another consequence of the marked level of federalism in the country: cantons 
have autonomy over the definition of principles on which premium subsidies are based, 
and they are also free to fix the cantonal (and federal) budget available for premium 
subsidy. 
Two interesting aspects emerge for research: first, to perform an econometric analysis on 
the  determinants  of  SHE;  and  second,  to  understand  whether  the  above  mentioned 
differences can somehow reflect local preferences. To test this latter hypothesis of local 
tastes two explanatory variables are introduced in the econometric model: first, an index 
of  direct  democracy,  which  represents  a  direct  expression  of  citizens  wherein  all 
inhabitants can directly participate in the political decision making process. Second, a 
dummy  variable  for  French-  and  Italian-speaking  cantons  is  introduced  and  should 
capture differences owing to cultural specificities. (PSLULFDODQDO\VLVRIWKH6ZLVVFDVH  165
 
 
This chapter aims at analyzing the determinants that lead to differences in the per-capita 
socialized health expenditure among the Swiss cantons. In particular, the chapter will 
develop as follows: section 5.2 will put forward the major characteristics of the Swiss 
health  care  system  as  it  emerged  after the  1996 reform; section  5.3  will  review  the 
present literature on intra-national analyses of health expenditure determinants in order 
to place these results into proper context. The model specification and comments to the 
results will be outlined in sections 5.4 and 5.5. Section 5.6 concludes and provides some 




In 2002 health care costs amounted to SFr 48 billion (US$ PPP 25 billion). This value 
corresponds to 11.2% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Switzerland still continues to 
rank first among European countries with respect to per-capita health expenditure (US$ 
PPP  3445)
90.  Outside  Europe,  the  United  States  of  America  is  the  only  developed 
country that spends more per capita, reaching an amount of US$ PPP 5267. Since 1996 
all permanent residents on the territory have to take out a compulsory health insurance 
(CHI)  from  one  of  the  officially  acknowledged  health  insurance  companies,  which 
premiums are community-rated (that is, a premium is the same for each person that buys 
an insurance policy with a particular company within a canton or sub-region of a canton 
regardless of individual risk rating)
91. In addition, citizens are offered a supplementary 
health insurance (SUHI) policy.
92  
                                                 
90 Data are taken from OECD Health Data 2004. 
91 It is important to note that the FHIL introduced the obligation to take out an insurance policy. Prior to 
the 1996 reform, individuals were responsible for purchasing statutory health insurance from accredited 166    &KDSWHU
 
 
The following paragraphs will outline the organizational structure and management of 
the  system,  its  financing  model  and  allocation  of  competences  between  the 




The Swiss health care system was constituted in 1911 and underwent a major reform in 
1996  through  the  enactment  of  the  FHIL.  The  following  six  points  introduce  the 
principal features of the system: 
1.  It is the responsibility of cantons to organize the provision of health care within a 
defined geographic area with a population that varies from 35,000 to 1.2 million 
inhabitants. The cantonal law on health and health related matters regulates the 
organization of the health care system of the canton in question. Each canton has 
then a Department of Public Health that manages and coordinates its health care 
system. The cantonal responsibilities encompass the elaboration of health and 
hygiene  policy;  the  setting  of  fee  schedules  negotiated  and  agreed  between 
service providers and associations of health insurance funds in each canton; the 
planning,  operation  and  construction  of  hospitals;  the  regulation  of  hospital 
external  care;  the  management  of  medical  and  paramedical  schools;  the 
registration and control of drugs; activities in the field of health prevention and 
promotion; and regulation of patients’ rights. The cantonal health laws confer the 
                                                                                                                                                
insurance companies (as many as 98% of the population did have cover under this voluntary system) and 
premiums were risk related. However, rising health care costs and lack of solidarity between insurance 
companies made reform necessary. 
92 The supplementary health insurance policies known as “private” and “semi-private” cover additional 
benefits that are left out by compulsory health insurance, i.e. free choice of hospital doctor and superior 
level of hospital accommodation (in private rooms or rooms shared just with another patient). (PSLULFDODQDO\VLVRIWKH6ZLVVFDVH  167
 
 
responsibility for health policy on the municipalities, too. Usually the task of 
providing nursing home care for certain vulnerable groups is delegated to the 
municipalities, with a special emphasis on home care, residential and nursing 
homes for elderly people and community-based mental health services.
93 Due to 
the political and legal system that gives cantons such broad responsibilities in 
health matters, there is little space of maneuver for the Confederation and little 
power of influence or coordination. There is no national Ministry of Health, and 
several  governmental offices  within  different  departments  are  concerned  with 
health and matters related to health services. The most important one, the Federal 
Office  of  Public  Health,  has  regulatory  and  supervisory  functions.  Its 
responsibilities are directed towards the control of communicable diseases and 
epidemics, and  regulations  pertaining  to  sera and vaccines,  poisons  and  food 
quality. Another important office is the Federal Office of Social Insurance, which 
officially  recognizes  the  health  insurers  and  regulates  and  controls  their 
activities. In  general, federal  authorities lack the formal competence to adopt 
national health strategies (Wyss and Lorenz, 2000). Notwithstanding the fact that 
the Confederation plays a more active role in the health care sector since 1996, 
there has not been a formal devolution of competences from the cantons to the 
upper  level,  which  would  have  required  a  change  in  the  Constitution,  nor  a 
redistribution  of  public  health  expenditure  for  a  greater  engagement  of  the 
Confederation (Crivelli and Filippini, 2003). 
2.  The overall number of insurance companies has decreased massively over the 
last decades, from 1100 in 1960 to 93 in 2002. Since not all of these companies 
                                                 
93 Many municipalities have subsequently delegated responsibility for nursing home care to independent 
organizations. Larger municipalities and associations of municipalities often run their own residential and 
nursing homes for elderly people. 168    &KDSWHU
 
 
were active in all cantons consumers can choose between 51 to 72 companies in 
each canton. Only those insurance providers who comply with the requirements 
set  out  by  the  FHIL  and  are  registered  with  the  Federal  Office  of  Social 
Insurance  may  provide  CHI.  There  is  free  competition  among  the  health 
insurance  companies  on  the  level  of  the  premium  but  not  on  the  services 
provided; these are defined by law. The main requirements are that no profit 
should be made from CHI activities, they all have to offer the same mandatory 
and uniform health insurance policy (i.e. covering the same package of benefits), 
and they are not allowed for any reason to refuse an individual’s application for 
CHI coverage. The health insurance companies have banded together to form 
cantonal and intercantonal associations that negotiate fees with service providers 
and the cantonal government. All health insurance companies are members of 
Santésuisse (the Swiss Association of Health Insurance Companies). Since 1996 
all the registered insurance companies established a joint organization, known as 
Foundation  18.  Its  responsibilities  are  to  meet  the  financial  obligations  of 
insurance companies in financial difficulty, to be responsible for risk adjustment 
between the registered insurance companies and to meet international obligations 
for reimbursing health care services.
94 
3.  To reduce the social impact of per-capita premiums, both the Confederation and 
cantons subsidize entirely CHI premiums through tax-financed allocations. These 
public  transfers  are  used  to  provide  a  means-tested  subsidy,  which  varies 
according to the income and wealth of the insured person. The financing of these 
                                                 
94 This is the case for example of a German citizen insured by a sickness fund in Germany but who uses 
health services in Switzerland. The joint organization pays the service provider and is later reimbursed by 
the German sickness fund. For people insured in Switzerland and using health care services in Germany, 
the  joint  organization  reimburses  the  German  funds  based  on  a  special  agreement  between  the  two 
countries. This procedure is nowadays valid with all members of the EU (since the bilateral agreements 
CH-EU came into force in 1999). (PSLULFDODQDO\VLVRIWKH6ZLVVFDVH  169
 
 
subsidies is ensured to the extent of two-thirds by the Confederation and one-
third  by  cantons,  through  general  taxation.  Fund  from  the  Confederation  are 
subsequently  distributed  to  cantons  via  a  specific  matching  grant.
95  Each 
canton’s  financial  participation  is  established  on  the  basis  of  an  equalizing 
allocation  system,  in  consideration  of  its  financial  strength  (Dafflon,  2004). 
Finally,  the  task  of  implementing  the  subsidy  distribution  system  lies  solely 
within  the  single  cantons.  Prior  to  the  FHIL  in  1996,  these  subsidies  were 
directly given to sickness funds, with the result that the level of premiums for all 
subscribers  was  reduced,  but  these  subsidies  were  not  targeted  on  the  needy 
people. Now subsidies are given to people with low or medium income to help 
them pay their CHI premiums. In some cantons the percentage of the population 
that is subsidized in this way is over 40%. Cantons have some autonomy to 
define the principles on which premium subsidies are based. They are also free to 
choose the level at which to fix the cantonal (and federal) budget available for 
premium subsidy. The consequence of this is that there is a high variation in the 
subsidy policy among the 26 cantons, and people who are eligible to get financial 
aid in one canton, may not be able to get it in another one.  
4.  CHI policies cover well defined benefits, in particular they cover outpatient care, 
including a wide variety of providers, hospital care (100% coverage on general 
ward of a public or publicly subsidized hospital in the enrollees’ canton, except 
for a co-payment of Sfr. 10, US$ PPP5.15, per day), prescription drugs listed, 
preventive vaccinations, prescribed treatments in health resorts, and alternative 
                                                 
95 Bailey (1999) offers a comprehensive discussion on the different types of grants. Note that as from 2008 
the specific matching grants should be replaced by a lump-sum general grant. In the future the budget of 
the  Confederation  for  the  program  of  premium  reductions  will  total  “25%  of  the  compulsory  health 
insurance expenditure for 30% of the population” and will be allocated to the cantons without regard to 
their own contribution.  170    &KDSWHU
 
 
medicine.  In  addition, there are also some contributions to certain preventive 
tests,  home  care,  glasses  and  medical  devices,  as  well  as  transportation  and 
salvage expenses. The insured can freely choose the service provider (general 
practitioner, specialist) because of compulsory contracting. CHI policies can be 
freely  changed  by  customers  up  to  twice  a  year.  There  is  a  wide  variety  of 
compulsory  policies.  Most  insurance  policies  require  customers  pay  a  fixed 
amount  of  the  costs  covered  by  the  CHI  in  the  form  of  a  deductible.  The 
individual may then choose the level of deductible that (s)he wishes to pay but 
her/his premium will clearly be less if a higher level of deductible is chosen. By 
contrast, there is no deductible for HMO plans that closely manage access to 
providers.
96 A further possibility is to choose a “bonus” plan, a five-year policy 
that rewards enrollees who do not use insurance with substantial reductions in 
premiums. Supplementary health insurance (SUHI) covers additional treatments 
and check-ups, all drugs, extended home care, provides generally higher benefits 
and up to 100% universal coverage worldwide. Its most important feature is that 
it provides customers with access to the private ward of all public and private 
hospitals in a one or two-bedroom and free choice of physician in the hospital. 
SUHI premiums are normally risk-related and currently there is no tax incentive 
to take out such an insurance policy. The number of people with SUHI is actually 
declining due to the rising level of premiums charged and the expansion of the 
                                                 
96 Note that managed care policies in Switzerland were not so widespread as, for example, in the USA. 
German- speaking cantons have tended to opt for managed care plans more often than French- and Italian-
speaking  cantons  (Federal  Office  of  Public  Health,  2004).  Managed  care  plans  offered  nowadays  in 
Switzerland  are  a  somewhat  weaker  version  of  managed  care  programs  normally  provided  in  other 
countries  (for  instance,  in  the  US).  For  example,  the  selected  physicians  of  managed  care  plans  are 
remunerated with a fee-for-service scheme, not much of an incentive for a family doctor to reduce his 
services, and hence costs. (PSLULFDODQDO\VLVRIWKH6ZLVVFDVH  171
 
 
CHI package that makes the supplementary insurance less attractive (European 
Observatory on Health Care Systems, 2000). 
5.  Both public and private hospitals, as well as nursing homes, offer inpatient care 
that is reimbursed in the bulk of cases on a per diem basis (some cantons started 
introducing  AP-DRG,  all  patient  diagnosis-related  groups,  payments  as  from 
2000  on).  Hospitals  and  nursing  homes  can  only  be  reimbursed  for  services 
under  CHI  if  they  are  included  in  the  canton’s  official  list  of  hospitals  and 
nursing  homes.  These  lists  are  drawn  up  as  part  of  the  canton’s  planning 
exercise. In most cantons the criteria used as the basis for planning are limited to 
bed requirements, but the basic objectives of the planning process are not always 
explicit  and  may  vary  between  cantons.  Planning  goals  might  include 
maximizing  efficiency,  containing  inpatient  expenditure,  providing  sufficient 
high quality inpatient health care, or meeting the needs of patients. The canton is 
responsible  for  planning,  but  some  cantons  collaborate  on  this  issue. 
Nevertheless,  a  supraregional  or  even  nationwide  consensus  about  hospital 
planning  does  not  exist  at  present  (European  Observatory  on  Health  Care 
Systems, 2000). Moreover, only public and selected private hospitals are eligible 
to have financial support by the canton.
97 On the contrary, private hospitals must 
finance their costs totally through health insurers’ reimbursements.  
6.  Ambulatory  health  care  services  are  provided  by  independent  general 
practitioners and specialists, and are reimbursed according to a fee-for-service 
(FFS)  scheme.  Licensed  physicians  are  free  to  choose  their  location  for 
                                                 
97 Cantons are mainly involved in the financing of capital costs. The capital investment costs for public 
hospitals  are  usually  fully  financed  by  cantonal  tax  revenues.  The  capital  investment,  education  and 
research  costs  for  public  and  publicly-subsidized  hospitals  are usually  fully  financed by  cantonal tax 
revenues.  The cantons also finance at least 50% of the running costs of these hospitals. Since 1996, 
cantons can impose fixed budgets on public or publicly-subsidized hospitals. 172    &KDSWHU
 
 
outpatient  care.  Government  is  restricted  to  control  the  formal  educational 
requirements  for  licensing.  However,  the  lack  of  regulation  governing  where 
doctors can set up their practice results in large variation in the density of doctors 
per inhabitant. Physicians’ fees for CHI in the FFS sector are negotiated between 
their  union  and  Santésuisse  on  the cantonal  level  and  are overviewed  by  the 
government.  By  contrast,  fees  are  not  regulated  with  respect  to  the  SUHI. 
Physicians  can  bill  only  for  services  covered  by  the  insurer  and  may  not 
supplement their bills for compulsory enrollees. In the FFS sector every licensed 
physician can bill every compulsory insurance policy (enforced contracting)
98, 
i.e.  the  insurer  cannot  choose  preferred  providers  except  in  the  context  of 





The  funding  model  of  the  Swiss  health  care  system  is  considered  particularly 
regressive.
99 By taking a look at table 12 one observes that overall, only one-third of the 
financing is collected in an income-dependent way. This concerns public financing (28% 
of total health expenditure) and social insurance contributions (6.1%). Furthermore, it 
must be highlighted that public contribution is predominantly provided by cantons and 
municipalities, whereas the Confederation contributes only 20% to public health care 
budget.  
                                                 
98  In  other  words  the  enforced  contracting  principle  states  that  all  medical  practitioners,  who  are 
authorized  to  practice  as  independent  professionals  in  Switzerland  have  the  right  to  be  party  to  a 
framework contract with any of the sickness funds. 
99 For a comprehensive review of equity issues in health care please refer to Wagstaff et al. (1999). (PSLULFDODQDO\VLVRIWKH6ZLVVFDVH  173
 
 
The  other  two-thirds  of  financing  are  collected  in  an  income-independent  way.  In 
particular, this concerns: CHI premiums (26.3%), SUHI premiums (9.6), co-payment for 
insured services (5.3), and out-of-pocket expenditure (23.7%).  
It is worth to note that the proportion of costs borne by citizens is considerable. By 
summing  up  the  quota  for  co-payment  of  insured  services  and  of  out-of-pocket 
expenditure one reaches the threshold of 29% of total health expenditure.  





Public financing of direct costs (in particular subsidies to public 
hospitals) 
8596.9  17.9 
Public subsidies to CHI premiums and nursing homes’ daily  2848.4  5.9 
Other public subsidies to social insurance  1968.7  4.1 
7RWDOH[SHQGLWXUHILQDQFHGWKURXJK*(1(5$/7$;$7,21  
Accident insurance  1413.6  2.9 
Other social insurances  1533.6  3.2 
7RWDOH[SHQGLWXUHILQDQFHGWKURXJK3$<52//7$;(6  
CHI premiums  12634.9  26.3 
SUHI premiums  4615.5  9.6 
Co-payment for insured services  2541  5.3 
Out-of-pocket payments  11351.1  23.7 





The Swiss health care system is in sharp contrast with all the other European countries, 
where health care expenditure covered by income-dependent levies vary between 65% 
and 80%. Two conclusions can be drawn from this: 
1.  The Swiss health care system does not attach much importance to the principle of 
equity of financing.
100 The fact that CHI premiums are community-rated and that 
                                                 
100 According to the World Bank Institute (2000), vertical equity means that “those who are in different 
circumstances with respect to a characteristic of concern for equity should, correspondingly, be treated (PSLULFDODQDO\VLVRIWKH6ZLVVFDVH  175
 
 
citizens  finance  directly  (or  through  SUHI)  39.6%
101  of  the  total  health 
expenditure,  leads  to  a  highly  regressive  financing  model.
102  Above  we 
mentioned that, in order to ease the financial hardship associated with per-capita 
health premiums, the government provides means-tested subsidies to low-income 
residents. It is estimated that about one-third of the Swiss population benefits 
from these subsidies. On account of federalism, subsidy policies vary from one 
canton to another, creating large regional differences.
103 
2.  The  presence  of  a  large  number  of  third-party  payers  makes  it  extremely 
complex to follow the financial flows among the stakeholders in health policy, 
which  in  turn  makes  it  more  difficult  to  manage  health  care  expenditure  in 
general,  and  can  lead  to  a  cost-shifting  problem.  Since  nobody  is  entirely 
responsible for the global health care budget, it is sometimes easier for a single 
financing body to obtain a reduction in its own financial share, rather than to 
engage in  a more  rational use of total health care spending. This encourages 
shifting costs at the expense of another payer, rather than looking for solutions 
allowing for an effective rationalization of expenditure. 
                                                                                                                                                
differently”.  Vertical  equity  implies  that  citizens  with  greater  economic  means  have  to  pay  more. 
Therefore, the larger the share of progressive (or at least income-proportional) financing, the greater the 
vertical equity of the financing of a health care system. 
101 This percentage results from the sum of SUHI premiums, co-payment for insured services, out-of-
pocket financing and other private funding. 
102 It has to be noted that a popular initiative (“Health must be affordable”) was called in December 2002 
and subsequently rejected by voters in May 2003. The goal of the initiative was to replace the current per-
capita contributions for health care coverage, mainly by linking the contributions for the CHI to income. 
The initiators argued that almost 80% of the population would have benefited through lower net payments. 
They also envisaged a better cost control through more coordination and centralization at the federal level. 
The reform was overwhelmingly rejected because the new financing via income-linked contributions was 
deemed to be an effective tax increase and thereby posing an obstacle to economic growth. 
103 For example in 2002, a household with two children with an annual gross income of SFr 70,000 (US$ 
PPP  36,082),  had  a  medium  health  premium incidence  of  8.2%  of the  disposable income  across the 





The independence of each canton has led to a situation where 26 comprehensive health 
care delivery systems are operating, all more or less self-governing (Wyss and Lorenz, 
2000). Decentralization of competences has created a series of significant inter-cantonal 
differences with respect to public financing, regulatory settings, and production capacity. 
Socialized health expenditure, which covers both public expenditure and CHI outlays, in 
2002  ranged  from  US$  PPP  2952  in  Geneva  to  US$  PPP  1104  in  Appenzell-
Innerrhoden. It is important to stress that public health expenditure is given by the sum 
of the following two elements:  
1.  Cantonal and local direct financing for the provision of health care services to the 
population. In particular subsidies to public and private hospitals, subsidies to 
nursing  homes  and  home  care  services,  and  participation  in  hospitalizations 
outside the home canton. 
2.  Means-tested subsidies as a financial support for needy citizens.
104 
 
                                                 
104 With the enactment of the FHIL in 1996 Switzerland tried to establish a social goal: the purpose of 
state subsidies is to keep the ratio between net premiums and taxable income below 8% for the poorest 
citizens. In general, the burden of premiums has increased considerably in the last few years and fewer 
and fewer cantons achieve this social goal. (PSLULFDODQDO\VLVRIWKH6ZLVVFDVH  177
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Considerable differences are acknowledged in the overall level of CHI premiums both 
among  and  within  cantons.  Figure  9  represents  inter-cantonal  and  intra-cantonal 
differences in adult premiums in 2002 and this is explained through box-plots. Box-plots 
show the median, maximum and minimum premium values for each canton and the 
concentration of the distribution of premiums paid by 50% of the cantonal population; 
the box-plot rectangle shows the dispersion between the first and the third quartile. 178    &KDSWHU
 
 
The highest premium was paid in Canton Geneva (more than US$ PPP 216 per month), 
the lowest was paid in Valais (less than US$ PPP 67). The highest cantonal average 
premium (US$ PPP 187) is found in Geneva, whereas the lowest average premium (US$ 






There  is  also  some  variation  between  cantons  with  respect  to  the  frequency  of 
institutional forms in the hospital sector. Some cantons (Ticino, Thurgau, Geneva and 
Appenzell-Ausserrhoden) exhibit a higher number of private hospitals, which cannot 
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105 Therefore, the higher the presence on the territory of private hospitals, the 
less the financial involvement of cantonal governments. 
The distribution of health resources is also very much diverse across the country. In 
Switzerland,  there  are  no  direct  regulations  at  either  federal  or  cantonal  level  for 
manpower and structural inputs into cantonal health care systems. So it is not surprising 
that  cantons show  considerable  differences  with  respect  to  the  number  of  practicing 
physicians and acute beds. As table 13 clearly shows there is a real gap with respect to 
the density of medical practices. The data range from more than 300 medical practices 
per 100,000  inhabitants  in Basel-City  and  Geneva  to  100-110  practices  per  100,000 
inhabitants in Obwalden, Nidwalden, and Appenzell-Innerrhoden, whereas the national 
average is 173.
106  
The density of acute beds is also unequally dispersed. The national average is 359 acute 
beds  per  100,000  inhabitants,  but  three  cantons  exceed  this  average  by  over  35% 
(Ticino: 523 beds; Appenzell-Innerrhoden: 544 beds and Basel-City: 717 beds), and 1 
canton has a density over 35% lower than the national average [Zug: 206 beds]. 
The  same  is  true  also  for  the  density  of  paramedical  staff  per  inhabitant  or  of 
pharmacists,  where  similar  inequalities  are  observed  between  cantons.  This  unequal 
distribution of human resources and health facilities across the country is to some extent 
                                                 
105 For further knowledge please see Federal Office of Statistics (2002a). 
106 All doctors who have obtained a Swiss university degree in medicine and have at least two years’ 
hospital experience are automatically entitled to practice independently and to invoice for their services at 
the  expense  of  the  CHI,  according  to  a  fee-for-service  scheme.  The  health  insurance  companies  are 
obliged  to  cooperate  with  all  the  medical  practitioners  entitled  to  practice  independently  within  the 
framework  of  the  coverage  provided  for  by  the  FHIL.  Service  providers  can  be  excluded  from  the 
reimbursement  of  the  CHI  only  in  the  case  of  citizens  who  have  voluntarily  joined  a  managed  care 
insurance program. Of course this payment system could easily lead to a phenomenon of supply-induced 
demand.  Note  that  since  2004  the  same  reimbursement  system  applies  to  all  cantons,  thanks  to  the 
introduction of “Tarmed”. With Tarmed each medical performance has the same value in all cantons in 
terms of points. The value of the point can then change from one canton to another; in this way medical 
fees are still different among cantons. The goal of Tarmed was to be neutral from a cost viewpoint. 180    &KDSWHU
 
 
the result of arrangements and agreements between cantons for providing specialized 
services in the hospital sector. 
 
7DEOH  'HQVLW\ RI PHGLFDO SUDFWLFHV DQG DFXWH EHGV SHU  LQKDELWDQWV
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
 $*  $, $5 %( %/ %6 )5 *( */ *5 -8 /8 1(
Acute 
beds 
347  544  237  391  352  717  323  392  339  359  419  291  396 
Medical 
practices  141  109  150  200  192  353  145  332  126  166  149  147  203 
 
 1: 2: 6* 6+ 62 6= 7* 7, 85 9' 96 =* =+
Acute 
beds  258  274  330  296  330  236  236  523  418  449  284  206  374 
Medical 
practices  116  107  155  186  156  120  126  193  132  236  166  160  225 
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Swiss cantons also show differences with respect to the mortality rate amenable to health 
care, defined by Nolte and McKee (2003) as deaths from certain causes that should not 
occur in the presence of timely and effective health care. These differences are depicted 
in figure 10. (PSLULFDODQDO\VLVRIWKH6ZLVVFDVH  181
 
 












































It  is  straightforward  that  federalism  has  created  marked  differences  between  local 
governments and what is probably really missing today in Switzerland is more central 
coordination and power. The strong independence of cantons has brought to a situation 
where 26 almost self-governing entities coexist. Nevertheless, one acknowledges that 
the strong cantonal competencies have promoted some bi- or multilateral agreements 
among cantons. These agreements seek to bring more coordination in the system and 
more organization in the different procedures. With respect to multilateral agreements 
                                                 
107 The mortality rate represented here is the rate calculated without ischemic heart disease for people with 
less than 75 years. 182    &KDSWHU
 
 
for example there are three main fields where cantons have renounced their authority 
and delegated it to inter-cantonal bodies. This is the case of the Conference of Health 
Directors, the Inter-cantonal Agency for the Control of Drugs, and the training of the 
labor force pursued by the Swiss Red Cross.
108 
Some  cantons  (as  for  example  Basel-City  and  Basel-Land;  Geneva  and  Vaud)  have 
established  bilateral  agreements  in  order  to  develop  coordination  in  planning  and 
management.  These  models  mainly  aim  at  the  integration  of  the  available  hospital 
resources  in  neighboring  cantons,  and  potential  referral  possibilities,  so  to  achieve 




The Swiss health care system is facing nowadays serious challenges such as increasing 
health care costs, a surplus in medical facilities, and rising levels of demand due to an 
ageing population, expectations and advancements of new technology available (OECD, 
2004).  In  comparison to  other highly developed  countries like  Germany,  the  United 
Kingdom, and the United States, the Swiss population generally has more health care 
resources available  (OECD  Health  Data  2004).  However,  because  of  lack  of  central 
coordination and the existence of 26 different health care systems, there are situations 
                                                 
108 The Conference of Health Directors coordinates and obtains national agreements mainly on technical 
issues (such as inter-cantonal compatibility of the health care systems); the Inter-cantonal Agency for the 
Control  of  Drugs  is  mainly  concerned  with  registering  medicines  and  controlling  manufacturing  and 
distributing policies of drug companies. However, it is not in such a position to initiate health policies, as 
for example the promotion of generics or essential drugs. The Swiss Red Cross trains the labor force in the 
health care sector, elaborates a list with the different types of medical professions, sets standards and 
defines  requirements.  Despite  these  tasks,  each  canton  still  maintains  its  own  regulations  for  some 
paramedical activities and auxiliary professions, and thus recognizes the professions according to its own 
standards. (PSLULFDODQDO\VLVRIWKH6ZLVVFDVH  183
 
 
where sophisticated and expensive hospital infrastructure is available in two places only 
a  few  kilometers  apart,  but  in  different  cantons  or  covering  only  a  relatively  small 
population of some thousand people (Wyss  and  Lorenz, 2000).  The level of service 
provision is thus in some areas inefficiently high.  If the positive side of this is that 
queuing is not a major problem in Switzerland, that shortages of care do not happen 
even in rural areas, and that the quality of care is generally considered high, the negative 
side is that from an economic point of view there is a waste of resources, which are 
inefficiently used, especially at the hospital level.
109 
As stated by Hacker (2004) Switzerland, with its strong federalism and tradition of the 
use of popular referendums by organized groups, has long been characterized by the 
most anemic government role in health policy of all European nations. The Swiss case 
shows that in a complete decentralized system, reforms may be particularly hard to take 
place. Not surprisingly, the whole health care system underwent only two major changes 
in its organization in the last century; one in 1911 that established a system of health 
insurance  (based  on  the  German  model),  and  the  other  one  in  1996  (FHIL),  which 
introduced fundamental objectives to strengthen solidarity and to tackle the problem of 
rising health care costs. Federal authorities thus lack the formal competence to adopt a 
national health strategy. Cantons are not only constitutionally independent, but tend to 
guard  their  political  and  legal  rights  jealously  (Wyss  and  Lorenz,  2000).  Such  a 
decentralized health care system can block any attempt of reform because the cantons 
themselves are too strong and independent, and any change of the system at the national 
level  is  hard  (if  almost  impossible)  to  achieve  because  this  would  mean  that  all  26 
independently operating units agree.  
                                                 
109 For an interesting discussion about hospital efficiency, see Filippini and Farsi (2003). 184    &KDSWHU
 
 
Those countries that are going through a decentralization process in their health care 
system  (or  have  just  taken  this  route)  should  bear  in  mind  that  such  an  extreme 
decentralization,  such  as  the  one  experienced  in  Switzerland,  may  give  rise  to  two 
problems: first, difficulties in establishing national priorities through coordination of its 
autonomous sub-units as these latter often follow their specific interests (Darras, 1997), 
and  second,  regional  disparities.  Yet  it  must  be  underlined  that  there  are  some 
advantages  connected  to  a  highly  decentralized  health  care  system.  There  are  more 
health  care  resources  available  and  more  proximity  to  the  needs  expressed  by  the 
population; the system experiences no implicit rationing (such as waiting lists); there are 
no shortages of care since the supply of health services is ample; the access to the health 
system has no barriers and the patient is empowered because (s)he has free choice over 
providers; finally, if all these previous conditions are fulfilled, it is likely that the public 





A body of literature has recently  started to examine the determinants of health  care 
expenditure within the same country. Of course, such a research allows to eliminate a 
number of acknowledged problems that are typical in international comparison studies. 
Among them there are, in fact, the different definitions existing on what constitutes 
health care expenditure, even if it must be stated that these differences have tended to 
vanish  in  these  very  last  years  because  of  a  better  harmonization  of  data  collection 
(especially  among  OECD  countries).  Another  avoided  difficulty  in  intra-national 
                                                 
110 Kocher and Oggier (2001) offer an interesting insight on the level of public satisfaction over the health 
care system in a sample of 15 countries.  (PSLULFDODQDO\VLVRIWKH6ZLVVFDVH  185
 
 
analyses is the problem connected to the construction of exchange rate conversions for 
data. 
The pioneer work in this field is Di Matteo and Di Matteo’s (1998), who carry out an 
interesting study on the determinants of health care expenditure in the ten provinces of 
Canada for the period 1965-1991, thus using pooled time-series cross-section data.
111 
Their  model  is  estimated  with  the  pooling  technique  of  Kmenta  (1986),  or  cross-
sectionally heteroskedastic and timewise autoregressive model. The income elasticity of 
real  per-capita  provincial  government  health  expenditure  is  lower  than  one  at  0.77. 
Hence, this result suggests that health care expenditure is indeed more a necessity than a 
luxury good. The proportion of provincial population aged over 65 is significant and has 
a large impact, as well as federal transfers.
112 
Giannoni and Hitiris (2002) pursue an intra-national analysis where the regional impact 
of health care expenditure in Italy is taken into consideration. The authors particularly 
shed light on the fact that the central government’s policies for rationalization and cost 
containment  of  the  growth  of  health  care  expenditure  in  combination  with 
decentralization  in  the  administration  and  provision  of  health  care  have  resulted  in 
interregional inequality, aggravating the existing regional divergence. The econometric 
model has been estimated with pooled time-series and cross-section data over the period 
1980-1995 for 20 Italian regions. The parsimonious empirical model, in which real per-
capita public health expenditure is regressed against, includes the following explanatory 
variables: per-capita real GDP, the ageing population, number of beds per hospital, and 
                                                 
111  Di  Matteo  and  Di  Matteo  decided  to  analyze  the  Canadian  regional  differences  in  health  care 
expenditure mainly because of the fact that it is the provinces that deliver health care to people. 
112 It is worth to remind the reader that in Canada, both the federal and the provincial governments finance 
public expenditure on health. The federal government’s contribution to provincial health care funding has 
declined over the years as the mechanisms for transferring money to the provinces were modified.  186    &KDSWHU
 
 
the number of medical and non-medical personnel per hospital.
113 The results highlight 
that the  main factors  influencing  per-capita  public  health  expenditure is  income,  the 
ageing population, and the structural characteristics of health care supply.  
Rüefli and Vatter (2001) analyze the differences in health care expenditure among the 
cantons of Switzerland over the period 1994-1999. An Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
model is used, and the results obtained show that city cantons tend to experience higher 
health care expenditure than rural ones; both supply and demand factors, such as the 
density of hospital beds and of doctors, an over-the-average unemployment rate, and a 
feeble cantonal social network tend to increase costs as well. Rüefli and Vatter (2003) 
later present an empirical investigation of differences in health care expenditure between 
the  26  cantons  of  Switzerland  from  1994  to  1999.  In  their  work  they  take  into 
consideration not only the classical demand and supply-related determinants of health 
care expenditure, but they also include political factors such as strength of left and right-
wing  parties  in  each  canton,  index  of  direct  democracy,  total  number  of  popular 
referendums, and an index of local autonomy. The empirical part calculates bivariate 
correlation and OLS model. The major driving forces of health care expenditure on the 
demand  side  are  the  level  of  cantonal  income,  high  unemployment  rates,  and  the 
proportion of senior citizens. With respect to supply side cost-driving factors Rüefli and 
Vatter find that the number of practitioners (GPs and specialists) as well as the overall 
level of medical service provision increase expenditure. Finally, as regards the political 
factors, general state interventionism is decisive, although only so far as public spending 
is concerned (i.e. health insurance costs are left out). Cantons with a general tendency 
towards interventionism rather than market-oriented problem-solving in politics stick to 
                                                 
113 The number of beds per hospital is taken as a measure of economies of scale: other things being equal, 
the more beds per hospital, the larger the hospital, and the lower the expenditure. The number of medical 
and non-medical personnel per hospital is taken as a measure of productivity improvement: the more the 
staff per hospital, the higher the expenditure, and vice versa. (PSLULFDODQDO\VLVRIWKH6ZLVVFDVH  187
 
 
this pattern in health care policy, too. As a result, public health care expenditure is rather 
high. 
Crivelli, Filippini and Mosca (2003) investigate differences in health care expenditure 
between Swiss cantons using a panel data set. Data cover 26 cantons over the years 
1996-2000, and the methods used for estimation are the OLS model and the Random 
Effects  Model  (REM).  The  income  elasticity  is  not  significant,  but  the  other  major 
variables carry the expected sign and are statistically significant: the most important 
factors explaining health care expenditure are the density of physicians and acute beds, 
the age structure of the population, and the unemployment rate. The main differences 
between the study of Rüefli and Vatter (2003) and Crivelli et al. (2003) regard the time 
period analysis and the usage of econometric models. Crivelli et al. examine subnational 
health care expenditure from 1996, when the implementation of the FHIL started in the 
whole country.
114 Moreover, the public health expenditure and the health insurance costs 
are  summed  and  analyzed  as  a  single  independent  variable.  The  research  is  more 
“empirically-oriented” as it makes use of two econometric techniques for panel data 
(OLS and REM). Rüefli and Vatter instead keep the values for public spending and 
insurance costs separated, they calculate bivariate correlations, and subsequently isolate 
those variables with the highest explicative power and run OLS regression analyses. 
Note that political factors in Rüefli and Vatter analysis turn out to be statistically not 
significant for insurance costs, and only partly significant for public expenditure, hence 
implying that they cannot be regarded as the sole source of explanation.  
                                                 
114 There was a change in the accounting of health insurance costs in 1994, and since 1996 the Federal 
Law on Health Insurance (FLHI) effectively took place. Hence the period of analysis comprised between 
1996 and 2000 makes data more reliable and comparable, given the fact that all health insurers adapted 
their accountancy systems.  188    &KDSWHU
 
 
Di Matteo (2005) analyzes the macro determinants of health expenditure in the United 
States  and  Canada.  The  study  focuses  on  the  assessment  of  the  impact  of  age 
distribution, income, and time using American state-level and Canadian province-level 
data.  The  method  of  estimation  used  is  OLS.  Ageing  population  distributions  and 
income explain a relatively small portion of health expenditure when the impact of time 
effects,  which  is  a  partial  proxy  for  technological  change,  is  controlled  for.  The 
estimated  size  of  the  time  indicator  variables  effects  imply  that  aggregate  health 
expenditures will continue to surge quite independently of an ageing population and 
rising incomes.  
Spycher et al. (2003) also make an interesting analysis of intra-national variation in the 
field of accident insurance annuities. They perform their study on the 26 Swiss cantons 
for the period 1990-2000, using a panel data set. The variables employed are: cantonal 
index of financial power, unemployment rate, share of over 60 in the population, number 
of doctors and psychiatrists, degree of urbanization, quota of foreigners in the canton, 
strength of left-wing parties, linguistic region, and the ratio of government expenditure 
to gross national product. The results show that the elderly, high unemployment and 
urbanization  rate  increase  the  accident  insurance  annuities;  while  a  higher  index  of 
cantonal  financial  power  and  less  government  expenditure  favors  minor  accident 
insurance annuities. 
It  is  clear  from  the  previous  description  that  subnational  studies  avoid  a  number  of 
difficulties typically present in international comparison researches. For example, the 
inherent  differences  in  the  definitions  of  what  actually  constitutes  health  care 
expenditure is eliminated; the construction of exchange rate conversions for the data 
disappears; the analysis is exclusively focused on a particular country that shows the 
same or similar features, thereby allowing us to deal with a single health care system (PSLULFDODQDO\VLVRIWKH6ZLVVFDVH  189
 
 
that permits to compare subnational units more easily.
115 Yet there are also some general 
problems in this ad-hoc approach: the  weak theoretical base for the determinants of 
health care expenditure, as underlined by Gerdtham and Jönsson (2000), still persists; 
the distinction between supply and demand factors in health care still remains unclear; 
and the assembling of data, especially about non-medical determinants of health (such as 
food, alcohol, and tobacco consumption, body mass index, and air quality) is in most 
cases hard to find at the subnational level. Consequently these factors must be left out of 




An important stage in the model specification is choosing the proper set of explanatory 
variables to include in the model as well as formulating the hypothesis concerning the 
direction  of  their  impact  on  the  dependent  variable.  In  this  study  a  single  equation 
approach is used to model the per-capita cantonal expenditure on health care services. 
Per-capita health expenditure depends on some economic, demographic and structural 
factors.  Following  the  model  specifications  used  in  previous  studies  and  taking  into 
account  the  availability  and  quality  of  data  for  the  Swiss  cantons,  the  following 
parsimonious cantonal health care expenditure model is specified: 
 
SHEit = I (Yit, UNit, POit, A75it, A05it, MOit, DPit, DDIit, PHYit, BEDSit, DLATit, T)      [1] 
 
                                                 
115 In international comparison studies countries show differences in the overall organization of the health 
care system, and not only in those demand- and supply-related factors that drive health care expenditure. 
By focusing on a national level, such difficulty is wiped off. 190    &KDSWHU
 
 
where subscript L stands for the canton and W for the year. Moreover, 
SHEit =   Socialized per-capita health expenditure (that is obtained by the sum of the 
per-capita public health expenditure and expenses covered by the compulsory 
health insurance);  
Yit =   Per-capita income;
116  
UNit =   Unemployment  rate,  calculated  as  the  ratio  of  the  unemployed  over  the 
working population; 
POit =   Poverty  rate,  calculated  as  the  percentage  of  households  with  an  income 
below 50% of the average cantonal income;
117  
A75it =   Percentage of population older than 75; 
118 
A05it =   Percentage of population aged under 5;  
MOit =   Mortality rate amenable to health care. This rate is based on the concept that 
deaths from certain causes should not occur in the presence of timely and 
effective health care. It represents a variable that partly captures the quality 
of the system;
119  
                                                 
116 Cantonal incomes represent a regionalization of the Swiss national income. The components of this 
aggregate figure are split with various keys. All values used refer to the national concept. Territorial 
delimitation  of  incomes  is  thus  based  on  the  canton  of  residency  of  the  owners  of  the  factors  of 
production. Cantonal incomes include all incomes accruing to the resident economic agents in exchange 
for  their  participation  in  a  process  of  production,  be  it  inside  and  outside  of  the  canton.  For  more 
information please visit the website: 
http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/en/index/themen/volkswirtschaft/volkseinkommen_der_kantone/blank
/kennzahlen/pro-kopf-einkommen.html  
117 See Connolly and Munro (1999) for a discussion on different measures of poverty, and Crémieux et al. 
(1999). 
118 The percentage of population over 75 years is utilized in order to analyze the effect of old-old adults on 
socialized health care expenditure. Furthermore, this variable was previously used in Gerdtham et al. 
(1998). 
119 See Nolte and McKee (2003) for a more detailed discussion on this issue. (PSLULFDODQDO\VLVRIWKH6ZLVVFDVH  191
 
 
DPit =   Population density, calculated as the ratio of the population to the canton’s 
area; 
DDIit =   Cantonal index for direct democracy. Direct democracy is defined in terms of 
individual political participation possibilities. In Switzerland, institutions for 
the direct political participation of citizens are present both at the federal and 
cantonal level. However, the direct democratic rights on the level of cantons 
are very heterogeneous. Therefore the index, calculated by Frey and Stutzer 
(2000),  measures  the  different  barriers  to  citizens  entering  the  political 
process. These difficulties in accessing the political system are then evaluated 
on a six-point scale: ‘one’ indicates a high barrier thus “less democracy”, 
‘six’ a low barrier thus “more democracy”. Hence, reaching a score close to 
six signifies that citizens in that particular canton manage to express in a 
greater way their preferences over public issues;
120  
PHYit =   Density of physicians per 100,000 inhabitants; 
BEDSit =   Density of hospital acute beds per 100,000 inhabitants; 
DLATit=  Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the canton is French- and Italian-
speaking (Latin languages), 0 otherwise; 
T =   Time variable that should capture the cost differences over time owing to 
changes  in  medical  technology  or  to other  factors  that  may influence  the 
development of health costs at the national level. 
                                                 
120 The four main legal instruments having a direct effect on the political processes in Switzerland are: 1) 
popular initiatives to change the canton’s Constitution 2) popular initiatives to change the canton’s law 3) 
compulsory and optional referendums to prevent new law or change one 4) compulsory and optional 
referendums  to  prevent  new  state  expenditure.  Barriers  are  in  terms  of:  1)  the  necessary  number  of 
signatures  to  launch  a  popular  initiative  or  referendum  2)  the  legally  allowed  time  span  to  collect 
signatures 3) the level of new expenditure per head allowing a financial referendum. Please refer also to 
Trechsel and Serdült (1999) for additional reading. 192    &KDSWHU
 
 
Estimation of equation [1] requires the specification of a functional form. The log-log 
form offers an appropriate functional form for answering questions about the elasticities 
of health expenditure, besides being one of the most used in the literature.
121 The major 
advantage, of course, is that the estimated coefficients amount to elasticities, which are 
therefore assumed to be constant.  
By applying the log-log functional form, expression [1] can be written as 
 
ln SHEit =   b0 + b1 lnYit + b2 lnUNit + b3 lnPOit + b4 lnA75it + b5 lnA05it +b6 lnMOit + 
  b7 lnDPit + b8 lnDDIit + b9 lnPHYit + b10 lnBEDSit + b11 DLATit +b12 T + 
it 




The econometric model outlined in equation [2] is composed of a combination of time-
series and cross-section data for 26 cantons and covers the period 1996-2002.
122 These 
data were obtained from annual publications of the Swiss Federal Office of Statistics and 
Santésuisse, an umbrella association of all health insurance companies in the country.
123 
Data  regarding  the  mortality  rate  amenable  to  health  care  were  obtained  by  the 
Department of Public Health of Canton Ticino, and the direct democracy index was 
                                                 
121 See for example Gerdtham et al. (1998) and Di Matteo and Di Matteo (1998). 
122 It is worth pointing out that some variables of the model show a high within variation while some 
others a low within variation. In particular, SHE has a within variation of 14%, Y of 8%, UN of 45%, A75 
of 5%, A05 of 20%, DP of 0%, PHY of 2%, and BEDS of 40%. 
123 For more information please refer to their websites: 
http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index.html (Federal Office of Statistics) 
http://www.santesuisse.ch/de/index.html (Santésuisse).  (PSLULFDODQDO\VLVRIWKH6ZLVVFDVH  193
 
 
taken by the empirical work of Frey and Stutzer (2000). For the conversion of socialized 
health expenditure and income the annual consumer price index (CPI) of Switzerland 
was used. 
Some variables included in model [2] are time-invariant; this means that only one value 
is available for the whole period analyzed. Such variables are: poverty rate, mortality 
rate,  index  of  direct  democracy,  and  dummy  variable  DLAT.  Table  14  provides 
statistical details of the variables employed in the estimation of model [2]. 








Socialized Health Expenditure 
per capita (SHE) 
SFr/inhabitant  1526.8  2591.3  5727.0 
Income per capita (Y)  SFr/inhabitant  30191  43479  82804 
Unemployment rate (UN)  Unemployed/working 
population  
0.003  0.024  0.078 
Poverty rate (PO)  %  of  households  with 
an  income  below  50% 
of the average income 
0.127  0.173  0.237 
Over 75 (A75)  Over 75/population   0.049  0.069  0.107 
Under 5 (A05)   Under 5/population  0.042  0.058  0.080 
Mortality rate (MO)  Rate of mortality 
amenable to health care 
22.39  29.84  48.76 
Density of Population (DP)  Population/canton’s 
area  
26.10  206.10  5267.9 
Direct Democracy Index 
(DDI) 
Index from 1 
(minimum) to 6 
(maximum) 
1.75  4.45  5.69 
Physician density (PHY)  Physicians/100' 000 
inhabitants 
76.20  152.35  357.15 
Density of acute beds (BEDS)  Beds/100' 000 
inhabitants 
109  369  1098 
 
As  paragraph  4.5  clearly  described,  there  are  different  econometric  techniques  for 
modeling panel data. Here the same approaches will be applied to model Swiss per-
capita health expenditure. The most widely used approaches are: the Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) model, the fixed effects model (FEM), the random effects model (REM), 
and  the  Parks-Kmenta  approach,  technically  known  as  the  “cross-sectionally 
heteroskedastic and timewise autoregressive model” (Kmenta, 1986). The Swiss model (PSLULFDODQDO\VLVRIWKH6ZLVVFDVH  195
 
 
has also been estimated with the instrumental variable two-stage least squares random 
effects (IV) technique in order to tackle the possible problem of  endogeneity of the 
physician density. In fact, the physician density might be endogeneous in the sense that 
doctors might decide to set up their own practices there where medical needs are higher. 
The model IV uses as instruments the following three variables: the logarithm of the 
number  of  students  enrolled  at  the  faculty  of  medicine  according  to  their  canton  of 
residency, the logarithm of the number of students according to the canton where the 
faculty of medicine is present
124, and the logarithm of the average of the density of 
cantonal physicians for the period 1991-1995. The IV estimator uses the Balestra and 
Varadharajan-Krishnakumar (1987) implementation, because it is computationally less 
expensive, and thus more attractive, than Baltagi’s. The results confirm the ones of the 
other models, and the coefficient of the physician density is positive and statistically 
significant,  thus  reinforcing  the  conclusion  that  physicians  can  swell  health  care 
expenditure.
125  
The econometric softwares used for the estimations are Limdep NLOGIT version 3.0 
and Stata/SE 8.0. Table 15 reports the results obtained with the four models. 
 
                                                 
124 Faculties of medicine are present in the following cantons: Basel City, Bern, Fribourg, Geneva, Vaud, 
Neuchâtel, and Zurich. 
125 Considering the difficulty of analyzing the problem of endogeneity the Swiss model has also been 
checked with the method of estimation put forward by Hausman and Taylor (1981), which allows some 
covariates to be correlated with the unobserved individual random effect. The model specified with the 
Amemiya-MaCurdy  (1986)  estimator  confirms  the  results  obtained  with  the  other  models.  The 

















































































































































































*, **, ***: significantly different from zero at the 90, 95 and 99% confidence level. 
In order to screen for individual effects one uses the test of the Lagrange multiplier for 
the  presence  of  an  error  component.  The  test  result  suggests  that  there  is  an  error 
component and that as such the random effects model or fixed effects model are to be (PSLULFDODQDO\VLVRIWKH6ZLVVFDVH  197
 
 
preferred to the ordinary least squares model (OLS). Furthermore, the Hausman test for 
all coefficients was applied to verify the superiority of the REM with respect to the 
FEM. The test statistics favored the random effects model. The Hausman test checks the 
null hypothesis that  [
*
+ and 
*  (the individual specific error term) are uncorrelated. The 









. b b ˆ ˆ -   reveals that  the  difference  in  coefficients  is  not 
systematic,  thus  implying  that  the  REM  is  to  be  preferred  and  that  0 ) | ( = ; (
0 a , 
namely  the  exogeneity  of  the  regressors.  Moreover,  the  within  variation  of  several 
variables in the model is not high and this turns out in a quite low efficiency of the 
parameters estimated with the FEM.  
The  likelihood  ratio  test  that  checks  the  panel-level  heteroskedasticity  point  in  the 
direction  of  a  heteroskedastic  structures  of  errors,  thereby  suggesting  the  error 
disturbances of the Parks-Kmenta model.
126 The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in 
panel data does not accept the hypothesis of no first order autocorrelation. On the basis 
of  these  results  the  Parks-Kmenta  model  is  preferred  to  the  REM.  Therefore  the 
following comments are based on the Kmenta approach. Note however that the results 
reported by the REM and Kmenta are similar. Most of the results reported in table 15 are 
satisfactory. The bulk of coefficients is statistically significantly different from zero and 
carry the expected sign. The log-log transformation allows to consider the estimated 
coefficients as elasticities.  
The estimation with Kmenta points out that the income elasticity is negative and is not 
significantly different from zero. The negative sign of the coefficient for income can be 
explained  by  the  fact  that  SUHI  expenditure  is  not  taken  into  consideration  in  the 
dependent  variable  of  the  model  (SHE).  SUHI  contracts  are  normally  taken  out  by 
                                                 
126 This result is confirmed when applying the modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity in 
time-series cross-sectional FGLS regression model. 198    &KDSWHU
 
 
wealthier people because such insurance policies tend to be rather expensive, and as 
such it is likely that SUHI payments are positively correlated with income. However, 
such an effect is not captured in the model because SHE is composed by two elements, 
public  and  CHI  expenditure,  that  cover  together  about  two  thirds  of  total  health 
expenditure. One can thus plausibly presume that the higher the average income of a 
canton, the lower the SHE, because individuals opt for SUHI.
127 
The unemployment rate is not statistically significant. Because unemployment is a larger 
phenomenon in French- and Italian-speaking cantons, it is possible that this effect has 
been captured by the dummy variable DLAT. The coefficient for the cantonal poverty 
rate is significantly different from zero at the 90% confidence level.
128 The relatively 
low significance of this coefficient can be explained by the fact that the poverty rate in 
Switzerland, measured with this indicator, is lower than in other European countries, and 
thus  this  influences  with  a  minor  tone  health  expenses.  In  those  cantons  where  the 
poverty rate is higher, health expenditure are influenced positively. 
The coefficient for the percentage of population over 75 is positive and significantly 
different from zero at the 99% confidence level. This result confirms the hypothesis that 
an older population tends to cause higher health expenditure, because of the increased 
incidence of illnesses as insanity or other chronic diseases, as well as proximity to the 
time of death of the elderly.
129 A 10% increase in people aged over 75 would cause a 
4.2% increase in health costs. The percentage of population under 5 also turns out to be 
statistically  significant.  The  negative  sign  of  the  coefficient  implies  that  a  younger 
                                                 
127 Note that the system has changed since 2001. This implies that from 2002 private insurances do not 
have to cover anymore part of the basic services. 
128 For a more detailed discussion of this issue please refer to Federal Office of Statistics (2002b). 
129 See Zweifel at al. (1999).  (PSLULFDODQDO\VLVRIWKH6ZLVVFDVH  199
 
 
population tends to cause lower health costs because young people are healthier and 
have less chronic diseases, which are thus less expensive to cure, than the elderly. 
The level of health expenditure is also conditioned on the mortality rate amenable to 
health care. This is an important variable because it can be considered as a proxy for the 
outcome of a health care sector. As expected, it has a negative sign and is statistically 
different from zero in both models. If the canton’s mortality rate amenable to health care 
decreases by 10%, then health expenditure increases by 1.7%. This result shows that 
cantons with low mortality rate have higher per-capita health expenditure, that is, more 
financial resources are spent in the system to forestall such preventable events. 
Another important factor explaining the model is the cantonal population density. This 
variable  has  been  used  as  a  proxy  for  the  urbanization  level  in  each  region  of 
Switzerland. It is highly significant and carries a positive sign. The reason for this is that 
the supply of medical services is higher in populated areas than in rural zones, and this 
causes lower transaction costs for people to access the medical infrastructure. This, in 
turn, might increase the probability of success of supply induced demand strategies. So 
the more populated is a specific region, the higher its per-capita health expenditure.  
As the previous section should have made clear, the direct democracy index represents a 
variable introduced in the model to test an hypothesis of the local public choice theory. 
Preferences expressed by citizens are captured. In the public choice literature it is argued 
that  the  more  citizens  can  express  their  preferences,  the  more  public  goods  will  be 
fashioned according to their tastes (see Oates, 1972 and 1999; Leu, 1986; Frey, 1994).
130 
                                                 
130 The local public choice theory indicates voice as one of the means through which individuals can and 
do express their preferences over public issues, especially in a decentralized context. Note that, in order to 
capture the federal dimension, other variables have been previously tested and introduced in the model 
(dummy variables for cantons, dummy variables for cantons with universities, dummy variable for cantons 
with university hospitals, and dummy variables for cantons exporting and importing patients respectively) 
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The coefficient of this variable is statistically different from zero at the 99% confidence 
level and carries a positive sign. A positive sign implies that in those cantons where 
direct democracy is stronger, health care expenditure is generally higher: it thus seems 
that citizens influence political decisions but this is not translated in gained efficiency 
for cost control.
131 It is possible that people act in a “not-so-wise” way and that, for 
instance, decide to have specific health structures that are maybe available in another 
canton just a few kilometers away. 
The elasticity of physician density has a positive value. In other words, an increase in the 
number  of  physicians  causes  an  increase  in  the  per-capita  cantonal  health  care 
expenditure.  A  10%  increase  in  physician density is linked  with  a 1.5%  increase  in 
health costs. This latter result is also confirmed by previous studies (Gerdtham et al., 
1998) that show a positive and significant relationship between health care expenditure 
and the density of doctors when paid FFS. This result may thus highlight the supplier-
induced demand problem. In fact, doctors in Switzerland are paid through a fee-for-
service scheme; not much of an incentive to contain the number of services given to 
patients.
132 
The density of acute beds is statistically significant at the 90% confidence level and has 
a negative sign. The dummy DLAT is significant at the 99% confidence level. It shows 
that French- and Italian-speaking cantons exhibit higher per-capita socialized health care 
expenditure than German cantons, and this result confirms previous findings of Rüefli 
and Vatter (2001). Various studies show that health care-related behavior, such as the 
demand for tobacco, medicaments and pharmaceuticals, eating habits or the extent of 
                                                 
131 It is interesting to bring to the fore the fact that in Switzerland popular initiatives and referendums are a 
central part of the democratic life of the country, and they are very frequently used. Citizens can also call a 
referendum on issues like cantonal hospital planning.  
132 For further details on the supplier-induced demand theory see McGuire (2000) and Domenighetti et al. 
(1997). (PSLULFDODQDO\VLVRIWKH6ZLVVFDVH  201
 
 
physical  exercise  vary  between  the  different  cultural  regions  (Federal  Office  of 
Statistics, 2000). Moreover, regions also differ in the perception of the social policy. 
Whereas most German-speaking areas prefer a liberal, subsidiary state that incorporates 
self-responsibility,  the  French-speaking  part  of  the  country  rather  follows  a  state-
centered model of welfare, placing more responsibility of the state as far as the provision 
of public services, such as health care, is concerned (Freitag, 2000).  
The time variable is positive and significantly different from zero. Hence, there is a 
tendency in all cantons toward higher per-capita health expenditure. This phenomenon 
might  be  explained  by  the  presence  on  the  market  of  new  and  more  expensive 
technologies, and by the fact that the package of health care benefits covered by the 




This chapter has shed light on the most important characteristics of the Swiss health care 
system, which is highly decentralized and assigns responsibilities for health matters to 
the 26 regional entities. The descriptive analysis has pointed out that in Switzerland, 
where the principle of federalism is historically very deep-rooted and an integral part of 
the set-up of the democracy, such decentralization of the health care sector has given rise 
to significant differences between cantons in terms of per-capita health care expenditure, 
equity  of  financing,  and  structure  of  the  supply.  The  current  system  has  many 
complexities: first, it is a social health insurance system with a multiplicity of health 
insurers  that  compete  with  each  other  but  offer  the  same  health  benefits  package 
(defined by the FHIL). Competition is not working properly: such a homogeneous good 
(health coverage) should be on the market with a unique price. Notwithstanding the 202    &KDSWHU
 
 
existence  of  the  FHIL,  health  premiums  vary  widely  between  and  within  cantons. 
Second,  the  Swiss  case  shows  that  a  decentralized  system  is  by  no  means  able  to 
guarantee  an  equitable  system  when  looked  at  from  a  national  viewpoint.  Health 
premiums  are  community-rated  and  thus  do  not  reflect  the  personal  income  of  the 
insured. In order to correct this inequity of financing there exists important financial 
flows among the principal stakeholders. This involves the presence of a large number of 
third-party payers, such as the Confederation (that intervenes with subsidies), cantons, 
municipalities, social insurances (accident insurance, invalidity insurance, and others), 
and the supplementary health insurance. As a consequence the system becomes heavy, 
complex  and  not  transparent.  Third,  on  account  of  federalism  the  situation  is 
characterized by a federal/national health insurance (it is, in fact, defined by the FHIL 
that was passed by the Confederation) managed with different approaches by the 26 
cantons. The consequence of this strong decentralization is the presence of territorial 
disparities in the public financing, regulatory settings, and production capacity. And it is 
in this context that it would be desirable to have more coordination among cantons, in 
order to establish national priorities. And in particular a more active intervention of the 
Confederation could help toning down these current marked regional differences and 
finding  the  adequate  instruments  to  control  effectively  the  growth  of  health  care 
expenditure. 
In order to better understand the regional differences in public health expenditure and 
CHI premiums an econometric analysis was performed with the estimation of a double 
logarithmic linear model of per-capita cantonal health care expenditure over the years 
1996-2002.  The  goal  is  to  highlight  the  determinants  that  explain  such  territorial 
differences.  The  model  determines  the  responsiveness  of  per-capita  expenditure  to 
cultural, demographic and structural characteristics of cantons. The results demonstrate 
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·  Demographic factors matter. The percentage of the elderly and of young people in 
the population cannot obviously be influenced by health policies. However, it is my 
belief that, faced with an ageing population exhibiting regional differences, a more 
active financial intervention by the central state would be highly desirable in order to 
avoid future fiscal distress at the cantonal level. 
·  The  French-  and  Italian-speaking  cantons  of  Switzerland  show  higher  per-capita 
socialized  health  expenditure.  This  implicitly  suggests  that  there  are  different 
patterns of consumption of health care services between the linguistic areas of the 
country. 
·  Physicians, when matched with a fee-for-service scheme, can balloon health care 
expenditure. A central, and thus more credible, control over physician density might 
help  reduce  the  increase  in  expenditure.  Alternatively,  the  Confederation  could 
eliminate  the  enforced  contracting  rule,  a  federal  regulation  that  forces  sickness 
funds to contract with every physician. By so doing, the level of competition would 
augment and this would both reduce FFS remuneration and regional disparities in 
physician density. 
·  The higher the population density in one area, the higher per-capita health outlays. 
Where the availability of health care infrastructure is high and barriers to access 
health services are practically non-existent, it is possible that supply induced demand 
strategies influence people’s behavior. 
The higher the citizens’ participation in the political decision making process, the higher 
the socialized health care expenditure. It thus seems that in those cantons where citizens 
are given a bigger chance to express their preferences, they presumably ask for more 






A single word “decentralization” has emerged to be a catch-all term in these very last 
years when one refers to changes applied to the organization of the health care system. 
Both  from  a  theoretical  and  empirical  viewpoint  there  is  not  a  clear  evidence  that 
decentralizing some functions to sub-layers of government brings with itself a better 
outcome.  Meaningful  tensions  are  created  by  the  basic  trade-off  of  decentralization, 
namely the realization of economies of scale and the internalization of externalities, on 
the one hand, and the consideration of local and heterogeneous preferences, on the other 
hand. Such a trade-off clearly hampers the set-up of defined recommendations whether a 
country should better centralize or decentralize health policies. This involves that such 
decision  should  be  taken  case-by-case,  namely  country-by-country,  and  implicitly 
suggests that decentralization is not a panacea equal for all countries. 
The  main  stated  arguments  in  favor  of  decentralization  are  the  capacities  of  local 
governments to shape policies according to the needs of their population, the idea that 
jurisdictions would act like private entities and enter into competition, and that citizens 
are protected by the danger of the  Leviathan.  Critics of fiscal federalism point their 
finger at the non-exploitation of economies of scale and scope if jurisdictions are too 
small, at the “race-to-the-bottom” possibilities, at the lack of managerial skills and the 
possible danger of lobbying in such a small environment. The empirical evidence is also 
mixed and sometimes inconclusive. What emerges is that decentralization of specific 
policies  and  programs  should  be  accompanied  by  a  consciousness  raising  of  some &RQFOXVLRQV  205
 
 
criteria and preconditions, the absence of which may maintain the status quo, that lead to 
its intended beneficial outcomes.  
As  reviewed  in  Chapter  3  different  historical,  cultural,  administrative  and  political 
circumstances have led to varying practices of decentralization in the health care sector 
across  OECD  countries.  Here  a  short  list  of  decentralization  preconditions  and 
considerations, gleaned from country experiences, is given: 
·  Decentralization  of  health  competencies  should  be  accompanied  by  a  clear 
delineation  of  responsibilities  among  the  different  stakeholders,  with  these 
responsibilities  formally  codified  in  legislation,  regulations,  or  other  binding 
instruments (Rondinelli 1999). 
·  Changes in the roles and responsibilities for the different actors in the health care 
sector,  particularly  those  for  local  government  health  officials,  should  be 
accompanied by training and plans for building capacity (LaFond and Brown 
2003; Pokharel 2001). 
·  In some countries management and planning health responsibilities are assigned 
to local governments but these latter have limited revenue-generating capacity. 
This is a weak form of decentralization because the sub-layers of government are 
likely to remain reliant on intergovernmental transfers from the center. Problems 
related to soft budget constraint can possibly arise. Local financing should be 
linked to managerial and planning health responsibilities so that “local politicians 
can deliver on their promises and bear the costs of their decisions”(Rondinelli, 
1999: Pokharel, 2001). 
·  The degree of decentralization varies considerably among the OECD countries 
analyzed. However, although health federalism implies a diminished role of the 
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likely to be most efficiently undertaken by the central government, which has 
better capabilities to monitor and enforce such tasks. 
·  Rondinelli (1999) points out that information relating to the costs of services 
provided,  delivery options,  and  available  resources should  be known  to  local 
communities  so  that  decision  making  can  be  informed  and  meaningful.  By 
having such information at disposal the local population is aware of the public 
sector performance and this allows people to react properly, if necessary. 
·  Much  of  the  success  of  health  federalism  depends  on  the  development  of 
coordination mechanisms and structures for learning the different experiences 
from each other, and improving the quality and performance of the overall health 
care system. 
It is thus clear from the previous description that decentralization per se cannot clearly 
be a cure for all the ills of a poorly functioning health care sector. Its success or failure 




One of the goals of this study was to highlight the main determinants of health care 
expenditure. Two different econometric models have been estimated with panel data 
techniques, which allow to observe the same country over time and several states at the 
same time point. Note that the main focus of the thesis has been the empirical part; a 
more theoretical model of federalism in the health care sector has not been considered 
here. Therefore,  I believe that the development of a theoretical relationship between &RQFOXVLRQV  207
 
 
decentralization and level of health care outlays could be an interesting topic for future 
research in this field. 
The first analysis has focused on a sample of OECD countries for the period 1990-2000. 
Besides  testing  for  the  classical  regressors  that  impact  on  health  care  expenditure, 
namely demographic, socio-economic, and production capacity factors, a set of dummy 
variables  relating  to  the  organizational  set-up  of  the  health  care  system  has  been 
introduced  in  the  model.  The  scope  was  to  understand  the  impact  of  the  cluster  of 
countries (NHSd, SHId, SHIc) on the level of per-capita health care expenditure. The 
research  highlights  that  per-capita  income  is  a  very  important  determinant  of  health 
expenses. The richer is a country, the higher its health costs. The result of health not 
being a luxury but a necessity good (Gerdtham et al., 1998) was confirmed here. The 
unemployment rate is another variable that increases health costs. Unemployment is a 
constraint  for  the  development  and  the  improvement  of  the  public  sector  and  has 
negative repercussions on the health status of a population. It is acknowledged that a bad 
health status causes higher costs to the individual and the society. The age structure of 
the population matters as well. On the one hand, an ageing population tends to swell 
costs, because of the major incidence of chronic and incurable diseases. On the other 
hand, a young population helps to keep low per-capita expenditure. With respect to the 
production capacity factors, the Kmenta model shows that it is the density of physicians 
that  balloons  health  outlays.  Moreover,  in  this  study  a  new  variable  measuring  the 
degree of effectiveness of a health care system (PYLL) has been introduced. The result 
suggests that whenever preventable deaths increase, it is because less money is spent on 
health issues. The three dummies characterizing the organizational set-up of health care 
sectors are all statistically significant and positive. The policy implications of this result 
are  very  interesting:  SHI  decentralized  systems  appear  to  be  the  most  expensive 
throughout  the  decade  of  investigation.  NHS  decentralized  nations  have  been  more 208    &KDSWHU
 
 
capable  than  SHI  centralized  and  decentralized  countries  to  hold  down  the  level  of 
health  care  expenditure.  Policy  makers  should  then  approach  the  decentralization 
process with caution when it comes to apply it in a context of SHI scheme. The higher 
number of stakeholders involved in the decision process, the complex financial fluxes 
between health insurances, state, citizens, and contribution collector are typical features 
of SHI countries. Furthermore, when the degree of decentralization of health policy is 
extremely marked, coordination problems might arise among health actors, thus adding 
another layer of complexity to the overall system. All this might result into an absence 
of central control over health issues and increasing intra-national differences in terms of 
per-capita costs and service delivery.  
The result of this thesis is in line with other major studies in this field (Saltman et al., 
2004) that show that SHI systems are more costly than NHSs; however, Saltman et al. 
(2004) find that SHI schemes succeed in reaching a higher level of satisfaction among 
the population, although this comes “at a price”. When a country has a SHI system it 
seems thus more suited to have a centralized organization if the major goal of politicians 
is to contain costs. NHSs have experienced lower expenditure throughout the decade. 
One  motive  is  that  these  countries  are  characterized  by  a  single-payer  system  and 
citizens normally have a restriction in the access to specialist care.  
The reader should be reminded that the analysis has exclusively pinpointed the issue 
relating to the determinants affecting the level of health care costs. This research points 
out that decentralized SHI systems incur higher costs level; but concomitantly these 
countries might well be spending more but also offer more in terms of supply of medical 
services, patient choice, and quality of care. These aspects are not “captured” by the 
econometric model presented in this study. For future research, it would be interesting to 
collect data for more years and check whether these differences of per-capita health care 
expenditure among the four country groups tend to widen, narrow, or to remain stable. &RQFOXVLRQV  209
 
 
Moreover, it would be interesting to capture the relationship and trade-off between the 
level of outlays and the quality of the system.  
The second empirical part of the research has drawn the attention to an intra-national 
analysis  of  health  care  expenditure  determinants  in  Switzerland.  The  Swiss  fiscal 
federalism is characterized by the strong principle of subsidiarity. Responsibilities are 
shared among the three levels of government in almost all fields of public intervention; 
however, health care is a cantonal policy and this has caused increasing disparities in the 
per-capita health expenditure. This actually raises a doubt on the real gain in efficiency 
of  the  Swiss  decentralized  health  care  sector.  A  trade-off  is  emerging  between  the 
commitment to social citizenship of the central government and the provision of services 
that  are  tailored  to  the  preferences  of  the  local  population.  Switzerland  is  a  SHI 
decentralized country and it spends a vast amount of resources in health, being second 
only to the USA. The ample autonomy granted to cantons has exasperated diversities 
among  them.  Both  public  outlays  and  health  insurance  premiums  vary  considerably 
between cantons, and there are differences in the production structure and capacity. The 
Confederation does not play an important role yet in the definition of a national health 
policy, although in these last  years its position in such sector has increased, mainly 
through rendering health insurance compulsory to the whole population. In my opinion 
the  Confederation  should  step  in  and  actively  intervene  to  town  down  such  marked 
regional differences. The creation of a coordination mechanism could be a first move by 
the  central  state;  this  would  smooth  out  the  current  differences  and  would  set  up  a 
normative framework equal to all cantons. A higher fraction of financial involvement 
should also be borne by the center in order to avoid future cantonal financial distress. 
The main econometric results show that an ageing population augment health outlays 
and that costs are also swelled where the density of population is high. The mortality 
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increases less resources are spent in health, de facto worsening the outcomes of the 
health sector. The density of physicians is another regressor that increases the level of 
health expenditure and it possibly points out a supplier-induced demand problem in a 
system characterized by FFS payments for its providers of care. An interesting result 
concerns  the  French-  and  Italian-speaking  cantons.  The  coefficient  for these  cantons 
exhibit  a  positive  sign,  thus  implying  that  the  level  of  per-capita  socialized  health 
expenditure is higher than in German areas. Therefore there are different patterns of 
health  care  consumption  in  the  linguistic  regions  of  Switzerland.  The  public  choice 
variable (index of direct democracy) highlights an interesting aspect; in those cantons 
where citizens are granted a bigger involvement in shaping political decision making 
processes,  health  outlays  are  higher.  It  can  be  inferred  that  citizens  are  probably 
“myopic” when voting for specific issues, in the sense that they might be well taking 
into consideration the avowed advantages of having more goods and services at the local 
level, but they concomitantly ignore the costs associated to them. 
The empirical results of this thesis point out that when decentralization is linked to a SHI 
set-up, there might be problems in containing the level of health expenditure in the long-
run, and it is possible that regional disparities arise (as in the Swiss case). Several factors 
have,  of  course,  an  impact  on  the  level  of  outlays  (demographic,  socio-economic, 
cultural, and structural) but the institutional framework of the health care sector also 
matters. If the goal of politicians is to maintain expenditure at a relatively stable level 
and  avoid  future  cost  explosions,  then  one  should  question  whether  it  is  useful  to 
decentralize in a context of SHI scheme. It is clear that the situation varies from country 
to country: in Switzerland, for example, there are nowadays rudimentary discussions 
about changing the health care delivery system and giving more power to the center, 
since health federalism is deeply ingrained in the democracy of the country. However, 
for those nations aiming at devolving health responsibilities to sublevels of government &RQFOXVLRQV  211
 
 
it should be kept in mind that decentralization does not necessarily mean better cost 
control  in  the  long-term,  and  this  could  give  rise  to  additional  constraints  to  the 





$8675$/,$: 6 states and 2 independent territories. 
7<3(2)+($/7+&$5(6<67(0: SHI 
*(1(5$/'(6&5,37,21: The system is mainly tax-funded and there is an ample 
role of the private sector. 
&$7(*25<: Decentralized. 
0$1$*(0(17: The states administer and deliver many health services (principally 
public  health  and  public  hospital services),  while  local  government  has  only  limited 
health care functions. 
)81',1*: The national  government (Commonwealth) funds the bulk of the health 
system, and subsidizes pharmaceuticals and aged residential care. It does not provide 
health services. States also fund the health care sector, but their role is much smaller 
than  the  Commonwealth.  The  Commonwealth  collects  the  bulk  of  revenue,  being 
empowered under the Constitution to collect income taxes. The states, and to a minor 
extent local governments, are responsible for most of outlays. 
 
 
$8675,$: 9 Länder. 
7<3(2)+($/7+&$5(6<67(0: SHI 
*(1(5$/'(6&5,37,21: The system is based on a national and compulsory SHI 
that  covers  the  whole  population  and  is  supplemented  by  private  health  insurance. 
Affiliation to health insurers is on occupation. 
&$7(*25<: Decentralized. 
0$1$*(0(17: Strong leadership by the Länder. They are responsible for carrying 
out  federal  directives  and  implementing  laws  and  policies.  The  federal  government 
delegates the task of public health administration to the Länder. 
)81',1*: Roughly half of health expenditure is financed through SHI contributions. 
One fifth is raised through general taxation. More than a quarter is financed through 
private  households.The  federal  government funds slightly  less  than  2% of  all  health 
spending.  Länder  and  communities  finance  around  16%  of  Austria’s  health  care 




%(/*,80: 10 provinces. 
7<3(2)+($/7+&$5(6<67(0: SHI 
*(1(5$/ '(6&5,37,21: The health care system is based on compulsory health 
insurance covering the whole population. There is the possibility to take out a private 
health insurance, which still remains very small in terms of market volume. People have 
free choice of health insurance. Patients have freedom of choice between a wide range of 
independent providers. 
&$7(*25<: Centralized. 
0$1$*(0(17: The system is characterized by a strong leadership of the central 
government. Health insurance is part of the social security system, so it has remained 
under the responsibility of the federal government. 
)81',1*: The federal government fixes the overall budget for health care services 





&$1$'$: 10 provinces and 2 territories. 
7<3(2)+($/7+&$5(6<67(0: SHI 
*(1(5$/'(6&5,37,21: Health care is financed primarily through taxation, both 
provincial  and  federal.  All  eligible  residents  are  covered  by  their  provincial  health 
insurance plans. The universality principle requires that provincial plans cover 100% of 
eligible residents. Supplementary health coverage is also offered. 
&$7(*25<: Decentralized. 
0$1$*(0(17: The hands-on management of health services is fundamentally the 
responsibility of each individual province or territory. Through their respective central 
health ministries or departments of health, they plan, finance, and evaluate the provision 
of hospital care, physician and allied health care services, some aspects of prescription 
care and public health. They also supervise those specific responsibilities delegated to 
other non-governmental agencies. The Canadian framework has ensured a health care 
system which, while composed of ten provincial and two territorial health insurance 
programs, exhibits the same fundamental characteristics across the country and yet also 
reflects provincial priorities. No two provincial programs are exactly alike in terms of 
organizational structure, planning, regulation, management, financing or supplementary 
health service. 
)81',1*: The federal government assists in the financing of provincial health care 
services through financial transfers.  However, the federal government’s contribution to 
provincial  health  care  funding  has  declined  over  the  years  as  the  mechanisms  for 
transferring money to the provinces were modified. Federal funding is transferred to the 
provinces  as  a  combination  of  cash  contributions  and  tax points  (taxing  power).  To 
receive  federal  funds,  however,  provincial  insurance  programs  must  adhere  to  the 
principles stated in the Canada Health Act.
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'(10$5.: 13 counties. 
7<3(2)+($/7+&$5(6<67(0: NHS
*(1(5$/ '(6&5,37,21:  After the  abolition  of  the  health  insurance  scheme  in 
1973 Denmark changed to a single-payer system, predominantly tax-based. The whole 
population is covered. 
&$7(*25<: Decentralized. 
0$1$*(0(17:  Counties  have  full  responsibilities  for  running  and  planning 
hospitals and primary health care services. 
)81',1*: The main sources of financing come from state, counties and municipal 
taxation.  Counties  and  municipal  taxes  vary  from  region  to  region.  The  central 
government thus intervenes for redistribution and financial equalization. 
Counties  financed  87%  of  total  health  expenditure  through  local  taxes.  The  central 
government financed the remaining 13% (Polton, 2003). 
 
 
),1/$1': 6 provinces. 
7<3(2)+($/7+&$5(6<67(0: NHS
*(1(5$/ '(6&5,37,21: The system is predominantly tax-based. All people are 
covered. Health care is mainly organized as a public service at the three different levels 
of government (state, provinces and municipalities). 
&$7(*25<: Decentralized. 
0$1$*(0(17: These latter have by law the duty to organize, deliver and plan the 
health care services (in general they are in charge of organizing basic services, such as 
education and social services). 
)81',1*: Health care is funded out of national and local taxes. In 1999 about 43% of 
total health care costs were financed by the municipalities, about 18% by the state, 15% 
by the National Health Insurance
134 and about 24% by households. 
 
                                                 
134 The NHI is a scheme introduced in the 1960s that partly reimburses the costs of drugs, private medical 




)5$1&(: 26 regions. 
7<3(2)+($/7+&$5(6<67(0: SHI
*(1(5$/'(6&5,37,21: The health care system is based on a national universal 
and compulsory health insurance system, which is linked to occupation and place of 
residence. About 98% of the population is covered by health insurance. There is no 
gatekeeping, patients have free choice of practitioner, who is paid FFS, and waiting lists 
are rare. 
&$7(*25<: Centralized. 
0$1$*(0(17: Legislation, management, the control over the health care system 
and of development programs, the creation of new medical posts and the budget are all 
set centrally. 
)81',1*: The main sources of financing come from health insurance schemes. Taxes 




*(50$1<: 16 Länder. 
7<3(2)+($/7+&$5(6<67(0: SHI
*(1(5$/'(6&5,37,21: The health care system is a social insurance based model 
financed through decentralized, self-administered non-profit sickness funds. Since 1996 
citizens  have  free  choice  of  fund.  Before  this  reform,  citizens  were  traditionally 
affiliated  to  sickness  funds  according  to  geographical  and/or  job  characteristics. 
Approximately 75% of the population is covered by compulsory health insurance. 14% 
of citizens (high income earners) have to take out an insurance policy themselves. There 
is also the possibility to take out a private insurance policy. 
&$7(*25<: Decentralized. 
0$1$*(0(17: The Länder are responsible for providing health care services. In 
each  Land  the  regional  associations  of  health  insurers  negotiate  with  the  regional 
associations of doctors to determine aggregate payments to primary health care, general 
practitioners, specialists, and hospitals. 
)81',1*: Social health insurance contributions account for the bulk of funding in the 
German health care system. Taxes do not play an important role; however, they are 
raised through Länder payroll taxes, and are augmented by federal matching funds for 




*5((&(: 13 regions. 
7<3(2)+($/7+&$5(6<67(0: NHS
*(1(5$/'(6&5,37,21: In 1983 Greece changed from a SHI system to a NHS, 
which  is  nowadays  still  financed  by  a  mix  of  tax-  and  insurance-based  statutory 
financing. Greece is thus still experiencing a transition period, moving from a Bismarck 
to a Beveridge model. The 1983 reform plan concentrated exclusively on the provision 
of health care services, and did not deal with the financing side. Membership in the 
funds is compulsory and is based on occupation. Most of funds are public entities and 
operate under the rigid control of the central government. 100% of people are covered. 
&$7(*25<: Centralized. 
0$1$*(0(17:  Regions  should  be  theoretically  responsible  for  planning  and 
managing the health care system. However, due to lack of human resources and of a 
managerial  structure,  they  have  not  become  operational  yet.  Thus,  regions  have  no 
responsibilities at present. 
)81',1*: The central government retains control of financing responsibilities. Both 
municipalities and communities play no significant role in the financing of health care 
services, except in large cities (such as Athens). 
 
 
,5(/$1': 26 counties. 
7<3(2)+($/7+&$5(6<67(0: NHS
*(1(5$/'(6&5,37,21: The health care system is mostly tax-funded. The whole 
population is covered. A voluntary health insurance (VHI) is also offered to citizens and 
has played an important role in the Irish health system for almost 50 years. In 2000 
almost 50% of the population had a coverage with the VHI. 
&$7(*25<: Decentralized. 
0$1$*(0(17: Provision and management of services is the role of the 8 regional 
health boards (RHBs) present on the Irish territory. The system is now undergoing the 
most extensive reforms since 1970. The RHBs have been abolished; from January 2005 
a  Health  Service  Executive  (HSE)  is  managing  services  as  a  single  national  entity, 
accountable directly to the Ministry for Health and Children. 
)81',1*:  Public  funding  for  health  services  is  determined  annually  in  negotiations 
between the Department of Finance and the Department of Health and Children. Together 




,7$/<: 20 regions. 
7<3(2)+($/7+&$5(6<67(0: NHS
*(1(5$/'(6&5,37,21: The NHS covers the whole population. Since the 1970s 
it created jurisdictional conflicts among the different levels of authority established by 
law. Responsibility was not clearly divided and health care was not planned coherently 
at  the  national  and  regional  levels.  The  sharp  separation  between  central  financing 
responsibilities and regional and local spending power was seen as the main reason for 
the constantly rising health care expenditure. Faced with these problems, a process of 
regionalization has started in the 1990s. In 1997 there was the first step towards fiscal 
federalism, as it provided some sources of autonomous financing to the regions. In 2000 
the National Health Fund has been replaced by various regional taxes. 
&$7(*25<: Centralized. 
0$1$*(0(17:  Planning  and  management  responsibilities  between  the  central 
government and regions were not clearly assigned and specified. This led to a situation 
of high discomfort with the system. The dissatisfaction with the organization of the NHS 
led  to  its  regionalization,  which  was  started  in  the  late  1990s  (this  is  why  Italy  is 
considered  a  health  centralized  country  for  the  period  1990-2000).  Since  2000  the 
Ministry  of  Health  is  in  charge  of  political  planning  and  regulation,  and  reviewing 
regional legislation. The regions are the main administrative level of the NHS and are 
responsible for implementing decisions taken by the Parliament and for providing health 
services.  The  Health  Units  (approx.  650)  are  in  charge  of  the  daily  management  of 
health services and for coordination between hospitals. 
)81',1*: The health care system is tax-funded. Prior to the 2000 decentralization 
reform  the  funding  was  completely  centralized  and  the central  government  provided 
financial  resources  to  the  regions.  These  latter  considered  the  amount  of  financial 
resources they got to be insufficient to satisfy the health care needs of their populations, 
so they consistently run into deficits. The central government had then to intervene in 
order to bail them out. 
Since 2000 the NHS is funded through general taxation collected centrally, but regions 
also partly finance their health care units through various regional taxes. Those regions 
unable to raise sufficient resources will receive additional funding from the National 




/8;(0%285*: 3 districts. 
7<3(2)+($/7+&$5(6<67(0: SHI
*(1(5$/'(6&5,37,21: The fundamental principles of the health care system are 
the free choice of the provider by patients and compulsory health insurance. 99% of the 
population is covered by health insurance. Citizens are allocated to health insurers on the 
basis  of  their  professional  occupation.  They  are  also  offered  a  voluntary  health 
insurance, which is, however, not highly used. 
&$7(*25<: Centralized. 
0$1$*(0(17: There is no decentralization in the health care system. The Ministry 
of Health is in charge of planning and organizing the system, establishing new hospital 
facilities and extending the existing ones. 
)81',1*: The health insurance has three sources of finance; contributions from the 
state (a maximum of 40% of the total), from employers (about 30% of the total) and 
from  insured  individuals  (about  30%).  Contributions  are  collected  centrally  for  all 
branches of social security by the Common Center of Social Security and are allocated 
to the Union of Sickness Funds. 
 
 
7+(1(7+(5/$1'6: 12 provinces. 
7<3(2)+($/7+&$5(6<67(0: SHI
*(1(5$/'(6&5,37,21: In the Netherlands, three parallel compartments (named 
pillars) of insurance coexist: the first compartmentis a national health insurance scheme 
for  exceptional  medical  expenses  (it  is  compulsory  for  the  whole  population).  The 
second compartmentconsists of different regulatory regimes; one for compulsory health 
insurance  through  sickness  funds  for  those  under  a  certain  income,  and  another  for 
private  health  insurance,  mostly  voluntary.  The  third  compartment is  voluntary 
supplementary health insurance. 
&$7(*25<: Centralized. 
0$1$*(0(17:  The  government  has  ultimate  control  over  planning  and 
management of health care facilities. 
)81',1*: The central government has responsibility for and financial control of most 
aspects  of  health  care.  The Central Agency  for  Health  Care  Tariffs  exercises  strong 
control over the fees and charges set by providers and oversees the setting of hospital 




1(:=($/$1': 12 regions. 
7<3(2)+($/7+&$5(6<67(0: NHS
*(1(5$/ '(6&5,37,21:  The  health  care  system  is  funded  mainly  through 
nationally taxation revenue. Health organizations are divided into two types of agencies: 
those  that  identify  and  purchase  health  care  services,  and  those  that  deal  with  the 
provision of health care services. There is the possibility to take out a private health 
insurance, but this is not so widespread in New Zealand. 
&$7(*25<: Centralized. 
0$1$*(0(17: The central state has retained overall responsibility for ensuring the 
provision of health care services. 
)81',1*: The health care system is centrally funded with no funds, except for some 
environmental health funds, channeled through local government. 
 
 
125:$<: 19 counties. 
7<3(2)+($/7+&$5(6<67(0: NHS
*(1(5$/ '(6&5,37,21: Norway has a mainly tax-financed health care system. 
The  three  tiers  of  government  (central  state,  counties,  and  municipalities)  were  all 
involved in the organization and funding of the system, prior to the change in 2002 (that 
caused a re-centralization of the health care system). As all inhabitants are covered by 
the public system, voluntary health insurance has not played a significant role so far. 
&$7(*25<: Decentralized. 
0$1$*(0(17: Counties are responsible for planning and provision of specialized 
care. Municipalities deliver and manage primary health care and social services. 
)81',1*:  Contrary  to  other  Scandinavian  countries,  Norway  has  a  centrally  tax-
funded health care system. Municipalities and counties can also draw on local taxes in 




32578*$/: 7 regions. 
7<3(2)+($/7+&$5(6<67(0: NHS
*(1(5$/ '(6&5,37,21: The Portuguese health care system is characterized by 
three coexisting systems: the National Health Service (NHS), special public and private 
insurance  schemes  for  certain  professions  (health  subsystems)  and  voluntary  private 
health  insurance,  such  that  some  groups  have  double  or  even  triple  coverage. 
Decentralization  is  a  formal  keyword  of  the  organization  of  the  health  care  system; 
however, the current system still maintains the features of a highly centralized NHS. 
&$7(*25<: Centralized. 
0$1$*(0(17: Responsibility for the functioning, organization and management is 
shared between the Ministry of Health and the five Regional Health Authorities (RHAs). 
However,  in  practice  responsibility  for  planning  and  resource  allocation  in  the 
Portuguese health care system has remained highly centralized even after the creation of 
the five current RHAs. 
)81',1*: The hospital budget is defined and allocated by the central state. The RHAs 
have autonomy over primary care budget setting and spending. However, their work is 
strongly influenced by the Ministry of Health. 




63$,1: 17 autonomous communities. 
7<3(2)+($/7+&$5(6<67(0: NHS
*(1(5$/ '(6&5,37,21: The Spanish health care system has been characterized 
for about two decades by a situation of “asymmetric federalism”. Some autonomous 
communities (AC) were given substantial planning powers already during the 1980s and 
1990s, while some others were still under the control of the central government. The 
central government maintains its power to fund the system. 
&$7(*25<: Centralized. 
0$1$*(0(17: The Spanish health care system underwent a major reform in 2002, 
when all the 17 AC gained full autonomy from the central government for the planning 
and management of their health care systems. However, during the period of analysis 
(1990-2000) the National Institute of Health (INSALUD) was the body in charge of 
organizing the social security health care services in 10 AC. The other 7 AC had already 
achieved  complete  autonomy  and  responsibility  for  the  management  of  health  care 
services  in  the  1980s  and  1990s.  Spain  has  been  catalogued  as  a  centralized  state 
because decentralization was a piecemeal process, and took considerable time and effort 
to continue it. The way in which responsibilities were shifted to the AC varied between 
them, causing great confusion in the overall system. Furthermore, the coexistence of 
relatively independent AC and those where central government continued to manage 
directly  health  care  services  had  blurred  the  distinction  between  the  functions  that  
corresponded to the ministry as a health authority at national level and those related to 
the direct supervision and management of health care in a given part of the country. 
)81',1*: Funding is collected centrally. In year 2000, 98% of total public health care 
expenditure was funded through general taxation, while the remaining 2% was generated 
by care provided for patients with other types of coverage.  Most taxes are centrally 
raised, due to the limited fiscal autonomy of Spanish regional and local governments. 
For example, in 1996, taxes generated by AC represented less than 9% of total public 
health care financing, while the equivalent figure for local governments was 0.3%. This 




6:('(1: 21 counties. 
7<3(2)+($/7+&$5(6<67(0: NHS
*(1(5$/ '(6&5,37,21:  The  Swedish  NHS  is  regionally-based  and  publicly 
operated. It involves all layers of government: national, regional (counties), and local 
(municipalities). Private health care is very limited in Sweden, accounting for less than 
1% of total health care revenue and providing only elective coverage to citizens. 
&$7(*25<: Decentralized. 
0$1$*(0(17: Counties are responsible for delivery, planning and management of 
health  care  services,  with  some  notable  exceptions  where  municipalities  have  the 
responsibility. About 85% of the counties’ activities are devoted to health care issues. 
Municipalities  are  in  charge  of  organizing  social  welfare  services,  environmental 
hygiene, nursing homes and home health care. 
)81',1*:  The  political  responsibility  for  financing  health  care  services  has  been 
delegated  to  county  councils.  Municipalities  finance  long-term  care  for  the  elderly, 
disabled, and long-term for psychiatric care. Local municipalities are not subordinated or 
accountable to the county councils. The laws on health care and social services allow the 
county councils and municipalities to impose taxes to finance their activities. 
 
 
6:,7=(5/$1': 26 cantons. 
7<3(2)+($/7+&$5(6<67(0: SHI
*(1(5$/'(6&5,37,21: The health care system is insurance-based. Premiums are 
community-rated, so they are not linked to an individual’s wealth. Since 1996 it became 
mandatory to take out a health insurance  policy, so 100% of the population is now 
covered. Compared to other OECD health care systems, the Swiss shoulder a significant 
large  portion  of  health  care  costs,  through  out-of-pocket  payments  or  private 
supplementary health insurance. 
&$7(*25<: Decentralized. 
0$1$*(0(17:  The  health  care  system  is  highly  decentralized.  There  exists  no 
national  Ministry  of  Health.  Cantons  are  the  main  bodies  responsible  for  planning, 
organizing,  managing,  and  providing  health  care  services  to  their  own  population. 
Municipalities are in charge of planning and organizing nursing homes and home care 
services. There exists 26 different health care systems within the country, as no two 
systems are exactly alike. 
)81',1*:  The  federal  intervention  in  health  care  has  traditionally  been  kept  to  a 
minimum. Much of the responsibility for financing goes to cantons and municipalities, 





*5($7%5,7$,1: 86 counties. 
7<3(2)+($/7+&$5(6<67(0: NHS
*(1(5$/ '(6&5,37,21:  Health care  services  are  provided  mainly  through  the 
National  Health  Service,  providing  universal  coverage  and  financed  mainly  through 
general  taxation  and  a  small  contribution  of  the  National  Insurance  Contribution 
Scheme. 
&$7(*25<: Centralized. 
0$1$*(0(17:  The  Ministry  of  Health  is  responsible  for  the  Regional  Health 
Authorities  (RHAs),  District  Health  Authorities  (DHAs),  Family  Health  Services 
Authorities and hospitals. The reforms in the 1990s designed to increase the quality and 
efficiency of health care services through liberalization, decentralization and the creation 
of quasi-market did not impact that much, because the degree of autonomy granted by 
these arrangements was very limited. Both purchasers and providers are accountable to 
the regional offices of the NHS Executive. In addition, the NHS Executive exerts strong 
control over DHAs and trusts in terms of planning and service priorities, and RHAs are 
part of the NHS Executive itself. 
)81',1*: The NHS is financed mainly through central government taxation together 




AUS  Australia 
A  Austria 
B  Belgium 
CAN  Canada 
DK  Denmark 
FIN  Finland 
F  France 
D  Germany 
GR  Greece 
IRL  Ireland 
I  Italy 
LUX  Luxembourg 
NL  The Netherlands 
NZ  New Zealand 
N  Norway 
P  Portugal 
E  Spain 
S  Sweden 
CH  Switzerland 
UK  United Kingdom 











Source: Adapted version from “Finanzströme im Gesundheitswesen”, BMFG (Austrian 





Source: Adapted from The Reform of Health Care – A comparative Analysis of Seven 
OECD Countries, Health Policy Studies No. 2, OECD (1992); Department of Health and 

























Note: The benefits-in-cash, which are not included in most of the diagrams, are included 
here. 
* l.t.c.: long-term care. 
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Source:  The  Reform  of  Health  Care  –  A  comparative  Analysis  of  Seven  OECD 
Countries,  Health  Policy  Studies  No.  2,  OECD  (1992);  Department  of  Health  and 





*  Outpatient  care,  household  advisory  bureau,  therapeutic  appliances  and  thermal 
services, care for poor people, for Italian who live abroad and for foreigners who live in 
Italy. 




















Source: IGSS (Inspection Générale de la Sécurité Sociale) Luxembourg (1998) 
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THE NETHERLANDS (1999) 
 
Source:  $GDSWHGIURPThe Reform of Health Care – A comparative Analysis of Seven 
OECD Countries, Health Policy Studies No. 2, OECD (1992) $QQH[  239
 
 
NEW ZEALAND (1998) 
 
 
* and other providers, such as laboratories and radiology clinics. 
** relating to contracts with the Health Funding Authority. 
















Source:  The  Reform  of  Health  Care  –  A  comparative  Analysis  of  Seven  OECD 





























Source:Adapted from,The Reform of Health Care – A comparative Analysis of Seven 
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Source:  Federal Office of Statistics (1999) $QQH[  245
 
 
UNITED KINGDOM (after the 1999 reform) 
 
Source: Department of Health (2000) 246    $QQH[
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2003) 
 
*Health care for the 14% of the population lacking health insurance coverage is financed by publicly 
subsidized charity care and patients’ out-of-pocket payments to health care providers. 
**Patient  cost-sharing  arrangements  vary  widely  by  type  of  coverage.  Indemnity  coverage  generally 
includes  deductibles  and  co-insurance.  Managed  care  plans  often  require  co-payments  s  for  certain 
services. 




AG  Aargau 
AI  Appenzell-Innerrhoden 
AR  Appenzell-Ausserrhoden 
BS  Basel City 
BL  Basel Land 
BE  Bern 
FR  Fribourg 
GE  Geneva 
GL  Glarus 
GR  Graubünden 
JU  Jura 
LU  Lucerne 
NE  Neuchâtel 
NW  Nidwalden 
OW  Obwalden 
SH  Schaffhausen 
SZ  Schwyz 
SO  Solothurn 
SG  St. Gallen 248    $QQH[
 
 
TG  Thurgau 
TI  Ticino 
UR  Uri 
VS  Valais 
VD  Vaud 
ZG  Zug 
ZH  Zurich 
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